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Abstract 
The classical and folk theory view on metaphor and figurative language assumes 
that metaphor is a rare occurrence, restricted to the realms of poetry and rhetoric. 
Recent results have, however, unarguably shown that figurative language of various 
complexity exhibits great systematicity and is pervasive in everyday language and 
texts. 
I f the ubiquity of figurative language cannot be disputed, however, any natural 
language processing (NLP) system aiming at processing text beyond a restricted 
scope has to be able to deal wi th figurative language. This is particularly true i f 
the processing is to be based on deep techniques, where a deep analysis of the input 
is performed. 
The L O L I T A NLP system employs deep techniques and, therefore, must be 
capable of dealing w i t h figurative input. The task of natural language (NL) gener-
ation is affected by the naturalness of figurative language, too. For i f metaphors are 
frequent and natural, N L generation not capable of handling figurative language 
w i l l seem restricted and its output unnatural. 
This thesis describes the work undertaken to examine the options for extending 
the L O L I T A system in the direction of figurative language processing and the 
results of this project. The work critically examines previous approaches and their 
contribution to the field, before outlining a solution which follows the principles of 
natural language engineering. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis describes current work in the field of processing figurative natural lan-
guage (NL) in the framework of the large-scale natural language processing (NLP) 
system L O L I T A ^ . The work was carried out as postgraduate research in close co-
operation w i t h other researchers and academic staff of Durham University's Labo-
ratory for Natural Language Engineering. This work is interdisciplinary, drawing 
on different sources for methodological, empirical and theoretical inspiration, most 
notably computational linguistics in the form of natural language engineering (see 
Sect. 2.1), cognitive science and psychology, socio-linguistics and general hnguistics 
as well as artificial intelligence and software engineering. 
1.1 Problem outline 
NLP concerns itself w i th the analysis, understanding and generation of NL , in the 
f o r m of wr i t ten texts or spoken language. NLP systems, therefore, deal wi th an 
array of tasks, one of them being the assignment of a meaning to N L input. 
U n t i l recently, figurative language was commonly seen as deviant, as an embel-
lishment and a rhetorical means for persuasion and was generally not regarded as 
a part of everyday language worth investigating outside the scholarly study of po-
etics, Hterature and philosophy. Literal language was regarded as the only concise 
way of transferring information and as the only true representation of reality. 
Most theories of meaning postulate that literal meaning is the primary mean-
^Large-scale object-based linguistic interactor, translator and analyser 
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ing of any linguistic expression ( t ru th conditional semantics [Davidson 1979, Car-
nap 1956], speech act theory [Searle 1975, Searle 1979], conversational implicature 
Grice 1975]) and that instances of figurative speech such as metaphor and irony 
are conscious violations of semantic rules indicating a secondary or speaker mean-
ing which is distinct f rom the invariable word or sentence meaning (based on the 
compositionaUty principle, [Frege 1952]). I t is assumed, furthermore, that any 
meaning conveyed in a non-literal expression could be conveyed equally well by 
a l i teral paraphrase (the expressibility principle, [Searle 1969]) or that non-Hteral 
language is indeed so peripheral to language and used for such l imited purposes 
that i t is not necessary to extend the study of meaning to such instances [Black 
1962 . 
Work carried out by an increasing number of researchers, most notably in the 
fields of psychology and (cognitive) linguistics over the past 15 years has, how-
ever, not only shown undeniable empirical evidence against the idea of figura-
t ive language being peripheral, but has also uncovered highly systematic figurative 
structures which are central to human cognition in general and to one rather cen-
t ra l manifestation of cognitive activity in particular, namely, human language (see 
Chap. 3). 
I f , however, figurative language is pervasive in everyday NL, a system that 
concerns itself w i th processing N L certainly has to be able to process figurative 
language. Particularly i f the input is unrestricted, i.e. i f any kind of text is wi thin 
the range of possible input, and figurative language cannot be explicitly ruled out. 
This is especially true of systems that do not perform 'shallow' NL tasks such as 
morphological analysis, simple parsing or pattern-matching style content scanning. 
As Noble observed: "an NLP system (in the fullest sense of the term) which cannot 
explain the mechanism of metaphor has failed" [Noble 1988 . 
The L O L I T A system is based on deep understanding techniques and therefore 
must be able to process figurative language as an integral part of the range of NL 
tasks i t set out to perform. Since the L O L I T A system is t rying to understand 
its input and is performing such tasks as query (where information can be added 
to the system's knowledge base ( K N B ) via NL input and queries on the existing 
knowledge can be performed) or reasoning (where the knowledge gleaned f rom the 
N L input is extended), the meaning of figurative input has to be computed. 
I f , for example, input like 'Becker killed Lendl on the centre court' is encoun-
tered, the meaning of this sentence is analysed and stored in the K N B to allow for 
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fur ther access, e.g. for reasoning. A literal reading would entail that Lendl is dead 
after the event mentioned took place, that Becker caused Lendl to be dead, that 
a murder (or manslaughter) took place, that the event was located at the 'centre 
court ' and so on. A query about the state of health of Lendl would therefore result 
in the information that Lendl was dead. 
I f a more fitting figurative interpretation were made, a different result would be 
obtained, e.g. that Becker competed successfully against Lendl, that Lendl lost in 
a competition, that the competition was fierce, that Becker used force and, most 
important ly, that both entities were presumably alive and well after the event. 
Taking into account the results f rom other work, i t wi l l be shown in Chap. 3 that 
this is no isolated, contrived example and that highly conventionalised metaphors 
pervade all texts to such an extent that they are hardly consciously recognised. 
Af te r considering related work, we wi l l present a detailed problem statement, 
elaborating on which sub-tasks figurative language processing consists of and which 
requirements have to be met in order to allow the treatment of figurative language. 
These results w i l l then be examined in the light of the L O L I T A system and the 
principles of natural language engineering (see Sect. 2.1), followed by an account 
of the work that was undertaken to extend the L O L I T A system wi th facilities for 
processing figurative language. 
1.2 Summary 
A n NLP system performing tasks above a certain level of complexity has to be able 
to arrive at the meaning of its input. Figurative expressions make up a considerable 
port ion of N L . Therefore i t is a necessity for NLP systems which operate on the 
meaning of their input to be able to process figurative expressions adequately. This 
thesis investigates the requirements and problems pertaining to the processing of 
figurative language in the existing large-scale NLP system L O L I T A wi th emphasis 
on the underlying principles of natural language engineering. 
Chapter 2 
Context of this work 
The work described in this thesis was carried out wi th in the framework of the 
L O L I T A natural language processing (NLP) system. This chapter wi l l introduce 
the most important aspects of this system as well as the principles of natural 
language engineering (NLE) on which both L O L I T A and, subsequently, this work 
are based. 
2.1 Natural language engineering 
Research in the field of NLP at the University of Durham centres around the meth-
ods of N L E rather than on the approaches taken by traditional computational l in-
guistics or cognitive sciences, although N L E aims to incorporate and utilise results 
of various disciplines where they are beheved to f u l f i l the criteria outlined by the 
requirements of N L E applied to natural language (NL) . N L E is a relatively recent 
development [Garigliano et al. 1995] and concerns itself wi th building useful and 
robust systems; by contrast, in the traditional approaches taken by theoretical com-
putational linguistics and artificial intelligence research, the evaluation of theories 
or the construction of smaller, domain-dependent or specialised systems (e.g. for 
parsing, spelling correction, text-to-speech) play a more central role. 
The main aspects of N L E pertaining to building N L systems are: 
• Feasibil ity: A n N L E system should be designed wi th its applicability to real-
world situations and hmitations in mind, i.e. the requirements on resources 
such as hard- and software and execution t ime have to stay wi th in reasonable 
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l imi ts . 
• Robustness: One of the most critical aspects of large-scale systems is ro-
bustness, pertaining on one hand to the scope of the system (e.g. vocabulary 
size, percentage of accepted versus rejected input) and on the other hand to 
the handling of input that falls outside the predefined scope of acceptable 
input . A robust N L E system should be able to deal wi th any type of input 
and to recover f r o m worst cases. 
• Scale: A n N L E system must be of sufficient size to support realistic large-
scale applications, i.e. considerably more powerful than l imited, small-scale 
systems used for such purposes as the evaluation of linguistic and cognitive 
theories and feasibility studies. Properties such as vocabulary size and the 
coverage of the grammar are important in this respect. 
• Integration: Single components of the system should not make unfounded 
assumptions about other parts (i.e. they should cover worst-case scenarios) 
and should be designed as independently as possible to be of general use to 
an array of other components. 
• Maintainabi l i ty: The usefulness of the system over a period of time must 
be ensured. Thus the requirements all three types of maintenance should be 
considered when designing the system and coding its components, i.e. perfec-
tive maintenance pertaining to the improvement of the system's effectiveness 
by adding new functionality, adaptive maintenance in response to changes 
in the specification or the system's environment and corrective maintenance 
regarding the elimination of flaws not detected during in-house testing. 
• Flexibi l i ty: Ease of adaptation to different tasks and domains is crucial to 
the notion of usefulness of an N L E system. 
• Usabi l i ty: A n N L E system should support appHcations that are of use to 
end users in real-fife situations and be user-friendly. 
2.2 The L O L I T A system 
The L O L I T A system has been under development at the University of Durham's 
Laboratory for Natural Language Engineering [LNLE 1995] since 1986. Currently, 
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approximately 20 researchers are working on various aspects of the system. I t is 
defined as an extension of the terminology presented by Galliers and Jones [Galliers 
and Jones 1993]: 
A n NLP system carries out a task and any system which is used to 
perform a task in a specific domain is an application. A generic system is 
designed to perform a certain task or [...] task type, in different domains 
...] General purpose systems are intended to be directly usable without 
fur ther tailoring for more than one application. 
This means i t is defined as a general purpose base NLP system [Smith et al. 1994], 
i.e. a system that olfers fundamental NLP functions and supports a range of 
difi'erent applications based on the core. Because unt i l recently research has been 
directed mainly towards the development of the core, no polished final application 
is yet available. The ease wi th which an array of prototypes could be developed, 
however, indicates how sound the core really is: the development of the figurative 
language processing sub-system was considerably facilitated by the foundations of 
the core system i t was buil t on. The prototypes were developed to investigate the 
strength of the core and the feasibility of the tasks carried out by the prototypes. 
They w i l l be discussed in Sect. 2.3. A diagram of the system's components and 
their relations is shown in Fig. 2.1. 
Morphological 
analysis 
Misspelt and 
unknown word 
recovery 
Structure 
analysis 
P A R S E R 
I N F E R E N C E 
I N T E R A C T I O N 
S E M A N T I C 
N E T W O R K 
D I A L O G U E 
A N A L Y S I S 
Feature 
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N O R M A L I S E R 
S E M A N T I C 
A N A L Y S I S 
C O N T E N T S 
S C A N N E R 
P R A G M A T I C 
A N A L Y S I S 
G E N E R A T I O N 
Fig. 2.1: Structure of the L O L I T A system 
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2.2,1 The SemNet 
The core of the L O L I T A system is a semantic network (SemNet) [Short 1996, Short 
et al. 1996], containing linguistic and world knowledge, loosely based on Conceptual 
Graph Theory [Sowa 1984], organising concepts as nodes and relations as arcs in 
a directed hyper-graph. SemNet currently comprises some 100,000 nodes and is 
compatible w i t h WordNet [Miller 1990]. The nodes in the SemNet graph correspond 
to objects, concepts or events and are identified by a unique number (Noderef). 
The links between the nodes represent the relationship between nodes. A link 
consists of an arc (the type of link stating the relation between nodes) and a list of 
Noderefs connected to the originating node by the particular arc. Each node is also 
assigned a set of control variables. Types of links are, for example, subject, is-a, 
or mode, denoting that the node they are referring to is the subject of an event, 
an instance of a concept, or a description of the mode of an event, respectively. 
For an example of an event node as represented in the L O L I T A SemNet, see Fig. 
2.2. This example corresponds to the event 'Joe Hkes coffee', where 'event X ' is the 
node representing the whole event of ' l iking coffee', consisting of other nodes f rom 
and links into the rest of the SemNet and ' X ' representing the Noderef) 
generalisation of 
e v e n t 
beveragre 
generalisation 
generalisation 
generalisation 
coffee event 
subject 
generalisation of 
action 
coffee 
likes 
cappuc2.no 
similar 
enjoy 
Fig. 2.2: A portion of SemNet around an event 
Control variables are stored wi th each link for reasons of efficiency (i.e. since 
they are accessed fa i r ly often, this representation results in faster lookup) and 
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provide information on specific nodes. Examples of some of the 60 different types 
of control variables currently in use are: 
• R a n k : provides information on the node's quantification, instances of which 
are individual , prototype, universal, bounded existential or named individual. 
L O L I T A uses a multi-sorted logic representation to deal wi th the ranking. 
• T y p e : roughly maps onto grammatical categories, wi th some exceptions and 
additions. Examples of type control variables are entity, relation, event, 
determiner, punctuation, attribute, preposition, greeting and fact. 
• Fami ly : classifies nodes into semantic and pragmatic classes and is used fre-
quently in resolving polysemy and ambiguity. Examples of the family control 
variables are l iving, vegetal, animal, human, abstract, concrete, temporal and 
location. 
2.2.2 The L O L I T A parsing system 
The L O L I T A parser provides large-scale coverage, i.e. i t is able to deal wi th f u l l 
and serious text, such as newspaper articles, and is based on a Backus Naur Form 
definit ion. I t uses a top-down Tomita-style approach and incorporates deterministic 
operators for improved efficiency [Ellis et al 1993], building a parse forest of 
possible parses f r o m the input. The ease wi th which the original non-deterministic 
parser was augmented w i t h these operators without disruption to the rest of the 
system reflects on the maintainabili ty of the system (see Sect. 2.1). The L O L I T A 
grammar was bui l t w i th the aim of dealing wi th erroneous and incomplete input 
(e.g. real-life speech and fragments of N L utterances), so that missing words and 
constructs at the beginning and end of a clause or sentence, for example, can be 
investigated. I t comprises over 1500 grammatical rules. Large corpora, e.g. the 
Brown corpus and WordNet, have been used for developing a broad coverage. 
2.2.3 Semantics and pragmatics 
The task of the L O L I T A semantic analysis is to map the deep grammatical rep-
resentation of the input provided by the parsing component onto nodes in the 
SemNet. To do this, the network has to be checked for the existence of nodes that 
already represent concepts in the input, and decisions have to be taken on when to 
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generate new nodes and how to connect them to the rest of the SemNet. Amongst 
other things, this involves anaphora resolution and making deictic references abso-
lute; ' tomorrow' w i l l be expanded into the date after the utterance event, T wi l l 
be resolved into a reference to the speaker, etc. 
Further semantic and pragmatic analyses ensure that, after a new or modified 
port ion of the SemNet has been buil t on the basis of previous stages, this portion is 
consistent w i t h the existing network. Examples are sentences like " I saw a tree f ly 
over the house", where no obvious syntactical and semantic rules are violated, or 
" I bought one of those Japanese TVs made by Philips" where i t is highly unhkely 
and undesirable to extend the coverage of the semantic representation to world 
knowledge (stating that Philips is not a Japanese manufacturer of consumer elec-
tronics). I f the pragmatic analysis (located at the intersection between semantic, 
linguistic and world knowledge) cannot resolve a conflict between new and existing 
informat ion in the SemNet, a low level of belief is attached to the new portion of 
the semantic network resulting f rom the input. 
Another way of deciding on the acceptability of input is source control. Source 
control takes into account f r o m whom the information came and the way in which 
i t was provided, e.g. a reliable source, an unknown source, part of a chat or a 
factual news report. A model of source control w i l l be fu l ly incorporated into the 
L O L I T A system [Bokma and Garigliano 1992 . 
2.2.4 The L O L I T A generator 
The L O L I T A generator was, like the rest of the L O L I T A system, developed with-
out any specific restrictions imposed by a particular apphcation and is thus very 
flexible. I t is capable of generating N L utterances f rom the SemNet and is widely 
used as an interface to L O L I T A and as debugging tool. Its input consists of a 
chunk of the SemNet, and its output is an N L utterance of a complexity greater 
of or equal to a sentence, depending on parameters such as the particular appli-
cation, e.g. storytelling or query, the context, the required style, i.e. colourful or 
simple, and previous dialogue analysis where applicable. A detailed discussion of 
the generator module can be found in [Smith 1995 . 
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2.3 Applications and prototypes 
The L O L I T A system has been used as a base for various prototypical apphcations. 
A short account of a selection of these prototypes w i l l be given in the following. 
• Content scanning 
Summarising templates are fi l led f rom input texts. Input text is parsed and 
semantically analysed to arrive at a representation of the input in the SemNet. 
A n application, i.e. a domain-dependent module, then accesses the SemNet 
in order to find relevant information to fill the template slots. Further infor-
mation on the use and applications of contents scanning can be found in the 
literature [Garigliano et al. 1993], [Morgan et al. 1995], [Costantino et al. 
1996]. The task of content scanning is one of the standard tests for evaluat-
ing natural language systems [Long and Garigliano 1994]. Fig. 2.3 gives an 
example of content scanning in the L O L I T A system. 
• Machine translation 
Although machine translation ( M T ) was not one of the goals the developers 
of L O L I T A originally had in mind, a prototype M T system was built wi th 
only a small amount of modification. After the addition of a number of rules 
to the grammar, i t became possible to analyse Italian and Chinese texts, 
adding the information contained in them to the SemNet. This information 
was subsequently reahsed as English N L utterance by the generator module. 
Clearly, the quality of the translation is not as refined as that of dedicated M T 
systems, but i t has to be kept in mind that the M T prototype was neither one 
of the original goals nor is i t a finished application. For work on improving 
the quality of transfer see Emery, who notes: "The eventual implementation 
of a style algorithm capable of extracting style and setting parameters for the 
generation of a range of stylistic effects would [...] be of particular benefit in 
Machine Translation where i t would ensure that the style of the original text 
was preserved." [Emery 1994 . 
• Computer-aided language learning 
A Chinese tutoring prototype application based on the L O L I T A core has 
been bui l t [Wang and Garigliano 1992], helping students learning Chinese to 
overcome L I interference-based transfer errors. The tutoring module makes 
use of intelligent tutoring techniques such as constant access and updating of 
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A car bomb exploded outside the Cabinet Office in Whitehall last night, 100 yards 
f r o m 10 Downing Street. Nobody was injured in the explosion which happened 
just after 9 am on the corner of Downing Street and Whitehall . Police evacuated 
the area. First reports suggested that the bomb went off in a black taxi after the 
driver had been forced to drive to Whitehall . The taxi was later reported to be 
burning fiercely. 
( T H E D A I L Y T E L E G R A P H 31/10/92) 
Template: I n c i d e n t 
I n c i d e n t : A bomb e x p l o s i o n . 
Where : On t h e c o r n e r of Downing S t r e e t and W h i t e h a l l . 
Outside Cabinet O f f i c e and o u t s i d e 10 Downing S t r e e t . 
I n a b l a c k t a x i . 
When : 9pm. 
P a s t . 
Night. 
When a f o r c e f u l person f o r c e d a d r i v e r to d r i v e a 
b l a c k t a x i t o W h i t e h a l l . 
R e s p o n s i b l e : 
T a r g e t : C a b i n e t O f f i c e . 
Damage: Human: Nobody. 
Thing: A b l a c k t a x i . 
Source: t e l e g r a p h 
Source_date: 31 October 1992 
C e r t a i n t y : F a c t s . 
R e l e v a n t I n f o r m a t i o n 
P o l i c e evacuated 10 Downing S t r e e t . 
Fig. 2.3: Example of a template produced by the content scanning module 
a student and teacher model during execution and a specially designed mixed 
grammar. Students are asked to perform translations, their input is parsed 
and the resulting parse is analysed for transfer errors. For an example of the 
Chinese tutor module, see Fig. 2.4. 
• Dialogue 
A dialogue model loosely based on Shank's script theory [Shank and Abelson 
1977] has been implemented in the L O L I T A system. A n example of the 
dialogue application [Nettleton and Garigliano 1995] is shown in Fig. 2.5. 
Since communicative behaviour in a dialogue, e.g. the appropriateness of a 
response or the right to initiate dialogue and to change the topic, depends 
mainly on different situations and contexts in which the dialogue takes place, 
and since there are, theoretically, an infinite number of possible contexts or 
dialogue situations, the dialogue module of L O L I T A makes use of prototypical 
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He have b r e a k f a s t a t e i ^ h t , 
P l e a s e enter answer and h i t r e t u r n : A L 
I'm s o r r y to say t h a t you haven't t r a n s l a t e d the sentence c o r r e c t l y . There may be more than one way o f t r a n s l a t i n g the sentence: 
The problem with your t r a n s l a t i o n i s t h a t you have t r a n s l a t e d the sentence according to the E n g l i s h word order. Please compare your t r a n s l a t i o n w i t h the standard one s) in order to f i n d out the d i f -f e r e n c e s between the s t r u c t u r e s and t r y again! 
They(fflale) have lunch a t one. 
P l e a s e e n t e r answer and h i t r e t u r n : I 
M i A (ASCII input) 
Fig. 2.4: Sample output f rom the Chinese tutor application 
Dialogue Structure Models (DSMs), representing a class of dialogues. DSMs 
are composed of Dialogue Structure Elements (DSE), each of which describes 
a fundamental property of a dialogue. The Dominance DSE, for example, 
comprises such dialogue constraints as whether i t is permissible to initiate and 
terminate a (sub-) dialogue or, to interrupt other participants (by choosing 
a different topic or referring to a previously encountered topic). 
LOLITA. 1: I desire a success. 
Input 1: I lilce you. 
LOLITA 2: I kmo-w; why do you Lilce me*? 
Injput 2: You are beautiful. 
LOLITA 3: I am glad because you tliinlc I am beautiful. 
Input 3: Do you like me'? 
LOLITA 4: Yes, I like you. 
Input -4: Do you like me'? 
LOLITA 5: I slightly am bored and emotional. 
Input 5: You are a machine. 
LOLITA <5: I do not believe that I am a machine. 
Input C>: Are you a i-nachine'? 
LOLITA 7: No. 
Input 7: Are you beautiful"? 
LOLITA 8: I do not know if I am beautiful. 
Input 8: I am tired. 
LOUTA S>: Tell me things. 
Input 9: I am tired. 
LOLITA ID: I slightly am bored. 
Input lO : Are you tired"? 
LOLITA 11: No. 
Fig. 2.5: Example of the dialogue appHcation 
• Query and database interfacing 
This application allows information to be entered into the L O L I T A know-
ledge-base SemNet in the fo rm of NL either by typing in sentences or by 
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having the system analyse files in batch mode, e.g. newspaper articles. The 
information extracted f rom the input is stored in the SemNet and can be 
retrieved using N L input, by typing in a question relating to information 
contained in the original input. For an example of the query application, see 
Fig. 2.6. 
Input 1: do I own a motorbike? Input 11: and Keith too. 
LOLITA 1: Yes, you own a big fast motorbike. LOLITA 11:1 understand. 
Input 2: do I control a vehicle? Input 12: do I like you? 
LOLITA 2: Yes, you own a big fast motorbike. LOLITA 12: Yes, you like me. 
Input 3: what do I use? Input 13: whom do I like? 
LOLITA 3: An office. LOLITA 13: Keith and me. 
Input 4: how many vehicles do I own? Input 14: Keith 
LOLITA 4: At least 1. LOLITA 14: What about Keith? 
Input 5: What do I own? Input 15: you admire him 
LOLITA 5: A big fast motorbike and a home. LOLITA 15:1 understand. 
Input 6: why did I go home? Input 16: whom do you admire? 
LOLITA 6: You went to your home because you were tired. LOLITA 16: Keith. 
Input 7:1 was owned by a motorbike Input 17:1 like you. 
LOLITA 7:1 do not believe that a motorbike owned you. LOLITA 17:1 know. 
Input 8: was I owned by a motorbike? Input 18:1 hate you 
LOLITA 8: no. LOLITA 18:1 do not believe that you hate me. 
Input 9: do I like you? Input 19: do you know that I like you? 
LOLITA 9:1 do not know if you like me. LOLITA 19: Yes, you like me. 
Input 10:1 like you Input 20: does Rick know that I hke you? 
LOLITA 10:1 understand. LOLITA 20:1 do not know if Rick knows that you like me. 
> 
Fig. 2.6: Example of the query application 
2.4 Summary 
I n this chapter, the framework of the undertaking to be presented in this thesis 
has been introduced. N L E as well as the criteria for a system that follows N L E 
principles have been described. The L O L I T A system, its architecture, applications 
and prototypes have been presented in order to allow for the work described in this 
thesis to be seen in its context. 
Chapter 3 
Related work 
This chapter reviews related work in the field of figurative language understanding. 
As the work presented in this thesis was conducted wi th an open mind towards 
suggestions f r o m any direction, findings and theories f rom disciplines as diverse as 
psychology, philosophy, computer science, computational linguistics and cognitive 
science have been taken into account. However, as the scope of this work is hmited, 
emphasis w i l l be put on work that is closely related to the problem central to 
this thesis, i.e. feasible computational treatment of figurative natural language. 
Approaches that were deemed to be promising and of relevance to this work wi l l 
be presented and critically evaluated. 
There are, moreover, further advantages to be gained through a critical survey 
of work in related areas. I t helps to establish and define the tasks that constitute 
what has been referred to, rather vaguely, as figurative language processing and 
ensures the current work takes into account the latest results, avoiding garden paths 
and reinventing the wheel; i t delineates the boundaries of the field as i t stands. I t 
also serves as a means of evaluating the work presented in this thesis providing a 
host of results for comparison. Furthermore, i t allows us to group together the vast 
array of different approaches according to schools of thought and ways of tackhng 
problems in order to clarify the state of the art wi th regard to theory and advances 
in sub-areas. 
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3.1 Classical accounts of metaphor 
Aristotle 
Although i t is not the first scholarly account of figurative language (both Plato 
and Socrates wrote about figurative speech and its use in rhetoric), Aristotle's 
thoughts on the topic had a great impact upon later studies of figurative language. 
The field has freed itself f rom them, in parts, not even today. His first detailed 
account achieved the status of definition and was, apart f rom some exceptions (e.g. 
Nietzsche 1974]), not questioned unt i l this century. In the Poetics X X I , 7-14, he 
says: 
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to some-
thing else; the transference being either f rom genus to species, or f rom 
species to genus, or f rom species to species, or on grounds of analogy. 
That f rom genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for 
lying at anchor is a sort of standing. That f rom species to genus in 
'Tru ly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought', where 'ten thou-
sand', which is a particular large number, is put in the place of the 
generic 'a large number'. That f rom species to species in 'Drawing of 
the life w i t h bronze', and in 'Severing wi th the enduring bronze'; where 
the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw', 
both words meaning to 'take away' something. That f rom analogy is 
possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second is to 
the first, as the four th to the third; for one may then put the four th 
in place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth. Now and 
then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to i t that to which 
the word i t supplants is relative. Thus a cup is in relation to Dionysus 
what a shield is to Ares. The cup accordingly wi l l be described as the 
'shield of Dionysus' and the shield as the 'cup of Ares'. Or take another 
instance: As old age is to life, so is evening to day. One w i l l accordingly 
describe evening as the 'old age of the day' - or by the Empedoclean 
equivalent; and old age as the 'evening' or 'sunset of l i fe ' 
Thus, Aristotle sets the scene for central questions such as what is metaphorical, 
how metaphors are structured, how metaphors are generated and how figurative 
language is related to everyday language. 
From this quotation, we can derive that Aristotle sees metaphor as deviant 
in so far as i t is "giving the thing a name that belongs to something else" and 
as a substitution: Metaphor seems to occur on the level of lexical items, wi th a 
term commonly used for one thing being replaced by another term, in accordance 
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w i t h the four principles stated, namely, genus to species, species to genus, species 
to species and analogy, where analogy is based on similarities between the two 
terms. I n a later paragraph, metaphor is described as a means of allowing poets 
to avoid everyday expressions and thus showing their talent and originality, and 
therefore belonging outside the realm of everyday language. Since the structure 
of metaphor or metaphoric replacement of one term by another follows the four 
principles, interpretation amounts to finding the term which has been replaced 
along the species-genus path or uncovering the similarities in the case of analogy. 
Cicero 
Aristotle's successors, most notably Cicero and Quinti l ian, elaborate on Aristotle's 
notions. In De Oratore, Cicero writes: 
There are then three things which the orator contributes in the 
matter of mere vocabulary towards the decoration and embellishment 
of his style - rare words, new coinages, and words used metaphorically. 
Cicero 1942] 
Here, we see that metaphor is thought of as a stylistic device, used for making 
the style of speech more colourful. He goes on to say: 
The th i rd method in our list, the use of metaphor, is of wide appli-
cation; i t sprang f r o m necessity due to the poverty and deficiency, but i t 
has been subsequently made popular by its agreeable and entertaining 
quality, [ibid. 
Again, figurative speech is seen as an effective means of conveying a meaning in 
a more agreeable and entertaining way, but now a reason for the use of metaphor 
is also given, i.e. the necessity to express something which could have not been 
expressed equally well, or in an equally pleasing manner in literal terms. Cicero 
fur ther states that: 
A metaphor is a short fo rm of simile, contracted into one word; this 
word is put i n a position not belonging to i t as i f i t were its own place, 
and i f i t is recognisable i t gives pleasure, but i f i t contains no similarity 
i t is rejected. [...] Occasionally also metaphors serve to achieve brevity, 
[ibid.] 
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Here, we are given the view that a metaphor is indeed a shortened fo rm of a 
comparison or simile to aid brevity and thus the overall impact of the text. Fol-
lowing this view, interpretation would involve expanding or unpacking the simile. 
Cicero again tells us about the deviant nature of metaphor: 
in fact the metaphor ought to have an apologetic air, so as to look 
as i f i t had entered a place that does not belong to i t wi th a proper 
introduction, not taken i t by storm, and as i f had come wi th permission, 
not forced its way in . But there is no mode of speech more effective 
i n the case of single words, and none that adds more briUiance to the 
style [ibid. 
The improper role of metaphorical expressions is once again emphasised, the 
notion of not belonging evoked. The dimension of the impact of a figurative expres-
sion is mentioned and the notion that metaphor belongs to the realm of substituting 
words occurs again. However, a l i t t le elaboration on the relationship between the 
proper word and what is expressed is also given: 
In] the figure of substitution or metonymy [...] one proper name is 
substituted for another [...] The method is effective in ornamenting the 
style, and should often be adopted; and to the same class belong the 
phrase the impartiality of the War-god and the use i f the terms Ceres 
for corn. Liber for wine, Neptune for the sea, the House for parliameiit, 
the polling booth for elections [...] and also in the same class is the use of 
names of the virtues and vices to stand for the people who posses them 
.. .] akin to i t are the less decorative but nevertheless not negligible 
figures employed when we desire a part to be understood to mean a 
whole [...] or else a whole to mean a part. [ibid. 
The term "metonymy" is introduced and defining criteria are given, i.e. sub-
st i tut ion of one term by a concept closely related to this term, e.g. a part for the 
whole or vice versa. 
Quintilian 
Quint i l ian introduces the aspect of the naturalness of metaphor, which has not 
been acknowledged before, but also emphasises the decorative function of figurative 
language when he notes in the Institutio oratoria: 
the commonest [...] of tropes, namely, metaphor [...] is not merely 
so natural a tu rn of speech that i t is often employed unconsciously or 
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by uneducated persons, but i t is in itself so attractive and elegant that 
however distinguished the language in which i t is embedded i t shines 
fo r th w i t h a fight that is all its own. [...] A noun or verb is transferred 
f r o m the place to which i t properly belongs to another where there is 
either no li teral term or the transferred is better than the literal. We 
do this either because i t is necessary or to make our meaning clearer or, 
as I have already said, to produce a decorative effect. [Quintilian 1922 
He then elaborates on the point about similes made by Cicero and gives his 
classification of metaphoric structure: 
On the whole metaphor is a shorter fo rm of simile, while there is 
this further difference, that in the latter we compare some object to 
the things which we wish to describe, whereas in the former this object 
is actually substituted for the thing. I t is a comparison when I say 
that a man did something like a lion, i t is a metaphor when I say of 
h i m He is a lion. Metaphors fa l l into four classes. In the first we 
substitute one l iving thing for another, as in the passage where the 
poet, speaking of the charioteer, says, 'The steersman then / / W i t h 
mighty effort wrenched his charger round,' or when Livy says that Scipio 
was continually barked at by Cato. Secondly, inanimate things may 
be substituted for inanimate, as in the Virgihan, 'And gave his fleet 
the rein, ' or inanimate may be substituted for animate, as in 'D id the 
Argive bulwark fa l l by sword or fate?', or animate for inanimate, as 
in the following lines: 'The shepherd sits unknowing on the height / / 
Listening the roar f rom some far mountain brow', [ibid. 
Again, metaphor is regarded as being interpretable by expanding a shortened 
comparison or by looking for the replaced term along the four lines of permissi-
ble replacements. Although Quinti l ian seems to take note of the abundance of 
metaphors, even in everyday speech, he goes on to say: 
The worst errors of al l , however, originate in the fact that some 
authors regard i t as permissible to use even in prose any metaphors that 
are allowed to poets [...] For metaphor should always occupy a place 
already vacant, or [...] should be more impressive than that which i t 
displaces, [ibid. 
Here again, he stresses the decorative and styhstic aspect and places metaphor 
proper (as opposed to the metaphors arising f rom the need of expressing something 
for which there is no literal term available) in the realm of poetry. He goes on to 
give a more detailed classification of tropes, including synecdoche, which is in his 
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words "making us realise many things f rom one, the whole f rom a part, the genus 
f r o m a species, things which follow f rom things which have preceded; or, on the 
other hand, the whole procedure may be reversed" [ibid.]; metonymy, which is the 
substitution of one term for another, e.g. "to indicate an invention by substituting 
the name of the inventor, or a possession by substituting the name of the possessor" 
ibid.] ; and others such as the container replacing the content, the cause the effect, 
a plural for the singular. Definitions and examples are also given for other tropes 
such as irony, hyperbole and allegory, the latter being described by h im as a chain 
of metaphors. 
3.1.1 Deviance and substitution view 
Incongruent as they may seem, all the cited classical authors deal wi th the (mul-
tifaceted) problem of metaphor, and we can now summarise their view on certain 
key points relating to figurative language: 
• What is metaphor? Metaphor operates on the level of words and involves two 
entities. One li teral term, a noun or verb is substituted by a figurative term 
that does not really belong in the place i t occupies. Some types of metaphor 
are thought of as a shortened simile or comparison. The figures are deviations 
f r o m the li teral mode of speech and could be expressed using literal language. 
• Is there a structure in metaphor? Aristotle speaks of general relations along 
an ontological hierarchy and analogy-driven substitutions, the others elabo-
rate on various fixed relations between the original term and the new term, 
such as species-genus, inventor-invention, cause-effect, i.e. in general a se-
mantic proximity following a well defined path chosen f rom a set of possible 
paths. This set of possible substitution patterns would amount to the set of 
possible metaphors. 
• How are metaphors interpreted? None of the classical authors explicitly states 
how metaphors are interpreted. Their main concern seems to be the provision 
of an explanation on how pleasing and successful metaphoric expressions are 
achieved and used, i.e. the generation of metaphors. I t seems obvious that, 
when a metaphor is used, the term most likely to have been replaced by 
the figurative term wi l l be re-substituted by the hearer/reader and thus the 
metaphor interpreted. 
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• Why are metaphors used? Although there is mention of a necessity for 
metaphor (in cases where no literal term is available), the authors cited agree 
that the foremost function of figurative language is to improve poetry and 
a r t fu l speech to make i t more pleasing and to aid brevity of expression. 
• How can metaphors be classified? The terms metaphor, synecdoche and 
metonymy are introduced, the first being a general term for the substitution 
of words, the second a substitution along the lines of genus-species and other 
ontological relations, and the latter a substitution not along an ontological 
but a conventional path, of a general semantic association (e.g. inventor for 
invention). 
No significant work was to follow these classical views for centuries, one of 
the reasons being that they were considered to be ult imate definitions. As wi th 
many disciplines, the theories of antique times were not questioned but regarded as 
definitive explanations and canonical truths. Furthermore, the scholarly treatment 
of language concerned itself mostly wi th (prescriptive) grammar and rhetoric, and 
therefore, as Meier observed, emphasis was put on didactic approaches rather than 
seeking new, objective insights [Meier 1963]. 
The classical view can be termed 'deviance view' insofar as i t regards metaphor 
as deviant f rom the literal basis of language or 'substitution view' wi th respect 
to the fact that a figure is thought of as being an expression in which a hteral 
te rm has been substituted by a figuratively used one in order to achieve a certain 
effect. Both views are st i l l alive today, in linguistics and philosophy ahke, and have 
spawned other views on metaphor which concentrate on aspects of the deviance 
and substitution view. 
3.2 Modern accounts 
3.2.1 Tension view 
The tension view is based on the notion that figurative language is deviant and 
false i f taken literally^. I t thus tries to explain the impact a metaphor has on the 
hearer by assuming that the falsehood encountered makes the reader/hearer want 
'^ One cannot literally drink a cup and no man literally is a lion. 
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to resolve the metaphor. The puzzle-like quality of a metaphor creates the desire 
(tension) for resolution and makes the figure aesthetically pleasing (if i t can be 
resolved); the inabil i ty to resolve a metaphor, however, results in its rejection and 
categorisation as inappropriate. Way notes that the tension view also accounts for 
language change, because the frequent use of a combination of terms reduces the 
tension. "Thus, old or dead metaphors become a part of language because of a loss 
in emotive tension" [Way 1991 . 
The tension view subscribes to the substitution and deviance notions of the 
classical view as well as to the idea that metaphor primarily serves a decorative 
funct ion. However, i t also goes beyond this to explain the mechanisms behind this 
aesthetic funct ion, thereby giving a glimpse of how metaphors are recognised, too. 
I f an expression is considered strange or false in some way, the hearer tries to over-
come the strangeness by classifying the expression as metaphorical and interpreting 
i t according to rules different f rom the ones used for literal language. 
3.2.2 Anomaly views 
The anomaly view elaborates on the notion that metaphor somehow violates the 
rules of l i teral language and results in a semantic or pragmatic anomaly. We shall 
analyse one typical account in order to evaluate what i t can contribute to the solu-
t ion of our problem. Levin is one of the proponents of the feature addition/deletion 
view, which is derived f r o m the deviance view [Levin 1977 . 
3.2.2.1 Feature addition/deletion view 
The feature addition/deletion view operates in the realm of compositional seman-
tics [Katz and Fodor 1963, Katz 1966, Katz 1967, Charniak 1981, Lyons 1977 . 
The basic assumption of compositional semantics is that the meaning of a larger 
linguistic unit such as a phrase or sentence can be constructed f rom the meaning of 
its subparts, where the meaning of the subparts, lexical items, is regarded as con-
sisting of a bundle of features. These features are regarded as universal semantic 
primitives and a set of features or markers sufficiently describes the lexical traits 
of one meaning of a word. 'Bachelor', for example, is described in terms of [-(-hu-
man], [+male] and [-married]. Although there is no generally accepted hierarchy of 
semantic features, compositional semantics is a widely used approach (e.g. for pol-
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ysemy resolution) and adequately describes semantic relations such as antonymy, 
synonymy and similarity. 
Levin makes the distinction between pragmatic and semantic deviance, prag-
matic deviance being the transgression of norms of language use. "Inasmuch as 
there are norms, they can be transgressed and, when the norms pertain to the 
participants in speech acts or the role played in such acts by the non-linguistic 
context, we may regard any such transgression as a form of pragmatic deviance" 
Levin 1977]. Semantic deviance is the violation of selectional restrictions, i.e. the 
combination of words whose meanings do not fit together. "By semantic deviance 
we mean that type which results f rom an 'improper' collocation of lexical items; 
viz. Green ideas sleep furiously.'''' [ibid. . 
He introduces the notion of pragmatic deviance to account for sentences which 
are semantically non-deviant and whose meaning can nevertheless not be derived 
f r o m the compositionahty principle [Frege 1952]; the latter states that the meaning 
a sentence can be understood without knowledge about the context in which i t was 
uttered, solely on the basis of the meaning of the components and rules governing 
the combination of those meanings. 
According to Levin's theory, recognition of metaphor is triggered by the real-
isation that an expression is deviant (pragmatically or semantically), and inter-
pretation of the deviant utterance is achieved by following the rules of construals. 
Metaphors involve the addition, deletion or transfer of semantic features f rom one 
of the involved terms to the other. One example which serves as explanation of 
how metaphors 'fade', i.e. lose their novelty, illustrates what he means by this. 
The expression " M y brother devoured three books this morning" is deviant insofar 
as does not contain the feature [-ffood] normally required by devour. One of 
the ways for [this sentence] to have been construed originally would be by delet-
ing (neutralising) the feature [-|-food], leaving as features in the reading of devour 
-l-rapid, -|-intensive], features which are compatible w i th book" [ibid.]. He goes 
on to say that through continued use, this change in the feature set of 'devour', 
i.e. the metaphorical reading, is conventionalised and becomes part of the word's 
meaning, making the metaphor less novel. 
The main part of his theory (T) consists of six modes of construal, examples 
of which w i l l be shown in detail below, according to which all metaphoric meaning 
can be understood, i.e. any metaphor can be explained through one or more of the 
construals. The construals operate on the features of the terms used metaphorically. 
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transferring or deleting them, as shown in the following examples: 
1. Adjoin ing features of the verb to the noun and disjoining them in the overall 
semantic representation of the sentence. Levin's example 'The stone died' 
would in this construal lead to an attempt at finding something which satisfies 
-|-animate] (because of 'died') as well as [-fmineral] ('stone'), such as 'natural 
physical object ' , thus resulting in the construal 'the natural physical object 
died'. 
2. Adjoining features of the verb to the noun and cojoining them in the overall 
semantic representation of the example 'The stone died' leads to the second 
construal in which the transferred feature is combined wi th the relevant fea-
ture of the other term, resulting in the reading 'the anthropomorphized stone 
died' 
3. Disjunctively adjoining features of the noun to the verb followed by disjoin-
ment of these in the verb's selectional restrictions. I f [-|-mineral] f rom the 
noun of 'The stone died' was adjoined to [-)-animate] f rom the verb and the 
generalisation of the disjuncts chosen, the resulting interpretation would be, 
according to Levin: 'The stone ceased to exist'. 
The problems w i t h this theory (T ) , anomaly views in general and the feature 
addition/deletion view in particular are that they concentrate on grammatically 
or, in Levin's case, semantically deviant sentences. Levin assumes that pragmat-
ically deviant sentences are interpreted according to rules of language use (e.g. 
speech acts [Austin 1975, Searle 1969, Searle 1975, Searle 1979, Searle 1980] or 
conversational implicature [Grice 1975], and semantically deviant sentences are 
likely candidates for metaphors; he also declares that " i t is exactly these anoma-
lous (or deviant) sentences^ that are the concern of a theory of metaphor" [Levin 
1977]. There are, however, many sentences one would assume to be metaphorical 
which do not exhibit anomalies, e.g. negations such as 'No man is an island', 'He 
isn't l iv ing in the fast lane', or idioms such as 'He kicked the bucket' and 'They 
broke the ice'. Whereas idioms would, presumably, be treated under the heading 
of pragmatic deviance (in a context where 'They broke the ice' was uttered and i t 
was evident that no breaking and no ice are involved, a pragmatic interpretation 
^Sentences exhibiting "the failure of one or more constituents to satisfy the selection restriction 
of another" [ibid.]. 
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would be performed), there are other cases - such as the much-cited 'The rock is 
becoming br i t t le w i th age', said of an old professor - which are, in isolation, se-
mantically non-deviant. Although Levin acknowledges the role of context (taking 
the context into consideration would shift the example into the realm of pragmatics 
again), his claims that the construals are capable of explaining the meaning of all 
metaphors seems far fetched for the reasons that there are semantically non-deviant 
expressions that are metaphors. 
Moreover, his theory allows only an a posteriori exphcation of how a meaning 
for a semantically deviant sentence might be constructed. I t is not constrained or 
elaborate enough to state how (or indeed, which) feature addition/deletion pro-
cesses take place and in which order. 
To summarise, as far as recognition is concerned. Levin's theory (T) is capable 
of recognising a subset of metaphors, those which exhibit semantic anomahes. The 
same set of expressions constitutes the answer to the question 'What is metaphor?'. 
As far as the interpretation of metaphors is concerned, theory (T) does not provide 
much help because the final interpretation has to be given first, before the feature 
transfer mechanism can be consulted to give us an idea of how the interpretation 
might have come about. 
The shortcomings of the feature addition/deletion thesis seem, therefore, to 
stem f r o m the fact that i t considers the metaphorical unit to be a sentence, i.e. 
ignores context and cotext (pragmatic deviance resolved by other means) and be-
lieves the metaphoricity to reside in single words whose features are the cause for 
the metaphoricity. I t is, in this respect, a descendant of the classical views. 
3.2.2.2 Constraint violation view 
The anomaly view has been carried over into artificial inteUigence ( A l ) and natural 
language processing (NLP) in the fo rm of the constraint violation or selection 
restriction violation view. The theory of metaphor put forward by Wilks [Wilks 
1975a, Wilks 1975b, Wilks 1978] borrows f rom both the anomaly view and feature 
addition/deletion view, but firmly rejects the binary distinction between acceptable 
and unacceptable readings imposed by the application of selectional restrictions 
Katz and Fodor 1963]. In his framework of preference semantics, Wilks replaces 
the fixed and inflexible semantic restrictions wi th semantic preferences to allow 
processing of utterances which are semantically not well-formed. 
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For rejecting utterances is just what humans do not do. They try 
to understand them. [...] It is proper to prefer the normal, but it 
would be absurd, in an intelligent understanding system, not to accept 
the abnormal if it is described. Not only everyday metaphor, but the 
description of the simplest fictions, require i t . [Wilks 1975b 
From this quotation, we can derive that Wilks acknowledges the need for robust 
broad coverage understanding and the extent to which everyday language does not 
conform to the narrow limits of selectional restrictions. He also regards metaphor 
as an everyday phenomenon and not a rare occurrence, which has to be treated 
adequately in an NLP system. 
Wilks 
Initially [Wilks 1975b], the preference semantics approach dealt only with the recog-
nition of metaphors and sentences described as anomalous by the tight constraints 
of generative semantics, and the acceptance but not the interpretation of these in 
the input. Instead of plainly rejecting anomalous sentences, an attempt is made to 
find the 'best-fit' for possible meanings. This is achieved through semantic formu-
lae stating the preferred semantics of words. The structured formulae themselves 
consist of semantic primitives "used to express the semantic entities, states, qual-
ities and actions about which humans speak and write" [ibid.] The primitives are 
organised in classes such as entities (e.g. human being, part-of and state), actions 
(e.g. force, flow or exist), sorts (e.g. being a container or being inanimate) and 
cases (location, agent or goal). For each word in the input, one or more formulae 
relating to different word senses, e.g. crook [bad person] vs. crook [shepherd's 
staff], is examined, and the heads of those formula are checked for compatibility. 
For an illustration of this, see Fig. 3.1. 
Semantic density is computed on the basis of how many incompatibilities the 
given input exhibited when completely processed, and the most dense reading is 
taken to be the preferred one. Thus the most probable - if anomaly makes a read-
ing improbable - overall meaning for the input is computed, based on the mutual 
influence words and higher syntactic structures have on each other. This proce-
dure allows acceptance of anomalous input, attachment of grades of acceptability 
to possible readings and recognition of figurative speech if it exhibits a semantic 
anomaly. 
In order to be able to distinguish between anomaly and metaphor, Wilks aug-
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John kicked the ball, 
ball! ((abstract), (social_event) 
kick ((agent: animate), (object: physical.object), .„) / ball! ((physicaUbject),...) 
Fig. 3.1: Example of a semantic formula in preference semantics 
mented his preference semantics with a knowledge structure called pseudo-text 
Wilks 1978]. Pseudo-texts are episodic or contextual knowledge structures similar 
to scripts [Shank and Abelson 1977]. A pseudo-text for cars, for example, might 
contain information about the material a car consists of, its prototypical shape, the 
fact that it needs fuel and maintenance at regular intervals etc. The violation of a 
semantic preference triggers an algorithm called 'projection'. The projection tries 
to find a match from the pseudo-text which, when replacing the part of the input 
that caused the preference violation, results in the constraints being satisfied. 
This can be described using Wilks' much cited example 'My car drinks gasoline'. 
In preference semantics, 'drink' requires its agent to be animate, thus leading to a 
constraint violation in this example. Pseudo-text lookup (matching the offending 
part of the input, i.e. 'drink' against the whole of the knowledge about cars) will 
select all possible replacements, amongst them being that 'cars use gasoHne'. These 
are then processed further by the usual mechanisms, i.e. the 'best-fit' is selected on 
the basis of preferences. In this respect, the constraint violation view can be seen as 
related to the feature addition/deletion view. Features from the anomalous input 
are changed or replaced to satisfy the constraints: if one adopted the semantic 
feature 'stance', 'drink' could be described in terms of the features of 'consume', 
requiring an additional feature of its agent, namely [-f animate . 
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Fass 
An elaboration of the constraint violation view, resulting in a comprehensive im-
plementation of the principles mentioned is Fass' met* method^ [Fass 1991]. It 
is based on an extension of Wilks' preference semantics called coUative semantics 
(CS) [Fass 1988]. Fass' framework deals with the recognition and classification of 
input as being metonymical, metaphorical, literal or anomalous, making use of an 
extended version of the preferences described above. However, instead of pseudo-
texts, which play a role in CS the form of noun-sense frames (the word sense entries 
for nouns in the lexicon), Fass uses an abstraction hierarchy to recognise and inter-
pret metaphors and metonymies. This abstraction hierarchy consists of the linked 
word senses (the dictionary entries for words, which, in turn, consist of 'cells') and 
virtue to the fact that more speciaHsed word senses are composed of more generic 
ones, form a sub-/ supertype hierarchy. To give an example from [Fass 1991], one 
possible sense of 'enter', enter would be the supertype of ingest; eat and drink 
would both be subtypes of enter (see Fig. 3.2). Fass' assumption is that, given an 
example like 'My car drinks gasoline', the literal meaning will be a sibling of the 
metaphorical input concept, in Fass' terms: "A relevant analogy'* is indicated by a 
sister match of the source's relevant cell" [ibid. . 
enter contract 
1 
expend — i 
Sub/supertype 
- > 
Sibling match 
Fig. 3.2: Example of the type hierarchy in the met* method 
In the above example, according to Fass, one sense of both drink and use share 
^Read 'met star', where star is to be taken as the regular expression wildcard, thus matching 
metonymy and metaphor alike, 
^i.e. a metaphorical reading 
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the common supertype expend. A lookup of senses closely related to the sense(s) 
of the source (input) will thus lead to possible interpretations, which in turn can 
be evaluated using preferences (c.f. Fig. 3.2). 
Another extension to the model of the recognition/interpretation presented by 
Wilks is the possibility of distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy. If the 
input is considered anomalous on the basis of violated constraints, a set of appli-
cable 'metonymic inferences' is applied to i t . These inferences are drawn on the 
basis of a set of fixed "knowledge-specific relationships between a concept and an 
aspect of another concept" [Fass 1991] which are coded into Fass' implementation 
as metonymic inference rules of the form rule(source, target) and explicitly state 
the relationship that must hold between the input and a possible metonymic re-
placement, such as container for contents or artist for art form. Part of the met* 
method is to find a path through the network of senses which will be in keeping 
with the metonymic inference rules. 
It has to be noted that Fass exhibits a strong preference towards the hteral 
reading of any given input. His met* method operates as follows: If a literal 
reading can be found, exit. If not, apply metonymic inference rules. If this proves 
successful (possibly after iterating to resolve a chain of metonymies), substitute the 
result for the 'offending' part of the input and exit. If this is not successful, try to 
find a 'relevant analogy' i.e. a metaphorical interpretation. This can either lead to 
success or failure; in the latter case, the input is classified as anomalous. 
This is an obvious point for further discussion: as seen above, there are se-
mantically non-deviant sentences which would not violate any constraints, but yet 
have either an additional metaphorical reading or only a metaphorical reading. 
The role of context, as in 'The rock is becoming brittle with age' is a major one. 
Fass addresses this point by arguing that if the met* method were viewed in par-
allel processing terms, literal and figurative interpretations would be sought at the 
same time. This seems to contradict his outHne of the met* method. If there is 
no constraint violation, no further readings are sought; and by obtaining multiple 
readings at the same time, the whole point of the met* method, i.e. distinguishing 
between various types of semantic well-formedness by applying test in a certain 
order (satisfied preferences, metonymic inference possible, relevant analogy found), 
is made obsolete. Thus sentences with a literal and figurative reading will, as CS 
and met* now stand, only ever receive a Hteral one if the role of context is not 
introduced into CS and multiple interpretations considered in the met* method. 
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Another problem is Fass' notion that the preferences and possible metaphorical 
interpretations are tied to the main verb of the input, and the relevant analogy is 
expected to reside in the semantic neighbourhood of this part of the input. Al-
though this is true of the 'car drinking gasoline' example, consider 'On hearing the 
news, he exploded'. Supertypes of exploding would presumably include expand, 
self-destruct and similar ones, but not necessarily exhibit suddenness (or any 
concept relating to anger). This means that, firstly, the quahty of the recognition 
and interpretation will vary to a great extent in accordance with the information 
available to the algorithm in the form of a concept hierarchy. Secondly, the 'some 
up, some down' approach of finding a sister concept will not work well when the 
distance between the input and the common ancestor is too great, i.e. the 'relevant 
analogy' very general. 
In summary, the met* method can be seen as a successful implementation of 
an advanced version of preference semantics and the classical view on metaphor, 
although in a limited framework; Fass gives the following implementation details: 
"The metaS program is written in Quintus Prolog and consists of a lexicon holding 
the sense-frames of just over 500 word senses, a small grammar, and semantic 
routines that embody [...] CS" [Fass 1991]. Possible metonymical relations (cf. 
Sect. 3.1) are explicitly stated in the form of metonymic inference rules, and 
metaphors are resolved using Aristotle's 'analogy' type, by finding the basis of the 
analogy in the shared supertype of both. Where Aristotle said 'As old age is to 
life, so is evening to day', Fass might say 'As drinking is to animates, consuming 
is to cars'. 
It is a useful tool for the recognition of a subset of metaphors and sheds light 
on the issue of how metonymies can be recognised and interpreted, an issue which 
had not been addressed in depth prior to Fass' met* method. 
3.2.3 Comparison view 
A view that is reflected in both Wilks' and Fass' approaches is the comparison view. 
It is derived directly from the classical views on metaphor in that it emphasises the 
similarities between the terms involved in a metaphorical expression. It regards 
metaphor as a shortened comparison or simile, concentrates on pre-existing simi-
larities between the parts of the metaphor and assumes that a literal paraphrase of 
metaphors could be given. For example, in saying 'A is B' , the speaker means 'A is 
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like B (in certain respects)' and that the 'certain respects' carry the meaning and 
have to be found in order to arrive at the interpretation of the metaphor. Using 
Aristotle's examples of the "old age of the day", the similarity between life and a 
day is that both span a certain amount of time, have a beginning and an end, and 
progress continuously. Furthermore, since 'old age' denotes the later stages in life, 
it can be used to mean the later stages of the day, namely, evening. This is basically 
an elaboration of the substitution view, not merely stating that a figurative expres-
sion is substituted for a literal one, but also giving an account of how the terms 
used relate to each other. It should be noted that, by its very nature, this view 
concerns itself exclusively with metaphors of the 'A is B' form or comparisons. It 
cannot explain phenomena such as metonymy, since the form of metonymies does 
not conform to the 'A is B ' schema. Its reflection in the selectional restriction view 
comes in the form of Wilks' projection and Fass' relevant analogy, which are both 
embodiments of the similarity emphasised in the comparison view. 
3.2.3.1 Analogy approaches 
A school of approaches closely related to the comparison view, which have received 
much attention in A I are the analogy approaches. They can be seen as a further 
elaboration of the fundamental notion of the comparison view which assumes that 
flnding the similarity between the two terms involved holds the key to understand-
ing metaphor. Their main concern is the modelling and explication of phenom-
ena such as analogical reasoning and learning by analogy [Centner 1983, Centner 
1989, Holyoak and Thagard 1989b, Long and CarigHano 1994], but the underly-
ing assumption is that the mechanisms of metaphor can be explained by the more 
general principles of analogy. This of course entails that metaphor is seen as a 
special case of analogy. One work on analogical reasoning, which does not deal 
with metaphor and can therefore be regarded as unbiased, describes analogy as 
follows: "the interpretation of analogy is taken to be the inference that a property 
holds of one term or concept from the premises that the same property holds of 
another term or concept and that the two terms are ahke in some relevant way" 
Long and Garigliano 1994]. Clearly, this sounds like a restatement of the problems 
of metaphor, at least according to the comparison view. 
Chapter 3: Related work 31 
Gentoer 
The questions of the properties holding for one term and the way in which this term 
is similar to another one are addressed by Centner in her structure mapping the-
ory [Centner 1983, Centner 1989]. Centner describes analogy as a mapping from a 
base domain that serves as the source of knowledge to a target domain where the 
domains are represented as concepts and properties of those concepts. Properties 
can be of two types, differing in their predicate structure, namely attributes such 
as large (x) and relations such as c o l l i d e (x,y). The structure mapping theory 
is based on three mapping rules, the discarding of attributes, the preservation of 
relations between concepts and the systematicity principle which prefers the map-
ping of systems of relations over that of isolated relations. Thus, the structure 
mapping theory favours systematic, (highly connected) relations between concepts 
rather than less connected relations, and these in turn are preferred to attributes as 
possible correspondences between domains. Depending on whether the 'systematic 
relations first' rules are satisfied. Centner distinguishes different kinds of domain 
comparison; literal similarity (milk is like water), analogy (heat is like water), ab-
straction (heat flow is a through-variable), anomaly (coffee is like the solar system) 
and mere appearance (the glass tabletop gleamed like water) [Centner 1989 . 
In a literal similarity statement, for example, many attributes and relations are 
mapped from the base onto the target, and the number of mapped properties is 
large relative to the number of non-mapped properties, e.g. a statement like "The 
X12 star system in the Andromeda galaxy is like our solar system" would not only 
entail that there is a central star and several planets orbiting it (relations), but 
also that attributes such as the size and colour of the X12 star are similar to the 
attributes of objects in our solar system [Centner 1983]. In the case of an analogy, 
few if any attributes are mapped, but many relations, as in "The hydrogen atom is 
like our solar system" where attributes such as the size of the central object or its 
temperature, the number of planets etc. are not mapped, whereas many relations 
such as attracts (x,y), revolves-around (y,x) are carried over from the base into 
the target domain [Centner 1989]. 
The relevance this has for metaphor is shown in the quotation "A number 
of different kinds of comparisons go under the term 'metaphor'. Many (perhaps 
most) metaphors are predominantly relational comparisons, and are thus essen-
tially analogies. [...] Although most metaphors are relationally focused, some are 
predominantly attribute matches" [ibid. . 
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The structure mapping engine 
The Structure Mapping Engine (SME) is an implementation of Centner's structure 
mapping theory. (It is described in detail by Falkenhainer et al. [Falkenhainer et 
al. 1989] and an overview is given by Centner et al. [Centner et al. 1989].) 
Its operation follows the principles stated in the structure mapping theory; a set 
of possible matches between the concepts and their properties of the base and 
target domain is generated and, once the match exhibiting the highest systematicity 
is found and selected, the (systematic) relations present in the base domain but 
missing in the target domain are transferred. In the example above, all relations 
holding between the entities in our solar system could thus be mapped onto the 
(underdetermined) domain of the X12 star system. 
This implementation helps to highlight some problems of the structure mapping 
theory and the comparison view in general. For example, SME starts processing 
off as follows: "If two relations have the same name, create a match hypothesis" 
Centner et al. 1989]. The example presented is the metaphor 'She allowed life 
to waste like a tap left running', where a section of one domain is represented as 
shown in Fig. 3.3 and 3.4. 
Wasted-Tap-Water 
LEAD-XO 
CAUSE 
FLOW 
water tap drain water drain 
V A L U A B L E 
B l 
DISAPPEAR PURPOSE pO water 
FLOW pO none 
water tap drain 
Fig. 3.3: Structure mapping: base domain representation 
The implicit a priori similarity between the base and target domain with re-
spect to the relevant relation is striking, and the representation seems to already 
incorporate metaphor interpretation, as life is metaphorically described as flowing 
from the present into the past. In other words, the analogy is only found on the 
basis of some pre-existing similarity, in this example the fact that life and running 
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Wasted Life 
CAUSE WASTE 
FLOW DISAPPEAR she life 
life present past 
VALUABLE 
T l 
life 
life past 
VALUABLE 
T2 
present 
Fig. 3.4: Structure mapping: target domain representation 
water are described as flowing. The fact that similarities are 'uncovered' leads 
to another problem; similarities are by definition symmetrical relations. If A is 
similar to B, then B is similar to A. If life flows away like unused water, than it 
should be possible to describe water being wasted in terms of a wasted life ('She 
left the tap running like wasting life', which has a very odd ring to i t ) . I t is not 
true that most metaphors, if any, are symmetrical. There is a signiflcant difference 
in stating 'all surgeons are butchers' and 'all butchers are surgeons'. Whereas sur-
geons are seen in a negative way in the first sentence, butchers are seen as skilled 
meat-cutters in the second sentence. This emphasises yet another problem of the 
SME approach: as the name suggests, the structure mapping theory's and SME's 
operation is purely structural, and they rely on the form of their input and take 
no notice of the content. 
Salience imbalance 
The fact that metaphors tend to exhibit asymmetry is addressed by Ortony's 
salience imbalance theory, which forms part of his account of metaphor and can be 
classified as an instance of the comparison view. Ortony argues that similarity or 
comparison can take two forms, literal similarity and non-literal similarity [Ortony 
1979]. He gives the following examples: 
1. Encyclopaedias are like dictionaries. 
2. Encyclopaedias are like gold mines. 
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Whereas, according to Ortony, (1) is an instance of a literal comparison state-
ment, (2) is an example of a non-literal comparison. In making a comparison, as 
explained above, properties from one domain are transferred to another domain. In 
the first example, the properties of dictionaries are transferred or compared to the 
properties of encyclopaedias. There will be a considerable overlap between them 
and this will mean that a considerable amount of highly salient features from the 
base will be found to be highly salient in the target domain as well, e.g. dictio-
naries and encyclopaedias are both 'reference books' and 'consist of alphabetically 
sorted entries'. In the second example, however, there is no obvious overlap of 
properties, the highly sahent features of gold mines might be 'filled with something 
valuable', 'a commercial enterprise', 'a subterranean location' and so on. Being 
ful l of something 'valuable' is true of encyclopaedias, too, but it is not the most 
outstanding feature, and, more importantly, metaphorically rather than literally 
true. This leads Ortony to the following thesis: "[In] a comparison 'A is like B ' , if 
high-salient predicates of B are also high-salient predicates of A then the compar-
ison is a literal one and the two referents will be judged as being 'really' similar. 
If a high-salient predicate of B is a less-salient predicate of A while there are high-
salient predicates of B that cannot be applied to A at all, then we have a simile" 
Ortony 1979]. 
Metaphors (especially 'good' or 'interesting' ones) thus will exhibit a salience 
imbalance between the features of the two terms. Moreover, it is the salient features 
of the term 'B ' in a comparison 'A is like B' that are of relevance in a metaphor. 
Since salience is conventionally fixed, a reversal of the terms will result in different 
features being central to the metaphor. The 'butcher-surgeon' metaphor mentioned 
can help to exemplify this; although 'cutting flesh', 'wearing white coats' and 'using 
sharp implements' is true of butchers and surgeons alike, highly salient features of 
butchers include the coarseness of their cutting, whereas skill and care certainly 
count as highly sahent features of surgeons. The comparison 'all butchers are sur-
geons' therefore focuses on the skills, whereas the opposite is true of the comparison 
'all surgeons are butchers'. 
Summary of analogy views 
To return to the structure mapping theory, as far as recognition is concerned it rehes 
on the two terms of the comparison to be explicitly present in its input and cannot 
deal with cases where they are opaque or where there is only little information on 
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a concept available (e.g. only attributes). 
On the computational side, SME also has some shortcomings. First of all, it 
will find all possible matches and transfer all reasonable (systematic and structural) 
relations, whereas metaphor serves to highlight only certain possible inferences 
and owes much of its effectiveness to the fact that it relates concepts which have 
not been previously related via a pre-existing (structural) similarity. Work by 
Tourangeau and Sternberg addresses this problem of 'aptness', i.e. the balance 
between the similarity that is necessary to find a common ground between the terms 
and the dissimilarity that is necessary to give the metaphor its effect [Tourangeau 
and Sternberg 1982]. They state that the aptness of metaphor depends on two 
measures of similarity. "The two kinds of similarity are within-domain similarity, 
or the degree to which two concepts occupy similar positions with respect to their 
own class or domain; and between-domain similarity, or the degree to which the 
classes or domains occupied by the concepts are themselves similar" [ibid.]. Similar 
domains, i.e. a great between-domain similarity, will result in less interesting or 
apt comparisons (the worst case being an intra-domain comparison). The greater 
the within-domain similarity (matching concepts that 'play the same role' within 
their domain such as the sun and the nucleus both occupying the centre of the 
solar system or the atomic structure, respectively), the higher the aptness. 
Useful as this notion may seem, it has not been implemented. Moreover, the 
very complexity of SME, which requires another stage of processing comparing 
each of its input elements with all others (since the possible similarities are defined 
purely in structural terms in the SME framework) on top of a costly algorithm will 
make a possible implementation prohibitively expensive in terms of resources. 
Furthermore, Carbonell cites evidence that the structure matching is NP-com-
plete^ and any unguided matching will be computationally intractable, too [Car-
bonell and Minton 1985 . 
More generally, the comparison view (and SME, if representation does not come 
to its aid) will fail for another reason. Everything is similar to everything else in 
one way or another. If there is not enough knowledge about the base and target 
concepts and their properties available, a very general similarity will be found, 
but in metaphor it is not possible to combine any two concepts via any similarity. 
^Nondeterministic Polynominal-time complete, e.g. all deterministic algorithms for the prob-
lem are exponential. This means that the execution time for n inputs and some constant C 
denoting an operation is 
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Moreover, it is usually not the obvious similarity that is of interest and central 
in understanding a metaphor, but some more obscure, sometimes metaphorical 
similarity that ties two concepts together. Ortony's sahence imbalance theory 
is the only representative of the comparison view that avoids those pitfalls, by 
giving criteria regarding the directedness of comparisons and the structure of the 
comparison. In addition, it accounts for cases where there is little knowledge of 
the target domain available, and most properties (metaphorically) attributed to the 
target will come from the base. Whereas the structure mapping theory and SME are 
unable to account for such configurations, Ortony terms such cases where features 
of the base are newly introduced into the target domain "predicate introduction 
metaphor" [Ortony 1979]. However, there exists no implementation of this process 
of 'predicate introduction', even though Carbonell's (theoretical) work, which will 
be outlined in the following aims at modelling the way in which features from the 
base can be re-instantiated or introduced into the target domain. 
3.2.3.2 Invariance hierarchy 
A different approach which has much in common with the analogy school of thought 
described above but which has a more refined view on metaphor and gives useful 
new impulses is the invariance hierarchy approach put forward by Carbonell [Car-
bonell 1982, Carbonell and Minton 1985]. His original interests in analogical and 
common-sense reasoning led him to the problems of metaphor; "Our use of the 
same terminology'' to describe metaphors, similes and analogies reflects our opin-
ion that they are merely different linguistic manifestations of the same underlying 
process: analogical reasoning" [Carbonell and Minton 1985]. Although he too re-
gards metaphor primarily as an analogy or comparison, he pays more attention to 
the computational needs of a metaphor comprehension system and gives a detailed 
account of those he considers necessary in a process model of metaphor under-
standing. 
He rightly criticises the plain comparison view by stating: "Metaphors, similes 
and analogies are more than clever ways of restating the obvious. They are extraor-
dinarily concise devices by which a writer can convey new information, simply by 
signalling his audience that information in the source domain is applicable in the 
target domain. [...] however, before the reader can initiate the transfer, he must 
^Carbonell refers to 'source' , 'target' and 'analogical mapping' for the domains and the cor-
respondences between the concepts in the two domains. 
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identify the correspondences between the two domains and establish exactly what 
information in the source is applicable to the target, since much of it is clearly in-
appropriate. [...] Furthermore, when one considers requirements for computational 
tractability, it becomes evident that there must be strategies to help focus the 
comparison and constrain the matching process" [Carbonell and Minton 1985]. 
His major contribution to the field is the invariance hierarchy, which helps to 
narrow down the set of possible correspondences and can be regarded as a more 
concise filter for cross-domain mappings than Centner's systematicity principle. On 
the basis of empirical results of the relations and attributes that are mapped from 
the base onto the target domain, he claims that "[there] is a well-defined invari-
ance hierarchy among the aspects of a situation that are mapped by a metaphor" 
Carbonell 1982], i.e. there is a regularity with respect to which relations and at-
tributes are carried over into the target domain, which are transformed and become 
metaphorical, and which are ignored in the transfer. He lists them in decreasing 
order of expected invariance as goals, planning strategies, causal structures, func-
tional attributes, temporal orderings, natural tendencies, social roles, structural 
relations, descriptive properties and object identity. In the process of metaphor in-
terpretation, these invariant structures are consulted in a top-down fashion. Thus 
an utterance like 'John is a fox' would not be taken to mean 'John has pointed ears 
and a bushy tail ' but would rather be resolved as follows: "scan down the hierarchy 
stopping at the first entry for which we have a commonly known fact. For foxes, we 
stop at planning/counterplanning - folk wisdom tells us that foxes are very adept 
at devious counterplanning behaviour" [Carbonell 1982]. This attribute of 'slyness' 
would then be transferred to John, preventing a lower-match transfer from being 
made (e.g. descriptive properties such as 'bushy tail '). 
Unfortunately, it is not directly obvious how the invariance hierarchy can be 
exploited computationally. Carbonell himself states that the question of an ap-
propriate representation is indeed difficult. Moreover, it will still only serve as a 
refinement for a computational treatment of metaphor in the framework of the anal-
ogy approach, whose shortcomings are discussed above. Nevertheless, Carbonell 
must be praised for the new ideas he has injected into the field of computational 
treatment of figurative language and the stance of both taking new results into ac-
count (such as the pervasiveness of conventional metaphors in everyday language, 
see Sect. 3.2.5) and realising the needs and requirements of any realistic com-
putational approach. Particularly with respect to the determination of the base 
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and target domain and recognition, his theoretical work is partly influenced by the 
conventional view, which is discussed in Sect. 3.2.5 
3.2.4 Interaction view 
A theoretical modern view on metaphor which refuses most of the classical view 
is the interaction view put forward by Black [Black 1962, Black 1979] based on 
the philosophical work of Richards, which was presented as a series of lectures 
Richards 1936]. Richards introduces technical terms to facilitate discussion about 
various aspects of metaphor, most notably 'tenor' and 'vehicle' for the two terms, 
words or concepts involved in a metaphorical utterance; the claim stemming from 
the classical view that metaphor involves two terms was never disputed, but an 
array of incompatible terminological material only contributed to confusion about 
the subject matter. As Richards notes: 
One of the oddest of the many odd things about the whole topic 
is that we have no agreed distinguishing terms for these two halves of 
metaphor - in spite of the immense convenience, almost the necessity, 
of such terms if we are to make any analysis without confusion [ibid.]. 
'Tenor' denotes the part of a metaphorical utterance (which may or may not be 
explicitly mentioned) that is described in terms of another concept, the 'vehicle', 
which 'carries' the metaphor. According to Richards, not all metaphors consist of 
one tenor-vehicle pair, a secondary vehicle may be also present, as exemplified in 
the following: 
A stubborn and unconquerable flame / / Creeps in his veins and 
drinks the streams of life 
The tenor, which is not mentioned explicitly is 'fever', expressed in terms of the 
vehicle 'flame'. But the flame is seen as 'creeping' and 'drinking', i.e. described 
in terms of a 'secondary vehicle', a stubborn, unstoppable, consuming animate 
agent. As an extension of Richards' terminology, the terminus 'ground' has been 
introduced, denoting the attributes or features shared between the tenor and vehicle 
or, more generally, describing in which way the tenor resembles the vehicle. The 
ground in the example above would be 'heat', since the feverish body and a flame 
resemble one another in terms of heat. 
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The interaction view addresses problems that cannot be solved by the compari-
son view, which states that metaphor is based upon a pre-existing similarity. Such 
problems include the existence of metaphors where the terms exhibit no apparent 
similarity or the similarity itself is metaphorical (e.g. 'He is an open book to me') 
and the fact that it is possible to conceive of metaphors where the tenor and its 
features are largely unknown but rather introduced by the metaphor ('Tom Brown 
is the Mother Theresa of functional programming'). The interaction view states 
that metaphor is not located at the level of words, but that of ideas and thus a 
metaphor such as 'man is a wolf is concerned neither with replacing part of the 
expression with a literal paraphrase (e.g. 'man is fierce and competitive') nor sim-
ply with finding an analogy or pre-existing similarity (e.g. both man and wolves 
are fierce creatures living in a social structure, competing for power and status 
within this structure), but rather with associations made between the concepts. 
The 'ideas' are commonly shared beliefs about and associations with the words 
used in the metaphorical expression. Black calls these ideas 'systems of common-
places': "These commonplaces are stereotypes, not necessarily definitional, not 
even necessarily true, just widely agreed upon. In interpreting 'man is a wolf , we 
evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces and are led by them to construct 
a corresponding system of implications about the principal subject (man)" [Black 
1962]. This 'system of implications' (from the domain of the vehicle) is employed 
to view the tenor in a metaphorical light, i.e. relations that hold in the wolf do-
main are used to re-organise the man domain. Black explains this process using a 
metaphor: 
Suppose I look at the night sky through a piece of heavily smoked 
glass on which certain lines have been left clear. Then I shall see only 
the stars that can be made to lie on the lines previously prepared on the 
screen, and the stars I do see will be seen as organised by the screen's 
structure. We can think of metaphor as such a screen and the system 
of 'associated commonplaces' of the focal world as the network of lines 
upon the screen [ibid. . 
Seeing the domain of the tenor in terms of the commonplaces from the vehicle 
makes the two domains interact with each other, as this process of highlighting 
some relations and concepts and simultaneously ignoring others on the basis of 
one domain changes the way the tenor domain is viewed. Since those changes are 
not tied to single words or concepts but to a system of commonplaces, an array of 
changes occur in the tenor domain. 
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Thus, the fact that metaphors can create similarity, rather than stating pre-
existing ones is explained, as the similarity in many cases will be the result of 
the domain interaction. The interaction view has been very influential, and many 
other approaches take its findings into account. It explains phenomena which other 
theories cannot account for - such as the creation of similarity through metaphor 
and the ambiguity in metaphorical meaning — by introducing the 'correspond-
ing system of implications' which allows the reader/hearer to select any possible 
interpretation in accordance with the implications. 
It has to be noted that, as with most other approaches, the interaction view 
concerns itself with 'metaphor proper' and gives no account of how other tropes 
such as metonymy and irony may be described. A more serious problem is that 
it is diflficult to see how a process model could be derived from the findings of the 
interaction view; the central idea of 'filtering' leading to interaction is expressed in 
metaphorical terms and lacks explicitness. It is also not clear how the 'correspond-
ing system of implications about the principal subject' can be constructed. The 
'related commonplaces' are a priori indefinite and possibly infinite, yet not all are 
equally important or can indeed contribute towards the imphcations. The selection 
and importance of the commonplaces varies, depending on the tenor or context, as 
the contrast between 'man is a wolf and 'your dog is a wolf shows. 
Kittay addressed the two problems of limiting the possible relations arising 
from the 'system of implications' and the attribution of importance to the 'com-
monplaces' in her semantic field theory of metaphor [Kittay 1987]. She argues that 
the metaphorical meaning can be traced to the introduction of relations from one 
semantic field (the field of the vehicle) into the field of the tenor, whereby the 
semantic fields are not universally fixed, but dynamic context dependent relations. 
She further makes use of syntactic relations between the concepts from the seman-
tic fields, to predetermine possible matches between concepts from the tenor and 
vehicle domain (or field), as in her example of Socrates' midwife metaphor (see 
Figs. 3.5 and 3.6). 
Her work can be seen as a concretion of the rather abstract notions put forward 
by Richards and Black, but stays well within the framework of the interaction 
view. A toy implementation (NETMET) of her model has been made available 
Steinhart 1993]. Its generation of a large number of match hypotheses and its 
limited applicability (input has to have the form of predicate-calculus notations) 
classify it as a theory evaluating model (which presumably is what it set out to 
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be), but nevertheless an interesting and well presented (self-guiding exercises, an 
interface for the incorporation of new semantic fields, general analogical processing 
capabilities) one. 
V E R B NOUN P H R A S E NOUN PHRASE NOUN P H R A S E 
(agent) (sentence) (instrument) 
help midwife V E R B A G E N T R E S U L T potents& 
incantations 
create mother child 
(mother's body) 
Fig. 3.5: Semantic field theory: example of topic domain structure 
V E R B NOUN P H R A S E NOUN PHRASE NOUN PHRASE 
(agent) (sentence) (instrument) 
help Socrates V E R B A G E N T R E S U L T dialectic 
create? student ideas 
(student's mind) 
true false 
Fig. 3.6: Semantic field theory: example of topic domain structure 
3.2.4.1 D y n a m i c type hierarchy 
Way's dynamic type hierarchy of metaphor (DTH) can be seen as an elaboration on 
the interaction view and a more comprehensive implementation of the central no-
tions "to make his^ ideas about fi l tering, domains and meaning shifts more precise 
^Way is referring to Black. 
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and less metaphorical" [Way 1991]. As the name suggests, a type hierarchy is at 
the centre of Way's model. I t is based on conceptual graphs [Sowa 1984] and is used 
for "modelling the hearer's ontology of the world. Different beliefs and different 
knowledge about the world w i l l generate a different hierarchy and a different set 
of conceptual graphs" [Way 1991]. According to Way , the ontological hierarchy, 
changes wi th context, t ime and knowledge. A hierarchy at a given point in time 
consists of a number of concepts and Unks between those concepts, representing 
semantic links. The fi l tering idea of the interaction view is echoed in that an origi-
nal hierarchy may be viewed under different aspects, applying a Hteral or figurative 
mask to the hierarchy, respectively. Different masks wi l l obscure different concepts 
and links, thus giving a different view on a section of 'the world' . 
I n order to recognise metaphors, the D T H relies on the occurrence of constraint 
violations. Way's central notion is that the similarity, which is either pre-existing 
or created by the metaphor, is based on a common supertype of the tenor and 
vehicle. 
I hold that the 's imilari ty ' we find in common is an abstraction of 
some fo rm of the properties found in the tenor and vehicle. In Black's 
example of men and wolves, what we find in common are not similarities 
between the way a wolf is fierce or competitive and the way a man is, for 
they are radically different kinds of fierceness; rather, what we find in 
common is a more abstract concept of fierce competitiveness. What this 
higher-level concept maps to in the domain of men is social behaviour; 
for the domain of wolves i t is in the form of physical attacks. These are 
both instances of a general fo rm of competitiveness [Way 1991 
Way gives two examples "Nixon is the submarine of world leaders" and "the car 
is thirs ty" . As Nixon and submarines have no immediate attributes in common, 
the hierarchy is consulted in a bottom-up fashion. As Way states: "when we look 
up the hierarchy for Nixon's salient characteristics as a leader, we might see that 
they have a supertype in common, namely, 'things which behave in a hidden or 
secret manner' " [ ib id . . 
She acknowledges that there are cases where no supertype common to the tenor 
and vehicle that makes sense of the metaphor can be found. In such cases, a new 
node which is a generalisation of both the tenor and vehicle concepts is created. 
Way's second example illustrates this process; 'cars' are (amongst other things) 
' inanimate things', 'machines' and 'objects'. 'Thirs t ' is a 'state' and a 'need', com-
monly associated w i t h 'animate entities'. Going up in the hierarchy w i l l lead to the 
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common supertype 'mobile-entity' for 'animate' and 'vehicles' and a generalisation 
of requirement for 'need'. Thus the node 'mobile-entity' is specified wi th reference 
to the requirement (of liquids) to create the new node 'things that require hquid' . 
Since the domains are now linked via the common supertype of the tenor and 
vehicle, other relations can be seen in terms of the vehicle domain. In the submarine 
example, Nixon can be described as torpedoing policies, attacking enemies and so 
fo r th and in the car example, the car can drink, get i l l or be stubborn. 
There are, however, some apparent problems wi th this approach. Most notably, 
i t relies on a very detailed ontology. I t is hard to imagine the average ontology 
conveniently accommodating a concept such as 'things which behave in a hidden 
or secret manner,' at least not explicitly and as a generalisation of world-leaders. 
Hidden behaviour and instances of i t such as plott ing may well be present in a 
semantic network, as might be instances of world-leaders, but i t is hard to con-
ceive of a knowledge engineer hard-coding a sub-supertype relation between them. 
Secondly, Way's model of metaphor interpretation works through abstraction and 
therefore necessarily loses information. She states that in the Nixon example, tor-
pedoing can be understood as wrecking the policies of Nixon's enemies, but this is 
almost a substitutionist view, since wrecking a policy itself is another metaphor. I f 
Way kept to her own model, the action of torpedoing would have to be generaUsed 
to an action that is applicable to both ships and policies (e.g. rendering unfunc-
tional) and thus is l i terally applicable. However, t rying or succeeding in 'rendering 
unfunctional ' has lost all of the original impact of the torpedoing metaphor. 
To summarise. Way's D T H models the important aspects of the interaction 
view well, and her notion of figurative and hteral understanding operating on the 
same representation by highlighting and playing down various concepts and rela-
tions seems very convincing. I t is a definite bonus that the creation of new concepts 
is triggered by the encounter of figurative utterances and thus formerly dormant re-
lations are activated, serving as a means of describing a domain in terms of another 
domain. I t is furthermore an advantage that related inferences can be drawn in 
accordance w i t h those new links. Both these capabilities enable the representation 
to model a learning process and the elaboration of metaphors over a period of time. 
However, the reliance on a convenient ontology (the only source of knowledge in 
the D T H ) casts doubt on the applicability of the D T H in situations where no such 
elaborate ontology is available. Other sources, such as encyclopaedic knowledge, 
episodic knowledge and world knowledge should be considered where available, 
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instead of demanding that the ontology provides all necessary information. The 
creation or discovery of a common supertype has positive and negative aspects as 
well. I t can serve as a good heuristic in finding the ground of the metaphor, but on 
the other hand w i l l provide l i t t le information i f i t is very abstract (cf. the critique 
of Fass' met* method in Sect. 3.2.2). Way has provided very l i t t le information 
about the actual implementation. Relying on the knowledge rich ontology and 
ignoring established relations such as part-for-whole leads the D T H into a posi-
t ion where possible metaphors have to be anticipated to a great extent [E. Way, 
personal communication . 
3.2.5 Conventional metaphor view 
The view currently receiving most attention, especially in the field of cognitive 
science and psychology, is an approach that can be termed the conventional view. 
I t is influenced by cognitive, linguistic and computational work and is based on 
the highly influential work of Michael Reddy and partially on the interaction view. 
Reddy presented an analysis of figurative language which was based on empiri-
cal work and linguistic analysis rather than the analysis of individual examples 
of tropes i n the light of a preconceived theory. He thereby came to almost rev-
olutionary conclusions, namely, that large areas of everyday language are highly 
metaphorical and that the metaphoricity 'behind the scenes' is very systematic 
[Reddy 1979 . 
The 'conduit metaphor' forms, according to Reddy, a major framework "[imply-
ing] that human language functions like a conduit enabhng the transfer of repertoire 
members f r o m one individual to another" [Reddy 1979] and has systematic exten-
sions, elaborating on the fundamental packing-sending-unpacking schema: "(1) 
thoughts and feehngs are ejected by speaking or wri t ing into an external 'idea 
space'; (2) thoughts and ideas are reified in this external space, so that they exist 
independent of any need for l iving human beings to think or feel them; (3) these 
reified thoughts and feelings may, or may not, find their way back into the heads 
of l iv ing humans" [ibid. . 
The 'conduit metaphor' shows that i t is almost impossible to talk about ideas 
and communication in a l i teral way. We speak of ideas or thoughts as i f they 
were objects^ ('you st i l l haven't given me any idea of what you mean'), words and 
' A l l examples in this paragraph are taken from Reddy [1979]. 
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sentences as i f they were containers for those objects ('whenever you have a good 
idea, practice capturing i t in words', ' t ry to pack more ideas into fewer words', 
'you have to put each concept into words very carefully'), and communication as 
i f i t were finding and filling the right container for the idea and sending i t along a 
conduit to the recipient ( ' t ry to get your thoughts across better', 'none of Mary's 
feelings came through to me wi th any clari ty ' ) , whose task i t is to unpack the 
ideas ('Can you actually extract coherent ideas f rom that prose?', 'Let me know 
i f you find any good ideas in the essay'). Not only are concepts f rom the domain 
of communication regularly expressed in terms of the domain of the exchange of 
physical objects, but also reasoning about communication, e.g. reasons for failure 
of communication, is guided in accordance wi th how things work in the domain of 
sending physical objects. Reddy gives examples of how the speaker/writer's success 
or failure to 'pack his ideas' ( 'The sentence was filled w i th emotion', 'your words 
are hollow - you don't mean them') , the listener/reader's role in 'unpacking' them 
( ' I don't get any feelings of anger out of his words'), and the nature of the container 
( ' that remark is completely impenetrable') are metaphorically expressed to state 
how the communication process and its success or failure are seen. 
From the large corpus of examples presented by Reddy, i t becomes clear that 
there are systematic correspondences between the domain of ideas and communi-
cation and the domain of transfer of physical objects. Aspects of communicative 
acts such as understanding are frequently and systematically expressed in terms of 
receiving and unpacking, i.e. in instances of the generic 'conduit metaphor'; so fre-
quently indeed, that this conventionalised systematicity seemed to be too obvious 
to be unnoticed prior to Reddy's work. 
On the basis of corpora analysis, Lakoff, and Lakoff and Johnson investigated 
the systematic correspondences between domains further. They uncovered a vast 
system of cross-domain correspondences which lie behind a large number of conven-
tionalised figurative expressions, such as the correspondences between the domain 
of arguments and the domain of warfare ('He attacked all weak points', 'you cannot 
win an argument w i t h them') [Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. The fact 
that such correspondences govern a large number of everyday expressions and that 
the correspondences find their expression not only in language, but also in reason-
ing and behaviour related to the metaphorically conceptualised domain led Lakoff 
and Johnson to the hypothesis that metaphors (cross-domain correspondences) are 
to be localised in thought, rather than language. 
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The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind 
of thing in terms of another. I t is not that arguments are a subspecies of 
war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things - verbal discourse 
and armed conflict - and the actions performed are different kinds of ac-
tions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, 
and talked about in terms ofWAR. The concept is metaphorically struc-
tured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the 
language is metaphorically structured. Moreover, this is the ordinary 
way of having an argument and talking about one. [...] Our conven-
tional ways of talking about arguments presupposes a metaphor we are 
hardly ever conscious of. The metaphor is not merely in the words we 
use - i t is i n our very concept of an argument. [...] Metaphors as hn-
guistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors 
in a person's conceptual system. [Lakoff and Johnson 1980 
Metaphor, according to Lakoff and Johnson, is a conceptual structure, a method 
of accommodating lesser known, inaccessible or new concepts in a better known or 
better understood framework, which helps to structure the newly acquired concep-
tual material. The INFLATION IS WAR metaphor, for example, likens inflation to 
an attacking enemy ( ' inflation is destroying the savings'), entities opposing infla-
t ion to defending forces ('the government launched an offensive to beat inflation') 
and monetary policies to warfare ('the chancellor is batt l ing inflation') . Since the 
concept of inflat ion is too theoretical to be understood directly, i t is expressed in 
terms of a concept that is, on the one hand, more accessible and, on the other hand 
allows the right amount and kind of inference and extensions to allow for reasoning 
about inflat ion i n terms of reasoning about warfare. 
Lakoff and Johnson present three classes of metaphors, namely, orientational, 
ontological and structural metaphors [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. In structural 
metaphors, one concept is partly understood or conceptualised in terms of an-
other, as i n the ARGUMENT IS WAR and INFLATION IS WAR examples given above. 
Structural metaphors are a combination and elaboration of the ontological and ori-
entational metaphors. Orientational metaphors are centred around spatial relations 
and the mapping of spatial relations onto other, non-spatial domains. Examples 
of orientational metaphors are MORE IS UP ('prices are soaring', 'circulation fig-
ures went up') and its counterpart, LESS IS DOWN ('his income is too low', ' turn 
the music down'), as well as instances of these generic metaphors where 'less' or 
'more' are concreted to specific ranges, e.g. HAPPY IS UP ('she is in high spirits', 
'he fel l into a depression') or LOW STATUS IS DOWN ('her social standing dropped 
considerably'). 
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The class of ontological metaphors consists of correspondences between the do-
main of directly accessible objects and entities, especially our own bodies, onto 
more abstract domains. "Understanding our experiences in terms of objects and 
substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete 
entities or substances of a uniform kind" [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. Examples 
are THE MIND IS AN OBJECT wi th instances Hke THE MIND IS A MACHINE ('he's 
been churning out ideas all day long') and THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT ('he 
just snapped', 'the refusal shattered her') and the many event, action and state 
metaphors such as ACTIVITIES ARE CONTAINERS ('she is in banking', 'they are 
total ly absorbed in playing cards'). Personifications can be subsumed under the 
heading of ontological metaphors as they are a specialisation of the general prin-
ciple; a particular domain is not described in terms of any physical object, but 
in terms of a human or animate agent ('the theory explains nothing new', 'the 
government kept silent'). 
Metonymy is also explained in terms of conventional metaphors, as there exist 
highly generative schemata such as PART FOR WHOLE, and, as an instance, FACE 
FOR PERSON . Lakoff and Johnson give the following non-linguistic example: show-
ing a photograph of somebody's face w i l l be seen as an appropriate response to the 
request 'Can I see a photograph of ..?', whereas showing a photograph of the per-
son's body without the face w i l l be seen as inappropriate. Lakoff and Johnson show 
convincingly that these cases are just as systematic and governed by an underlying 
cognitive process as the other types of metaphor and give a short listing of possible 
metonymic mappings (e.g. PART FOR WHOLE, PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, OB-
JECT USED FOR USER,CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED). They do, however, make 
a distinction between metonymy and metaphor. The latter "is principally a way 
of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is under-
standing" [Lakoff and Johnson 1980], and metonymy "has primari ly a referential 
funct ion, that is, i t allows us to use one entity to stand for another" [ibid.]. 
The systematicity leads, by application of Occam's razor, to the assumption 
that the many related surface expressions, (figurative speech) can be traced to 
an underlying principle governing them all. Lakoff gives the following examples 
of the LOVE AS JOURNEY metaphor 'we've hit a dead-end street', 'we can't turn 
back now' and 'their marriage is on the rocks' [Lakoff 1993]. In assuming that 
they are three different metaphors, one would ignore the fact that they follow the 
same principle, namely expressing states of a relationship in terms of states of 
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journeys. Thus Lakoff comes to the conclusion that: "We have one metaphor, in 
which love is conceptualised as a journey. The mapping tells us precisely how love 
is being conceptualised as a journey. And this unified way of conceptualising love 
metaphorically is realised in many different linguistic expressions" [ibid.]. 
To summarise, the theory of conventional, conceptual metaphors states that 
metaphor is a cognitive agency whose surface phenomena, metaphorical expressions 
in natural language, reflect the conventional and systematic way of conceptualising 
one more or less abstract domain in terms of a more accessible one. This is founded 
in bodily experience and cultural conventions. General mappings (such as L O V E 
AS J O U R N E Y ) have systematic instantiations, therefore metaphor should not be 
regarded as 'mere words'. The theory has considerable strong points. First of all, 
i t was based on the empirical analysis of large amounts of data. The collection of 
instances of conceptual metaphors is an ongoing project, resulting in the Master 
Metaphor List [Lakoff et al. 1995], which is a repository, classification and index of 
the examples analysed so far. I t is backed up by this empirical evidence insofar as 
the notion that metaphorical expressions are the surface of an underlying process 
explains the systematicity and the ubiquity of metaphor; i f i t is easier (or sometimes 
even the only way) to talk and reason about something in terms of a better known 
structure, then this w i l l surely be reflected in the use of language. I f there exists 
a large and conventional system of cross-domain mappings, based either on bodily 
experience (we are subject to gravitational force, have an intrinsic front and back) 
or cultural community, the ease wi th which conventional metaphoric expressions 
and extensions of those mappings seemingly are understood is explained. Novel 
metaphors are easily understood because they are based on pre-existing conceptual 
schemata and are mere extensions of them into a previously uncharted area. 
Despite the appeal of the explanatory power and coherence of this theory, i t 
must be kept in mind that i t is a rather theoretical approach and does not easily 
lend itself to a process model of metaphor understanding. As Mar t in noted in ref-
erence to the conceptual metaphor view: "While i t is difficult to apply results f rom 
psycho-linguistics to computational models in a direct fashion, these results can 
nevertheless pose useful rough constraints" [Mart in 1990]. The aspects of recog-
ni t ion of metaphors, the influence of context in the recognition and interpretation 
of metaphors and metonymies and the details of how the mapping works are not 
detailed; the mappings are seen as static correspondences, derived f rom cultural 
or bodily experiences and the interpretation obviously seems to be immediate. 
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Furthermore, a comprehensive basis of explicit knowledge about the cross-domain 
mappings and their instances is assumed to exist a priori , and an account of how 
those existing mappings might be extended systematically is given, but no model 
is provided of how they (or new metaphors) can be acquired in the first place. 
3.2.5.1 Knowledge-based approaches 
The findings that metaphors are a conventionahsed part of everyday language be-
cause they are situated in thought (hence the high systematicity in language, which 
is the expression of those cognitive configurations) led to new approaches in the 
computational treatment of figurative language. As Carbonell stated: "The prob-
lem of understanding a large class of metaphors may be reduced f rom a reconstruc-
t ion to a recognition task. That is, the identification of a metaphorical passage as 
an instance of one of the general metaphorical mappings" [Carbonell 1982]. This 
means that not every occurrence of a possible metaphoric expression is computed 
anew by comparing domains and t rying to find a possible correspondence. In-
stead, figurative input is compared to expHcitly stored knowledge about general 
metaphors. 
M I D A S 
Mart in 's work was one of the first computational approaches to make use of ex-
plici t knowledge about figurative language [Mart in 1990]. For a l imited domain 
(the U N I X operating system, the transfer of ideas and diseases), he showed how 
a knowledge-based approach makes the treatment of figurative language more 
tractable, or even possible. By coding knowledge about processes being seen as 
enclosures, for example, his system was able to interpret instances of metaphors 
such as 'How can I get out of emacs?' and automatically extend its knowledge by 
classifying previously unknown metaphors ('how do I get into the LISP shell?') as 
instances of already known ones. 
His metaphor interpretation, denotation and acquisition system (MIDAS) con-
sists of a lexicon ( in which traditional word senses are listed alongside conventional 
metaphors), the metaphor interpretation system (MIS) and a metaphor extension 
system (MES). The representation of knowledge about conventional metaphors is 
modelled in terms of source and target domains (case roles and their relations) and 
a set of associations between concepts f rom the two domains (a mapping structure. 
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l inking case roles), using the K O D I A K representation language, a construct similar 
to K L - O N E [Brachman and Schmolze 1985 . 
Mar t i n distinguishes between core metaphors and extended metaphors. This 
is basically a distinction between generic metaphors (such as the MORE IS UP 
metaphor) and instances of these generic metaphors, (e.g.HIGH STATUS IS UP). 
He also states a set of conditions for an extended metaphor to be derivable f rom 
a core metaphor, pertaining to the relationships between the concepts involved in 
the core and extended metaphor. As an example of a core metaphor, Mar t in names 
"infection-as-possession: Mary has a cold" and as extended metaphors derived f rom 
this core metaphor he cites "becoming-infected-as-getting: John got his cold f rom 
Mary, causing-infection-as-transferring: Mary gave John a cold" [Mart in 1990 . 
The roles of the infection domain ('having a cold', 'giving a cold') correspond 
to the roles i n the possession domain; the extension consists in the mapping of 
previously uninstantiated roles f rom the core metaphor to roles in the extended 
metaphor (infection-as-possession does not explicitly mention receiving, but a pos-
sessor can pass on his possession to a recipient). 
Interpretation in MIS consists of two main steps; first, all possible interpreta-
tions are sought, l i teral and non-literal alike. I f one or more matches wi th the stored 
metaphorical knowledge are found, the most specific is preferred. In the 'Mary gave 
John a cold' example, a match would succeed wi th both 'infection-as-possession' 
and 'causing-infection-as-transferring'; and the latter would be preferred as being 
a specific case of the more general 'infection-as-possession'. A process termed 'con-
cretion' is responsible for ensuring that the most specific interpretation is found; 
i t instantiates generic concepts such as 'giver' in accordance wi th the constraints 
the metaphor puts on the new role of the input concept, i.e. the instance must 
satisfy all roles i t plays when used in the metaphor schema. The second step 
is called 'metaphoric unviewing'. I t creates an instance of the general metaphor 
that was found to be applicable to the input, in which the target concepts f rom 
the metaphor replace the corresponding source concepts. To give an example, all 
roles f r o m 'how can I get into LISP' satisfy the constraints of the entering-as-
invoking ('self-propelled entity as agent', 'process as target location', 'entering as 
action') , where entering an enclosure corresponds to invoking a process; the map-
ping requires the agent and the location to remain unchanged and the action to be 
replaced by 'invoke'. 
M a r t i n argues that i t is useful to arrange metaphors in an inheritance/ab-
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straction hierarchy, firstly so that "independent concepts can then be shared by the 
various related senses that have common associations" [Mart in 1990]. For example, 
having an infection puts the agent in the role of possessor in the core metaphor and 
is shared by causing infection, in the role of the transferer. The second advantage is 
to allow cases of non-core related metaphors, (metaphors which cannot be derived 
f r o m generic ones via extension) to be subsumed under one metaphorical scheme. 
He gives the following examples for non-core related metaphors: 'how can I k i l l 
a process', 'those ideas won't bear any f r u i t ' , ' inflation is eating up our savings' 
as being related through "a component association that links an abstract concept 
that is not aHve w i t h a kind of Hving thing" [ibid.] or, in better known terms, 
personifications. 
The notion of arranging metaphoric knowledge in a hierarchical fashion has 
obvious advantages. I t enables a system to find the most specific interpretation of 
a generic metaphor, thus avoiding the danger of returning interpretations which 
are so general that they are of l i t t le value. I t accounts for the fact that linguistic 
realisations of metaphors seem to be related to general conceptual schemata and 
allows for systematic relations between metaphorical expressions which share parts 
of their structure (as in Martin 's core and extended metaphors). 
M a r t i n went on to examine how metaphor can be used to exphcate the phe-
nomena of polysemy and for the acquisition of new word senses [Mart in 1991b . 
He further investigated how his model of metaphor extension can be used towards 
the accommodation of semantic systematicities not captured by lexical semantics 
M a r t i n 1992 . 
To summarise, Martin 's work offers some very helpful insights and new direc-
tions. The need to represent metaphorical knowledge expHcitly to allow for efficient 
computational treatment of figurative input can be derived f rom both the findings 
about the conventionality of metaphors by Lakoff and Lakoff and Johnson, and the 
shortcomings of the analogy-based approaches. Arranging metaphors and their 
surface realisations in a hierarchy is in keeping wi th the conventional theory of 
metaphor, too, as i t allows for systematic elaboration of more general schemata. 
The idea that a system should be able to interpret new instances of figurative lan-
guage on the basis of previously acquired knowledge is particularly appealing, as 
i t loosens the constraints of the closed world assumption. 
The problems w i t h Martin 's work, however, must also be examined. In his origi-
nal work [Mar t in 1990], he does not give details about how an inheritance hierarchy 
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could be modelled, apart f r o m one example consisting of 11 Non-Living-Thing-As-
Living-Thing metaphors. In a later paper [Mart in 1991a], the construction of a 
large knowledge base ( K N B ) containing all metaphors f rom the Master Metaphor 
List [Lakoff et al. 1995] is considered, but no further details are given. Moreover, 
possibly because his examples come f rom a l imited domain, he deals wi th cases 
where an interpretation is completely determined by the metaphor that is found 
to match against the input; "Metaphor maps are needed to link all the core source 
concepts [...] to their counterparts in the target domain" [Mart in 1990], either 
directly or through extension. This means that his metaphor maps are specific 
enough to lead to a detailed interpretation, stating explicitly which roles in the 
input correspond to which roles in the metaphor and thus in the interpretation. 
Granted, i n the first instance, his work serves as a computational model, but in a 
real application wi th an extensive K N B , the chances are high that there might be 
a general schema such as process-as-enclosure, whereas the existence of a domain 
specific schema such as entering-as-invoking cannot be presupposed. Therefore, the 
model should support 'on the fly' generation of instances of metaphors to support 
the coverage provided by Martin 's processes of extension and concretion. A final 
point, similar to the problem wi th Way's D H T , is the fact that the correspondences 
in Mart in 's model l ink target and source concepts through an abstraction, thus los-
ing information. In a similar vein, MIDAS 'replaces' the figurative input wi th a 
l i teral and often more abstract interpretation; "The concept that best accounts for 
the input replaces the pr imal representation as the ult imate representation of the 
input" [Mar t in 1990] and therefore records no evidence about the relation between 
the two domains, apart f r o m the fact that the interpretation w i l l be classified as 
an instance of a particular metaphor. 
3.2.6 Connectionist models 
The work of Veale lies at the intersection of knowledge-based and connectionist 
approaches to modelling of metaphor understanding [Veale and Keane 1992a, Veale 
and Keane 1992b, Veale and Keane 1993, Veale and Keane 1994, Veale and Keane 
1995;. 
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Conceptua l scaffolding 
Veale's model of metaphor interpretation, conceptual scaffolding [Veale and Keane 
1992a, Veale and Keane 1992b] takes the fact that many conventional metaphors 
use spatial relations to structure non-spatial domains (MORE IS UP,LOW STATUS 
IS DOWN ) as a basis for establishing a framework of connections (the conceptual 
scaffolding) between concepts. According to Veale, this framework forms, the basis 
of metaphor understanding. The scaffolding is "constructed f rom a fixed set of spa-
t ia l ly founded operators, which encode our experiential intuitions about collocation, 
containment and orientation" [Veale and Keane 1992a]. This is a direct reflection 
of the large system of conventional metaphors based on spatial relations uncovered 
by work i n the wake of Lakoff and Johnson [Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff et al. 
1995]. The scaffolding captures underdetermined relations, association and disas-
sociation between concepts, on the basis of which a flner interpretation, involving 
the naming of associations and the inference of new associations f rom the existing 
ones, takes place at a later stage. 
Veale presents a spatial semantic for conceptual scaffolding, involving operators 
such as 'connect', 'disconnect', 'actual-causality' and 'attempted-causahty' that 
can represent both li teral and figurative meanings [Veale and Keane 1992a]. For an 
i l lustrat ion of the operators, relating to the sentences (1) 'Mary went to town' , (2) 
'Mary went to sleep', (3) 'Mary went f rom rags to riches' and (4) ' B i l l gave Mary 
a book', see Fig. 3.7. 
1. Mary — 
2. Mary — 
3. Rags ^ 
4. Mary — 
•0-
•0-
•0-
Town 
~ Sleep 
Mary •0- Riches 
-0-
I 
I 
Bill 
Book 
^ 0 -
DISCONNECT 
^ 0 -
CONNECT 
CAUSALFTY 
Fig. 3.7: Spatial semantic operators for conceptual scaffolding 
The process of metaphor interpretation in Veale's model is broken up into the 
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first stage of the construction of the conceptual scaffolding between the concepts 
f r o m the input and the later stage of elaborative inference f rom the scaffolding. 
The creation of the scaffolding involves finding the most interesting attributes of 
a concept, which might change wi th context (a brick w i l l be seen in different lights, 
according to whether i t is on a building site, securing a caravan f rom moving, or is 
thrown through a window), but "Regardless of context, an orientation operator wi l l 
naturally prefer those attributes which contribute to the function of the concept 
as a whole" [Veale and Keane 1992a], in other words, the context-independent 
most salient features. Once the connections between concepts are established, a 
knowledge base is consulted. The K N B takes a simple concept association, such 
as 'apple, colour' or 'tea, hot ' and returns a relation specifying the associations 
between the concepts, labelling the association, such as 'apple, colour, green' or 
'tea, hot, temperature'. Since there is no guarantee that a concept association 
can always be labelled (reasons can be the lack of knowledge or an unresolved 
metaphorical meaning), unspecified associations are kept by the K N B unt i l enough 
knowledge for their labelling is available. 
Veale gives the following example: "The RISCsystem 6000 workstation rescued 
I B M " . 'Rescue' is expressed in terms of up(predicament) —> safe and leads to 
connect(IBM,safe) —> connect(IBM,(up(predicament)) —> u p ( I B M ) . As I B M is, in 
this context, seen as a manufacturer of a product, the salient feature of I B M being 
a business is chosen; thus, u p ( I B M ) resolves to up(IBM,market-share) (which, as 
i t turns out, is another metaphor). 
The conceptual scaffolding employs the same techniques when dealing wi th 
other kinds of figurative language such as metonymy. Input such as ' J im drank the 
whole bott le ' would receive the relation (beverage as content of bottle) f rom the 
knowledge base on the query connect (bottle,beverage). 
Veale's model presents some very good answers to questions not previously re-
solved. Furthermore, i t overcomes the difficulties traditional lexical semantics have 
w i t h metaphor, thus the deep seatedness of metaphor in our conceptual system (his 
spatial semantics represent the basic structure of the spatially founded metaphor 
system) is acknowledged. A uniform method is used for treating different kinds of 
figurative language. Although some implementation details are given, namely that 
the conceptual scaffolding model was implemented as part of the T W I G concept 
acquisition f r o m text NLP system in common LISP, a very central question is not 
addressed, namely, how the knowledge base is organised, how large an amount of 
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knowledge is stored in i t , and how many relations apart f rom the ones returned are 
possible on the basis of its data. The data base's functionality is explained, but 
not its key features. 
Cleaver % 0 Scalpel 
Dormant link 
Attributive relation 
Fig. 3.8: Sapper triangulation rule 
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Fig. 3.9: Sapper squaring rule 
Another shortcoming of the model is its failure to address what had been of cen-
t ra l concern to almost all other scholars in the field, namely, comparison statements 
of the f o r m ' A is B ' . 
This deficit has been made up for by further work [Veale and Keane 1993, Veale 
and Keane 1994, Veale and Keane 1995], in which Veale complemented conceptual 
scaffolding w i t h a hybrid symbolic/sub-symbolic model of metaphor interpretation 
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called Sapper. This model is based on a localist graph that, represents concepts as 
nodes, and semantic relations between the nodes as linkages. The interpretation 
process consists of two separate steps. First, a symbolic process augments the 
network of concept relations wi th dormant finks: "Such dormant network Hnkages 
represent merely plausible, rather than fu l ly established, semantic relations, and 
are thus not operative carriers of activation" [Veale and Keane 1994]. The creation 
of new dormant links is governed by two rules which operate on the structure 
of the network. The first ' triangulation rule' forms a fink between concepts that 
share a common supertype or a common attribute (see Fig. 3.8). This can be 
compared to Way's approach of finding a common supertype, but i t must be noted 
that while Way is making use of an ontology, Veale's triangulation rule operates 
on knowledge that is not restricted to ontological relations. The second 'squaring 
rule' makes use of the links established by the triangulation rule in establishing 
fur ther inter-domain linkages which are coherent w i th the links derived via the 
triangulation rule (see Fig. 3.9). 
The second, connectionist step propagates activation f rom the tenor and vehicle 
nodes. This activation can 'awaken' a dormant l ink on the condition that the fink 
receives activation f r o m different parent nodes. Once i t is activated, i t passes on 
activation f r o m one domain to the other. This can be seen as a direct model of the 
theoretical notions of domain interaction proposed by the interaction view (see Sect. 
3.2.4). The newly estabfished links are then ranked according to various criteria, 
including a measure of how well they fit the overall systematicity of the domain 
relation (single unsystematic links are ignored) and are seen as 'is metaphorically 
l ike ' semantic relations (see Fig. 3.9). 
The LISP implementation of Sapper comprises 284 concepts nodes f rom the 
domain of professions and 1597 user-specified semantic links, including attributive, 
control/controlled, part /part-of and effect. In an evaluation experiment [Veale and 
Keane 1995], i t compared favourably wi th systems based on the analogy approach 
Falkenhainer et al. 1989, Holyoak and Thagard 1989a, Holyoak and Thagard 
1989b], but some of its fimitations must be pointed out. The model obviously only 
deals w i t h comparison statements and, although this might prove very useful, an 
application of its mechanisms to extend the depth of the interpretation of conven-
tional metaphors cannot be easily derived f rom the information Veale presents. I t 
expects the tenor and vehicle concepts to be expHcitly present in its input and re-
turns a very general 'is metaphorically like' semantic relation in the fo rm of a newly 
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established l ink between concepts. I t seems that, while this is a cognitively very 
plausible model of metaphor interpretation, direct application of its mechanisms 
to a general computational treatment of metaphors is not possible i f one considers 
the size and structure of the data used for its evaluation. 
Veale notes that "the worst case scenario involves the generation of n * (72 —1)/2 
dormant linkages, where n is the number of localist nodes in semantic memory" 
Veale and Keane 1995]. I f one applied Veale's model directly to the L O L I T A 
system w i t h its 100,000 nodes (c.f. Sec. 2.2.1), this would mean the creation of 4 999 
950 000 dormant linkages. This is a better result than SME's n! complexity^, but 
s t i l l a rather prohibitive number for a large system aiming at real-time processing, 
as the dormant linkages only fo rm the basis for the second, connectionist step of 
metaphor interpretation. Assuming that 10 mil l ion operations of linkage generation 
are performed per second, the in i t ia l stage in the L O L I T A system would, in the 
worst case, take more than 8 min . Veale further notes that "as i t happens, the 
average case performance is much lower than this ceihng, the effect of a weU-
defined domain structure being to considerably reduce the possibilities of inter-
node bridging" [ibid.]. While an evaluation configuration can afford to rely on a 
well-defined domain structure, an implementation which deals wi th a dynamic and 
non-predetermined representation w i l l lack the benefit of the well-defined domain 
structure and w i l l thus tend towards the worst-case scenario. 
To summarise, while the scale and dependence on the representation of the 
Sapper model allow for no immediate transfer of its results to a real-life large-scale 
system, i t is a very convincing cognitive model. The central notions of domain 
interaction are reflected, and the loss of information that accompanies 'abstraction' 
approaches (such as Way's D T H , see Sect. 3.2.4) is avoided by letting the two 
domains interact freely during the connectionist phase. On the computational side. 
Sapper manages to avoid the factorial complexity of analogy-based approaches (see 
Sect. 3.2.3). This is obviously due to the fact that processing is spHt into a two-
tiered symbolic and subsequent sub-symbolic stage, which is a highly interesting 
approach. 
^For n inputs, ( l * . . . * n — l * n ) operations are performed, making a complexity of n! unfeasible 
for all but the smallest number of inputs 
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3.3 Summary 
There are many different approaches to the many questions surrounding metaphor 
and figurative language, each highlighting various aspects of the multifaceted prob-
lem. There is no unified account to date, but the study of metaphor (outside tra-
dit ional disciplines like literature) is an emerging field. The renewed interest is due 
to the realisation that metaphor plays a central role (in thought, and therefore in) 
language. Most current work is carried out in cognitive frameworks, wi th emphasis 
on psychology and Hnguistics. Computational models tend to be created mainly 
for the evaluation of theories f rom those fields. 
3.3.1 Central issues 
The questions that arose f rom an analysis of the classical authors can now be 
re-evaluated in the light of the various approaches discussed above: 
• What is metaphor? 
Metaphor and other figures are the expression of cognitive mechanisms, which 
accounts for their high degree of systematicity (and pervasiveness) in natural 
language. Figurative language is widespread and describes one set of concepts 
in terms of another. Most current theories deal w i th comparison statements 
of the fo rm ' A is B ' , which has led to overemphasis of the necessity for ana-
logical mapping. A distinction is made between metaphorical (as a means 
of understanding/describing one thing in terms of another) and metonymic 
figures (as a means of referring to one thing in terms of another) [Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980 . 
• Is there a structure in metaphor? 
The analogy approaches argue that the key to metaphorical structure lies in 
the similari ty between the structures of the base and target domains, thus 
restricting the domains that can possibly be used to describe others. The 
conventional view, which seems more convincing and ultimately more suited 
as a basis for a computational approach, states that experience and cultural 
influence constitute a conventional system of general metaphors, which serve 
as templates for individual instances and realisations of figurative expressions. 
This is i n keeping w i t h the more theoretical interaction view, which posits 
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that two systems of concepts and a set of 'commonplaces' associated wi th the 
concepts structure metaphor [Black 1962 . 
• How are metaphors interpreted? 
There are two main views on the interpretation of metaphor. The analogy 
school of thought sees interpretation as a process by which the relevant valid 
similarities in two domains are computed, and the most important ones then 
transferred f r o m the base domain to the target domain, where they are re-
instantiated. The conventional view assumes fixed but general and abstract 
correspondences between domains (e.g. metaphors such as M O R E IS U P ) and 
sees interpretation as activation of knowledge about these correspondences. 
As Carbonell noted in reference to the results of Lakoff and Johnson [Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980]: "There appear to be a small number of general metaphors 
.. .] that pervade commonly spoken Enghsh. [...] The computational signifi-
cance of the existence of a small set of general metaphors underlies the reasons 
for my current investigation: The problem of understanding a large class of 
metaphors may be reduced f rom a reconstruction to a recognition task" [Car-
bonell 1982]. The feasibility of this approach is underlined by the results of 
Martin 's M I D A S system [Mart in 1990 . 
• W h y are metaphors used? 
Having established that metaphors do not merely have a decorative function, 
since otherwise a large percentage of everyday language would have to be 
classified as ornamental, the most convincing explanations seem to be the 
inexpressibility and the compactness hypotheses. 
The inexpressibility hypothesis states that metaphor is used "to express ideas 
that simply cannot be easily or clearly expressed wi th Hteral speech" [Gibbs 
1994]. The compactness hypothesis claims that metaphor serves as a cue, 
evoking many associations and possible inferences on the basis of a compact 
utterance [ibid. . 
Grice [Grice 1975, Grice 1978] assumes that metaphor violates the rules of 
l i teral language and that, on the basis of this violation, a pragmatic analysis 
to salvage the communicative contribution is initiated. He has been severely 
criticised for his views on metaphor [Gibbs 1994], but his conversational max-
ims hold, i n our view, for figurative language and literal language alike. This 
is particularly true for his maxim of quantity — make your communicative 
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contribution as informative as required by the context, neither more nor less 
so — and the maxims of relation and manner — say only what is relevant in 
the context; make your contribution as precise and brief as possible. These 
seem to capture the impact of metaphors, even though they were not in-
tended to apply to figurative language. By giving the hearer/reader a cue 
that can, due to its conventionahty, serve as a basis for further inferences and 
elaboration, all three maxims are clearly being followed. 
• How can metaphors be classified? 
As the field as a whole is in the process of establishing itself and many oppos-
ing camps handle various different aspects, no unified or generally accepted 
terminology has been agreed upon yet. In the following, a classification out-
l ining the better estabhshed terms and traditional classes w i l l be given. This 
classification w i l l be re-assessed in Sect. 5.3, taking into account the necessi-
ties of a computational treatment. 
3.3.2 Classification of types of figures 
• Allegory 
A trope of 'continual metaphor', where a large section or a whole text is 
expressed in metaphorical terms f rom one domain. 
E.g. The description of statesmanship in terms of seafaring (likening the 
leader of a state to the captain of a ship, the state to the ship, history to the 
sea, pohtics to the art of navigation). 
• Analogy 
The likening of entities or relations. A stipulated isomorphism between two 
concepts and their attributes. A n analogy states, in varying degrees of ex-
plicitness, the matching similarities between its referents, usually in the form 
A is to B as C is to D. 
E.g. The atom is hke the solar system, i t has a large central object around 
which other objects are orbiting. 
• Antonomasia 
The replacement of a proper name by either a term describing the genus or 
a periphrasal construction. 
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E.g. 'The almighty' instead of 'God' . ' A n odyssey' instead of 'a long and 
complicated journey'. 
• Emphasis 
A subclass of synecdoche (see below), where a (semantically or pragmatically) 
more poignant expression than required in the context is used to increase the 
impact of the utterance. 
E.g. 'Be a man' for 'Behave like a man'. 'A childish child' to put emphasis 
on the childish qualities (e.g. of behaviour). 
• Euphemism 
Replacement of a term (often f rom a taboo domain) by a term without any 
negative or even a highly positive connotational value. 
E.g. 'Friendly fire ' for the gunfire of one's own soldiers. 
• Hyperbole 
Use of a term that exaggerates a given quality of the term i t denotes in 
order to draw attention to this quahty or increase the emotive impact of the 
utterance. 
E.g. 'Heart of stone'. 'Dr ink a gallon of mi lk ' . 
• Idioms 
A fixed syntagmatic construction consisting of more than one lexical entity 
(otherwise an additional lexicalised meaning could be listed for a single lexical 
i tem) where the meaning of the whole expression cannot in part or as a whole 
be derived f r o m the individual parts; the paradigmatic exchange of single 
elements does not result in any systematic change in meaning. 
E.g. 'This work is not my cup of tea'. 'There is too much red tape'. 
• Irony 
Replacement of what is meant by an expression denoting the opposite by 
means of antonymy (e.g. 'How nice of h i m ' instead of 'How awful of h im ' ) , 
contrasts (e.g. 'Physically, he is very strong' for 'Intellectually, he is not very 
strong') or i l locution (e.g. 'Go ahead!' for 'Do not do this!'). 
• Litotes 
Replacement of a term (often accompanied by an emphatic marker) by the 
negation of the opposite. Related to irony and the inverse trope hyperbole 
(see above). 
E.g. 'Not (particularly) good' for '(Very) bad'. 
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• Metonymy 
One of the classical definitions of figures holds that metonymy is the replace-
ment of a term by a semantically related term. The relation can be causal, 
spatial, temporal or a generically semantic/ontological such as inventor-
invention, place-inhabitants, thus less restricted than the relations that hold 
in the case of synecdoche (see below). 
E.g. 'Read Shakespeare' for 'Read Shakespeare's work(s)'. 'Drink a bottle ' 
for 'Dr ink the contents of the bottle' . 
• Personification 
The likening of an inanimate or abstract entity to a human or humanoid 
entity; the application of human attributes or features to non-human referents 
(entities, events). Depending on the point of view, personification could 
be regarded as a specialisation of an inverse antonomasia, synecdoche or 
metonymy (see above). 
E.g. 'This dog owns the house'. 'The car is thirsty ' . 
• Rhetorical question 
In a general sense every interrogative phrase that although formally and gram-
matically asking for an answer (where a possible answer would be either 
yes/no or a phrase) pragmatically does not ask for an answer (newspaper 
headlines, for example). In a more special sense, the same grammatical con-
structions indicating the opposite of their proposition. 
E.g. ' D i d he arrive in time?' for ' ( I am sure that) he did not arrive in time'. 
'Does he ever leave his terminal ' for 'He never leaves his terminal ' . 
• Simile 
A comparison between two referents, usually made explicit by the use of 
lexical entities expressing a comparison, i.e. 'as' or 'Hke'. 
E.g. 'His voice is like thunder'. 
• Synecdoche 
Replacement of one term by a semantically more restrictive or less restric-
tive one. The restrictions are based on the classical definition of synecdoche 
(genus/species, part/whole). In most cases, the relation can be inversed. A l -
though the traditional classification makes a distinction between metonymy 
and synecdoche, there is no evident reason why the two types should not be 
subsumed under the more general type. 
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E.g. 'The sail disappeared on the horizon' for 'The ship disappeared' 
3.3.3 Additional issues 
Besides the original questions discussed in Sect. 3.3.1, there are additional points 
arising f r o m the discussion of the literature which seem worth noting. 
Recognit ion 
Recognition in some theoretical and almost all computational models (the excep-
t ion being Martin 's M I D A S system [Mart in 1990]) is based on the detection of an 
anomaly, although linguistic and cognitive results show that no anomaly detec-
t ion mechanism is responsible for the recognition of figurative language by humans 
Gibbs 1994 . 
Generally, there does not seem to be a fail-safe way of recognising or distinguish-
ing figurative f r o m literal or anomalous language that does not at the same time 
wrongly classify a substantial amount of utterances. Without recourse to context, 
world and episodic knowledge (c.f. Wi lks ' pseudo-texts. Way's type hierarchy) as 
well as knowledge about figures (c.f. Martin 's core metaphors, Fass' metonymic 
inference rules), the anomaly detection heuristic is the only fallback method. 
Stages of processing 
I n a cognitive framework, Gibbs [Gibbs 1993] makes the necessary distinction be-
tween the process and the product of linguistic understanding and identifies the 
following stages during the understanding of figurative language: 
• Comprehension. 
The "immediate moment-by-moment process of creating meanings for ut-
terances. These moment-by-moment processes are mostly unconscious and 
involve the analysis of various linguistic information (e.g., phonology, lexical 
access, syntax), which, in combination wi th context and real-world knowl-
edge, allows listeners/readers to figure out what an utterance means or a 
speaker/author intends" [ibid. . 
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• Recognition. 
The conscious identification of the products of comprehension as either literal 
or figurative and as instances of a certain type, e.g. a metonymy, a promise 
or a command. 
• Interpretation. 
The conscious assignment of one or more (more or less elaborate) meanings 
to "the early products of comprehension" [ibid. . 
• Appreciation. 
This stage "refers to some aesthetic judgement given to a product" and "is 
not an obligatory part of understanding linguistic meaning, because listen-
ers/readers can easily comprehend utterances or texts without automatically 
making an aesthetic judgement about what has been understood" [ibid. . 
A t this stage, dimensions such as the aptness, the novelty and impact of a 
figurative expression are evaluated. 
This categorisation is useful, because i t helps to avoid a dilemma that might 
arise when no distinction is made between the individual stages of processing and 
the process as opposed to the product. When being confronted wi th an utterance 
like ' M y car is thirs ty ' , we are inclined to immediately state that this is an instance 
of a metaphor. However, we can do so only after having passed through the primary 
stages of linguistic processing. This would mean in detail: understanding what the 
individual words mean and what the relation between them is (comprehension), 
consulting our world knowledge (cars are machines and only animate beings that 
require fluid intake for their metaboHsm to function can be thirsty) (recognition), 
and constructing one or more interpretations on the basis of the previous stages 
and extra-linguistic knowledge such as the discourse situation (the car needs oil or 
petrol). These stages then support appreciation (the car is described in terms of a 
pet or companion, its owner employs similar metaphors very often etc.). 
In our model, too, these stages are reflected, not because we are aiming at a 
cognitively appropriate model, but because they either prove necessary or useful 
or both. Nevertheless, our distinction differs f rom the proposals made by Gibbs, 
and this w i l l be discussed in detail in Sect. 5.2.1. 
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Representat ion 
The hierarchical structure of general metaphors (as proposed by Lakoff [Lakoff 
1993] and modelled by Mar t in [Mart in 1990]) and their instances is a useful and 
necessary concept, as i t captures already established metaphorical relations and 
allows elaboration of these on the basis of pre-existing structures. In a computa-
tional model, this means a reduction in processing time, as i t is possible to build 
on foundations that have already been analysed. In a similar vein, the automatic 
extension of metaphoric knowledge (as shown in Martin 's MIDAS system [Mart in 
1990]) is useful and important, too. Firstly, i t frees the system to a certain extent 
f r o m the restrictions of pre-coded knowledge (the closed world assumption); sec-
ondly, i t allows broader coverage by extending basic mechanisms over a dynamic 
range of possible input. 
The representation of knowledge and the results of the processing is also con-
sidered to be of importance. Whereas Wilks and Fass do not make direct use of 
the resolution, Mar t i n stores the results of the analysis in the appropriate place 
in the abstraction hierarchy to facilitate the processing of similar input [Wilks 
1975a, Fass 1991, Mar t i n 1990]. In a theoretical outline of a process model, Car-
bonell assigns this task a high priori ty: "Remember this instantiation of the general 
metaphor wi th in the scope of the present dialogue (or text) . I t is likely that the 
same metaphor w i l l be used again [...] w i th additional information conveyed" [Car-
bonell 1982 . 
Novelty of metaphors 
The dimension of novelty is discussed controversely. Whereas Lakoff argues that 
even the most poetic and novel metaphors are necessarily based on (a combina-
tion) of the conventional, general metaphoric schemata and even idioms and 'dead' 
metaphors (such as 'leg of a table') should be regarded as ' true' metaphors [Lakoff 
1993], others, such as Way advocate that 'dead' metaphors be simply listed in the 
lexicon [Way 1991]. In a computational framework, i t is important to choose the 
most efficient way of resolving figurative input. The question of novelty thus be-
comes an issue, since i t affects whether the same resolution mechanisms should be 
applied to 'novel' and 'dead' metaphors alike. 
In the following chapter, these points w i l l be analysed, alongside the implica-
tions f r o m the evaluation of related work, in the framework of the L O L I T A system. 
Chapter 4 
Figurative language and L O L I T A 
This chapter presents the implications of the work discussed in Chap. 3 for the 
problem outlined in Sect. 1.1 wi th regards to the L O L I T A system. In Sect. 4.1, the 
general problem area of figurative language processing is re-analysed in the light of 
the L O L I T A framework, and Sect. 4.3 presents criteria for evaluating the solution 
to the stated problem. Methodological considerations of importance to the work 
in general and the solution in particular w i l l be discussed in Sect. 4.2 
4.1 Problem statement 
Recent research has unarguably shown that figurative expressions pervade every-
day language. The meaning of figurative language cannot be computed easily, 
using the established natural language processing (NLP) methods such as lexical 
(compositional) semantics, t r u th conditional semantics and generative semantics 
frameworks. Nevertheless, i t exhibits systematicity and various models aiming at 
explaining the mechanisms behind understanding figurative expressions have been 
put forward (c.f. Chap. 3). 
By far the largest part of work undertaken in the field of non-hteral language 
concerns itself w i t h the evaluation of cognitive theories by implementing models of 
those theories. The results of both theoretical and small-scale work seem advanced 
enough to be analysed wi th respect to their appHcabihty in a large-scale, natural 
language (NL) engineered system. But at the same time i t has to be kept in mind 
that the transfer of results f rom a small evaluation model to a real-life NLP system 
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is not a mere software engineering endeavour; an expensive algorithm that may 
work well for a l imi ted domain or small knowledge base ( K N B ) is unsuited to a 
large-scale system. 
As stated in Sect. 1.1, the L O L I T A system would greatly benefit f rom an 
extension of its NLP capabilities into the direction of figurative language for the 
following reasons: 
• The L O L I T A system is a large-scale systems, whose aim i t is to process 
unrestricted, everyday texts. This means that figurative language cannot be 
ruled out as lying outside the systems scope of possible input. Especially if 
one considers the pervasiveness of figurative language. 
• Being able to process non-literal language is not so much of an advantage, but 
a necessity given the ubiquity of figurative language of varying complexity. 
NLP systems which cannot deal wi th figurative input are severely restricted 
in their scope. 
• The L O L I T A systems is based on deep techniques. This means a thorough 
analysis of its input on all linguistic levels (syntax, semantic, pragmatics) 
is needed, and an analysis of figurative input has to be performed in order 
to ensure that the required depth of processing is guaranteed for the whole 
range of input; this is particularly crucial, since subsequent stages of pro-
cessing make use of the results of previously analysed input. Not being able 
to process figurative language would ultimately result in 'holes' in the sys-
tem's performance, whenever access to various levels of analysis of non-literal 
language were needed. 
I t is necessary therefore to extend the existing processing capabilities of the 
L O L I T A system to cover figurative language as well. By processing figurative 
language, we mean: 
• Recognising figurative parts in the system's input and distinguishing i t f rom 
both l i teral and anomalous input. 
• Enabling the system to apply its existing functionality to figurative input. 
This means that figurative input should be assigned an interpretation and 
thus subsequently be available for other stages of processing (such as the 
drawing of inferences or generating N L on the basis of i t ) . 
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• Representing knowledge about figurative language in the system's K N B . This 
is part ly a prerequisite for the analysis of figurative language and partly a 
requirement for the successful completion of the functionahty mentioned in 
the last point above. Since the L O L I T A K N B is the basis for generation of 
N L , a suitable representation of knowledge about non-literal language would 
ul t imately enable the generation of figurative expressions. 
The details of this functionali ty wi th regard to the L O L I T A system and their 
comparison w i t h the task of understanding figurative language as presented in Sect. 
3.3.3 w i l l be discussed in Sect. 5.2. 
The delimitat ion of what we consider to be 'figurative expressions' is, of course, a 
prerequisite for further investigation. I t is necessary to give a clear account of what 
k ind of N L expressions we consider to be wi th in the range of figurative language 
(as regards processing in L O L I T A ) , thus stating which phenomena we expect to 
be treated. This w i l l be addressed in Sect. 5.2.2, where the classical types of 
figures (discussed in Sect. 3.3.2) w i l l be re-assessed in the light of computational 
requirements for their resolution and representation. 
One fundamental, hitherto implic i t assumption has to made explicit, namely, 
whether or not the undertaking of implementing non-literal N L analysis is possible 
and feasible, especially in the framework of a large-scale NLP system. Therefore, 
one central objective of this work is to establish the feasibility of such an under-
taking. To this end, a thorough literature survey and evaluation of related work 
has been carried out; as discussed in Chap. 3, some theories and approaches seem 
more suited to forming the basis of an implementation than others. Most work 
in this area has either been theoretical, undertaken to evaluate theories by sup-
plying a computational model, or restricted in size. Although the work of Wilks 
Wilks 1975a, Wilks 1975b, Wilks 1978], Fass [Fass 1991], Mar t in [Mart in 1990], 
Veale and Gentner [Falkenhainer et al. 1989] [Veale and Keane 1992a, Veale and 
Keane 1993] has been implemented, none of i t was incorporated into a large-scale 
system. Domain independence or broad coverage were not a concern to those im-
plementations either, and in some cases (including most of the theory-evaluating 
implementations) the representation was customised for the task at hand. 
For the reasons given in Sect. 3.2.5, we favour the knowledge based approach to 
understanding figurative language. On the theoretical side, i t exhibits the highest 
degree of explanatory and predictive power over a range of types of figurative 
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language, whereas other approaches concentrate on single types. While i t is not 
a readily implementable theory, i t avoids the pitfalls of the analogy approaches' 
computationally intractable process model. 
Whi le the conventional, knowledge-based theory is chosen here as a basis for the 
investigation into processing figurative language in the L O L I T A system, however, 
i t should be noted that our aim is not the evaluation of its theoretical merits or the 
ease w i t h which i t lends itself to implementation. Neither wi l l we consider i t as our 
only source of theoretical inspiration, as i t cannot claim to explain all phenomena 
which are of relevance to the treatment of non-Hteral language in an NLP system. 
When seen in isolation, this liberal approach to the re-use of theories and results 
might be considered unmotivated. Therefore some points on the methodology 
adopted for this work w i l l be presented in the following. 
4.2 Methodology 
The subject of this research is to investigate the state of the art in figurative 
language processing as well as to outhne and, i f possible, implement a solution to 
the basic problems concerning figurative language in an existing, NL engineered 
NLP system. 
Owing to the complexity of the field and general lack of agreement, this work 
had to be part ly theoretical. The critical evaluation of the results, advantages 
and shortcomings of previous approaches was necessary in order to gain insights 
into the general and special problem areas, to localise obvious garden-paths (with 
the benefit of hindsight), to avoid approaches which seem outright unsuited for a 
large-scale system, and to have a means of comparing our solution wi th others. 
Furthermore, as there is no generally accepted terminology and (particularly wi th 
regard to computational work) only localised theories are available, the analysis 
and comparison of previous work serves to focus the manifold approaches in order 
to arrive at a clear outline of which tasks pertain to figurative language processing. 
As far as the modelling and implementational side is concerned, one method-
ological aspect is the view taken by artificial intelligence ( A I ) or appHed computa-
tional linguistics: The model should exhibit behaviour parallel to human behaviour, 
regardless of whether this behaviour is due to underlying processes similar to those 
assumed or proven to govern human behaviour. In addition, the methodology and 
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criteria applied in the field of natural language engineering (NLE) in general (c.f. 
Sect. 2.1) apply to this work as well. Since N L E is understood as the application 
of sound engineering methods to the field of NLP, the work presented in this the-
sis follows the structure of engineering procedures. Af ter taking related work into 
account, a solution to the problem is designed in Chap. 5, and its implementation 
evaluated in accordance wi th the criteria outhned below in Sect. 4.3. 
I t should be noted that the aim of the design and implementation stages is to 
arrive at a prototype. The work set out, namely, to establish whether a broad 
spectrum of problems in the field of processing figurative language in the L O L I T A 
system can be dealt w i th , rather than concentrating on the perfection of a single 
sub-task, e.g. the treatment of personification. Prototypes are defined as software 
solutions which are developing in parallel to the theoretical aspects of solving a 
given problem [Gorz 1993]. They contain the essential algorithms, data structures 
and interfaces needed for an application or f u l l solution and are a valid formal 
approach, since the required algorithms and data-structures for many problems are 
known only theoretically, and detailed insights can only be gained by prototypical 
implementations and their evaluation. In the context of this work, this means that 
starting f r o m carefully chosen examples, an in i t ia l solution was sought, which was 
then the subject of testing and generalisation. 
Keeping to N L E principles means, that although a sound theoretical basis is 
desired, theory forming and adherence to a chosen paradigm is not the primary 
goal. The need for useful and robust systems calls instead for a flexible approach, 
subordinating aspects like cognitive adequacy. This might result in the need for 
the incorporation of localised theories in sub-areas, especially when, as is the case 
w i t h most aspects regarding figurative language, no comprehensive computational 
account for certain phenomena has been given yet. 
4.3 Evaluation criteria 
There are some reasons why no comparative evaluation in the traditional sense 
can be carried out. Firstly, the systems discussed in Chap. 3 are not generally 
available for testing. Secondly, some systems are not comparable either in size 
(toy systems or evaluation implementations as N E T M E T [Steinhart 1993] or Sun's 
microfeature-based approach incorporated into CONSYDDER [Sun 1995], consist-
ing of nine relevant concept nodes) or in the direction of their thrust: the structure 
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mapping engine [Falkenhainer et al. 1989] deals wi th comparison statements based 
on analogues. Wi lks ' aim [Wilks 1975a] on the other hand was to extend an exist-
ing system so i t would tolerate input that was a l i t t le outside the system's scope; 
which is in itself a laudable approach, in line wi th the N L E criterion of robustness. 
Moreover, the implementations were based on a customised representation (fa-
ci l i ta t ing the operation of the chosen algorithms) that was l imited in size, gran-
ularity, coverage or structure. No work concerned itself wi th the extension of an 
existing system (wi th its own representation) in the direction of comprehensive 
processing of figurative language. 
The aim of this work is therefore not to compete wi th models whose design bears 
a resemblance to self-fulfil l ing prophecies, but to assert and tackle the requirements 
and problems involved in processing figurative language in the framework of the 
existing large-scale system L O L I T A . 
The evaluation of NLP systems (particularly large-scale NLP systems) is an 
emerging and not yet well developed area. Due to the variety of NLP tasks and 
an abundance of more or less specific systems, there are no established criteria or 
methods to evaluate any given (sub-)system. Although competitions and work-
shops can provide a basic measure of how well a system (dedicated to single tasks, 
e.g. machine translation or information retrieval) fares wi th respect to others, this 
is not a sensible method for evaluating parts of a system. Problems arising in a 
different sub-part might be attr ibuted to the component in question; an evaluation 
setup for the sub-task of processing figurative language is hard to conceive of. A l l 
the components the figurative resolution module relies on (e.g. parsing, semantics, 
pragmatics, the knowledge-base and generation) have to be up to scratch in order 
to show the actual performance of the resolution module. 
Of course, a sub-system adhering to N L E principles should not make assump-
tions about the reliabili ty of other sub-systems i t depends on. Moreover, the aver-
age N L E system w i l l not have the benefit of a small-scale, customised environment, 
as is the case for theory-evaluating models. Keeping these factors in mind, the only 
conceivable method for evaluation is a meticulous comparison of results in the light 
of their setting^ that is the original goal, the data available and, most importantly 
the impl ic i t factors such as back-door encoding of results and constraints. 
A n evaluation of the work presented herein thus consists of a review of the fol-
lowing points: how does the solution to the problem of non-literal analysis compare 
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to previous solutions, bearing in mind that they have been designed for a different 
framework and therefore a one-to-one transfer of results is not always possible, and 
how does the solution conform to the N L E criteria (c.f. Sect. 2.1). 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced a detailed account of the problem area of processing figura-
tive language in a large-scale, natural language engineered NLP system, mentioned 
aspects of the methodology observed throughout the work presented in this thesis, 
named criteria for the evaluation of the achievements, and presented the objectives 
of this work. 
The objectives were to estabhsh the feasibility of non-literal analysis wi th in 
the L O L I T A system and, to meet this objective, the state of the art has to be 
analysed. I f the task proves feasible, a solution which is in keeping wi th the N L E 
criteria (see also Sect. 2.1) and which recognises and classifies figurative input 
should be designed. The integration of this solution into the L O L I T A system, 
i.e. the extension of LOLITA' s existing capabiHties in the direction of non-literal 
language, embodies the final objective. 
Chapter 5 
Processing figurative language in 
L O L I T A 
In this chapter, the tasks and prerequisites for the successful completion of the 
problems discussed in Sect. 4.1 are presented in detail, and important details 
of the implementation and integration into the L O L I T A system are given. The 
introductory section discusses theoretical issues of the computational treatment of 
figurative language in the L O L I T A system. 
5.1 Theoretical issues 
We adopt an approach similar to the knowledge-based and conventional approach 
put forward by LakofF, Johnson and Mar t in [Mart in 1990, Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, Lakoff 1993]. The deep entrenchment of well-established figurative schemata 
in the conceptual system, reflected in the systematicity wi th which they appear 
in linguistic expressions, is grounded in bodily experience [LakofF and Johnson 
1980, Johnson 1987], cultural or linguistic tradition [Lakoff 1993]. They determine 
how and under which circumstances we may use one concept to denote another 
or one relation to express another. I t would, therefore, seem very inefficient to 
compute the relations between concepts t ime and time again for each occurrence 
of a figurative expression. Rather one should make use of the schemata to the 
best possible extent, as has been realised by others working in a computational 
framework. Carbonell, for example, states: 
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The problem of understanding a large class of metaphors may be 
reduced f r o m a reconstruction to a recognition task. That is, the iden-
t if icat ion of a metaphorical passage as an instance of one of the general 
metaphorical mappings is a much more tractable process than recon-
structing the conceptual framework f rom the bottom up each time a 
new metaphor instance is encountered. Each of the general metaphors 
contains not only mappings of the form ' X is used to mean Y in 
context Z , ' but inference rules to enrich the understanding process 
by taking advantage of the reason why the writer may have chosen 
the particular metaphor (rather than a different metaphor or a literal 
rendition). [Carbonell 1982 . 
Furthermore, Sowa maintains wi th reference to the knowledge-based approach: "A 
standard catalogue of metaphors is probably adequate for interpreting everyday 
speech" [Sowa 1984 . 
The reasons for rejecting the analogy approach are that i t is interested only 
in comparison statements (missing out on the large amount of metonymies) and 
that i t computes the cross-domain correspondences anew every time a metaphor is 
encountered. Moreover, as i t lacks the facil i ty to recognise metaphors a priori , i t 
fails to enable a system to distinguish between figures and anomalies without going 
through a complete resolution process. 
We do not replace a figurative expression wi th a literal paraphrase. We keep the 
original input and the interpretation, as well as the method by which we arrived 
at the interpretation. So the figurative surface can be carried over into subsequent 
stages of processing, which greatly helps cohesion in dialogue, for example. How-
ever, at the same time, the fact that a figurative resolution has taken place is also 
recorded, together w i th the result. I f a part of the system requests the mean-
ing behind the figure, i t can easily be retracted and serve as the basis for further 
processing. 
This touches on the fact that we do not subscribe to the repair view on figura-
tive language, i.e. input is analysed to yield a literal reading first; i f this reading is 
found to be defective, a non-literal reading is computed [Searle 1979]. Neither do 
we express any a priori preference towards literal or figurative interpretations, as 
Fass' met* model does [Fass 1991]. I t should be noted, however, that in doing so, 
we are not merely shifting the responsibility towards a different component of the 
system. The goal of this work was to determine i f and how figurative processing 
in the L O L I T A system can be tackled. Therefore, integration into the pre-existing 
structures and flow models had to take priority. On request, our model delivers 
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information about whether given input is metaphorical or not and which class(es) 
of trope(s) i t belongs to i f i t is figurative, and provides an interpretation of varying 
depth (depending on the depth of information that is available for the interpreta-
t ion) . 
Instead of ranking the results in any order or attempting a literal interpreta-
t ion first, our starting point is located at the level where sense creation [Gibbs 
1994] takes place in the system. Although this is in keeping wi th cognitive results 
obtained f r o m experiments, i t was not cognitively adequate modelling but the ne-
cessity for robustness and coverage that motivated this design decision. Gibbs 
states: 
One idea, called the error recovery model, assumes that sense cre-
ation is ini t iated only after the conventional meaning has been found to 
be in error [ . . . ] . This model posits that hsteners recognise the need for 
a figurative interpretation of such an utterance as The ham sandwich is 
getting impatient for his check after i t is seen as violating the maxims 
of truthfulness, [ibid. 
Al though a preference for li teral interpretation can be expressed (by disabling the 
figurative processing sub-system completely or requesting non-literal resolution 
for events individually after l i teral processing has taken place), the entry point 
for figurative processing is where meanings for lexical items and phrases are se-
lected/created in the course of 'Hteral' processing (see Fig. 5.1). 
Figures can appear i n combinations and chains. We are able to account for such 
cases, as we do not treat the unit sentence but 'events'; this means that any relation 
between concepts that is expressible in LOLITA's representation formalism can be 
analysed (see Sect. 2.2.1 and Fig. 2.2). Concepts in L O L I T A are not restricted to 
the level of lexical material but are rather nodes in the SemNet, defined by their 
relation to the rest of the semantic network. They can represent an entity ('the 
beer in the glass on the table', 'Jake'), a class ('surgeons', 'breweries'), a word sense 
( 'str ip ' , for example, has a number of senses, either as a noun or verb) or a complex 
conceptual structure, such as a whole story. 
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Fig. 5.1: Location of the figurative processing sub-system in L O L I T A 
5.2 Tasks and prerequisites 
This section introduces the prerequisites for a computational treatment of figurative 
language and examines their manifestation in the L O L I T A system. The tasks 
relating to the processing of figurative language are discussed and, subsequently, a 
classification of figures based on the requirements of their computational handling 
is given. 
5.2.1 Resolution levels 
I n the following, the tasks that are part of the complex process of understanding 
figurative language are presented and the psycho-linguistic categorisation of tasks 
carried out during the understanding of figurative language (presented in Sect. 
3.3.3) is re-evaluated in the light of a feasible computational framework. 
The convincing categorisation of temporal stages and discrete processes of im-
derstanding figurative language proposed by Gibbs (see Sect. 3.3.3) and backed 
by experimental work [Gibbs 1994] is reflected in our model. Yet computational 
treatment of figurative language requires additional tasks to be carried out, such 
as representing, modifying and storing knowledge (about metaphors, about the 
process of understanding and its results). In the following, the tasks involved in 
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processing of figurative language in the L O L I T A system w i l l be described. 
Comprehens ion 
Comprehension does not play any central role in our model, because the retrieval 
of meanings, the lexicon lookup, the morphological and syntactical mechanisms we 
use in the processing of figurative language in the L O L I T A system are the same as 
for hteral processing. There are, however, two points to note. Although the equiv-
alent treatment of li teral and figurative processing is in keeping wi th cognitive 
models of linguistic processing, i t has not yet been explicated which processes take 
place during comprehension. Meaning selection, for example (discarding or pre-
ferring one particular reading of a linguistic enti ty) , or polysemy resolution would 
require at least a partial interpretation. I f this interpretation is not accessible unt i l 
a later stage, ambiguity has to be carried over into the following stages. This is the 
way i n which the L O L I T A system deals wi th ambiguities that cannot be resolved 
during parsing and lexical lookup. Ambiguities are carried over into semantics and 
pragmatics and, in our case, into the figurative processing sub-system. I f they can-
not be resolved, they are kept and carried over into the processing of the following 
input un t i l enough information for their resolution is available. Although an in-
terpretation (even partial) might help at early stages (e.g. polysemy resolution), 
the architecture of the system currently provides no alternative to going through 
all (or most) stages of resolving the literal and figurative meaning of an utterance 
before any information derived f rom the input can be used to discard improbable 
readings w i t h an acceptable degree of certainty. 
Moreover, inasmuch as the assignment of a figurative meaning to input is per-
formed by the figurative language sub-system, the stage of sense creation (tradi-
t ionally associated wi th comprehension) is indeed part of our model. Meanings for 
words and phrases not conventionally accessible (by lexicon-lookup) are created by 
the figurative interpretation, thus comprehension features in our model. But since 
the figurative interpretation process operates alongside the hteral processing (i.e. 
i t is not necessarily triggered by the detection of an anomaly after a f u l l literal 
interpretation was sought, although the system can be configured to prefer literal 
readings), comprehension is not a process that has unique relevance to figurative 
processing. 
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Recogni t ion 
The task of recognition is central to our model. Aspects of robustness and usability 
are very influential at this crucial stage. The percentage of input correctly tagged 
as being metaphorical has to be maximised, and the percentage of metaphorical 
input not recognised as such has to be minimised. Ideally, all metaphorical input 
should be recognised as such, and no Hteral input should be tagged as metaphorical. 
Recognition cannot be regarded as a uniform process for all types of figures (see 
Sect. 5.2.2 for a more detailed discussion). As even seemingly 'simple' metaphors 
require complex knowledge to be recognised as such and since there are cases where 
both l i teral and figurative readings are possible, i t is assumed that, in the absence 
of other criteria for recognition, even the shallowest of interpretations indicates the 
presence of a figurative utterance (which might also have a vahd literal interpreta-
tion) and that the absence of a figurative interpretation indicates that the input is 
not metaphorical. 
I t is impossible for any type of figurative expression, let alone all of them, to give 
even a heuristic for their safe recognition. Some previous approaches to metaphor 
(most computational models) took the violation of certain rules (communicative, 
t r u t h conditional or semantic) not only as indication but as a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the existence of a metaphorical expression [Levin 1977, Searle 
1979, Fass 1991, Carbonell 1982]. But the evidence of counterexamples has shown 
that, although these criteria might help in the task of recognising figurative lan-
guage, they neither support a clear distinction between literal and non-Hteral, nor 
do they guarantee a high success rate in detecting metaphors. 
Employing methods such as selectional restriction violation is helpful in a l im-
i ted area, which leads us to use them in our model without relying on them ex-
clusively; this is because the requirements of robustness favour failure to recognise 
correctly rather than incorrect classification of literal input as metaphorical. 
T ru th conditional criteria are of even less value, since they rest on a clear dis-
t inct ion between li teral and figurative language or, in their extreme form, deny 
figurative language to have any t ru th value at all. Assigning a t ru th value to a 
figurative expression before the stage of interpretation does, however, not make 
sense. When 'Becker kills Lendl on the Centre Court' , i t follows that 'Lendl is 
dead'. T ru th condionalists would claim that since 'both tennis players walk off the 
court ' , either no t r u t h value can be assigned to the expression, or i t is plainly false. 
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Not so, after we have arrived at an interpretation of this instance of the C O M -
P E T I T I O N A S P H Y S I C A L A G G R E S S I O N conceptual metaphor, where competition is 
seen and described as direct physical aggression and the entailments (metaphorical 
mappings) between the domains of aggression and competition have been taken 
into account. K i l l i ng , beating and winning battles are successes in aggressive be-
haviour, whereas being killed, being beaten and losing battles constitutes failure in 
aggressive behaviour. In accordance wi th the metaphorical mappings of the C O M -
P E T I T I O N A S P H Y S I C A L A G G R E S S I O N metaphor, success in aggressive behaviour is 
success in competition, and failure in aggressive behaviour is failure in competi-
t ion. So Lendl is really (although not literally in the literal sense of the word) dead, 
because he failed in a sporting competition against another tennis player. As can 
be seen f r o m this example, i t is not valid to claim that metaphors have no t ru th 
value, especially when this claim does not take into account the interpretation or 
actual meaning of metaphors; i t is impossible to decide on the t ru th value of a 
hteral expression i f the meaning of the expression is not taken into consideration. 
The false assumption about metaphorical t ru th seems to arise f rom the lack of 
consideration for the various stages of linguistic interpretation. 
In general, there are different criteria for different types of figurative expression 
which can serve in their recognition. For the knowledge-based figures (see Sect. 
5.3), the correspondence of the input to knowledge about the form and instances 
of figures can be utilised. The anomaly detection mechanism can be used as a 
fallback method, but i t fails to recognise a number of metaphorical expressions 
and, more importantly, i t cannot help to distinguish between figurative language 
and anomalies (see Sect. 3.2.2). The role of context and an array of kinds of 
knowledge is important for the recognition of figurative input. A n utterance like 
'the King lost his head during the revolution', when seen in isolation, can be taken 
either l i terally or figuratively. Only world knowledge w i l l help to disambiguate. 
A special twist of figures is that they can combine l i teral and figurative meaning, 
leading to an unresolvable ambiguity. The example above exclusively illustrates 
this point. Humour is often based on such unresolvable ambiguities where multiple 
valid interpretations are possible. As a last resort, finding a shallow interpretation 
serves as an indication that a metaphor has been encountered in cases where no 
other method can be applied. Shallow interpretation in this context means that 
the input can definitely be classified as belonging to a specific type of figure. 
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Interpretat ion 
The essential sub-task of understanding figurative language is interpretation. But 
what exactly does interpretation of figurative language mean? The interpretation 
of a sentence like 'The university told h im to apply' seems to differ significantly 
f r o m the interpretation of a sentence like 'They drank all the bottles' which in turn 
is different f r o m the interpretation of a sentence like 'Becker killed Lendl on the 
Centre Court ' or 'Your mother really is an elephant'. 
Whi le the first example does not even seem figurative, the last one has a decid-
edly odd ring to i t , i f taken literally. I t seems that there are not only different types 
of interpretation needed for different types of figures, but that there are different 
levels or depths of interpretation needed to 'understand' a figure of a certain type. 
• 'The university told h im to apply' is figurative depending on whether we 
see the university as a collective or abstract body (which cannot perform 
utterance acts, thus a personification) or whether we take 'university' to 
stand for the office or employee that told the person to apply (thus a met-
onymy). I t is obvious that this kind of figure is so common that humans do 
not seem to encounter any problem when faced wi th instances of i t . No deep 
interpretation is performed, and the utterance is merely accepted. 
I t has to be noted that not all input that is 'sHghtly' outside the normal range 
of expected input should be accepted. I t is perfectly reasonable to restrict a 
system's analytical capabilities by e.g. selectional restrictions (only humans 
perform utterance acts) to simplify tasks such as anaphora resolution (e.g. 
' M y wife went to see the Cut ty Sark in Greenwich. She told me about i t ' , 
where 'she' w i l l presumably not refer to the ship). But the restrictions should 
not interfere w i th other tasks the system has to perform, or the restrictions 
have to be loosened again when those other tasks are carried out. In the case 
of figurative expressions, the system's restrictions have to be loosened in a 
formal manner to allow the acceptance of figurative expression at least (this 
being the lowest level of interpretation). 
In the above example, no deep interpretation is needed because the meaning 
is quite clear and, more importantly, no further entailments arise f rom the 
figurativeness. This is not the case in the following example: 
• 'Becker kil led Lendl on the Centre Court' . Understanding poses no problem 
to humans here either, but i f taken figuratively, more can be gathered f rom 
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the expression than 'Becker won a fierce competition against Lendl, who was 
defeated' , e.g. the contestants are seen as adversaries, the contest is bitter 
and serious and force was used. In such cases, accepting the input and arriving 
at the immediate figurative meaning is only a (necessary) first step. Finding 
the possible entailments constitutes a further level of interpretation. The next 
example lies somewhere in between these two extremes of interpretational 
requirements. 
• 'They drank all the bottles' cannot merely be accepted and yet has no entail-
ments. Bottles cannot be drunken, fluids can. Bottles prototypically contain 
fluids, and the highly conventional figure of expressing a part through the 
whole (and its instance using a container to stand for the content) makes 
the task of interpretation straightforward. The container is used, the con-
tent meant. But interpretation should in such cases not simply be regarded 
as replacing a figurative expression wi th a literal paraphrase. This would 
reduce the validity of the analysis, as can be exemplified by one natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) task, namely, machine translation. I f the source text 
contains a figurative expression and the target text does not, the quality of 
the translation is adversely affected. Therefore, i t is necessary to retain as 
detailed information as possible about the figurativeness of the input once i t 
has been analysed. No conventional correspondences between what is said 
and what is meant can be postulated for cases such as: 
• 'Your mother really is an elephant'. Here, interpretation is a deep task which 
cannot be performed on the basis of lexical or conventional information. 
Knowledge about one particular mother and elephants in general and the 
world they live in and their relationship is needed. Moreover, knowledge 
about the situation in which the utterance was made w i l l contribute towards 
the meaning as well. Interpreting this sentence means finding out about how 
this mother and elephants in general relate to each other in the context of 
the utterance. 
Interpretation should not be considered to be a monolithic process. I t has 
various depths, and the required depth at which a sufficient interpretation can be 
said to have been achieved varies w i t h the type of figure at hand. Furthermore, 
information that a certain type of figure was encountered has to be regarded as 
part of the interpretation. 
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In the discussion of the recognition of figures, i t was mentioned that recogni-
t ion might in some cases rely on finding a shallow interpretation. This might seem 
contradictory, but becomes more reasonable in the light of dividing up the task 
interpretation. I t is obvious that once we have arrived at f u l l metaphorical inter-
pretation for some input, we can classify the input as being of a certain type of 
figurative language. But i t is also possible to arrive at safe knowledge about the 
figurativeness without being able to or having to arrive at a f u l l interpretation. The 
min imal interpretation consists of stating that the input can be safely assumed to 
be metaphorical. 
This approach was taken in our model to maximise the percentage of figurative 
input correctly classified as such and to minimise the percentage of non-figurative 
utterances classified as metaphorical, since i t is possible to ascribe a metaphori-
cal interpretation to almost any utterance. Thus there exists an intersection of 
recognition and interpretation, rather than a clear-cut boundary between the two 
stages. Min ima l interpretation means reliably ascribing a type of figurativeness to 
the input , which amounts to recognising the input as metaphorical; the recognition 
as a certain type in tu rn counts as the minimal interpretation. 
Since mechanisms like constraint violation cannot guarantee the detection of 
figures, and a fu t i le attempt (in case the input is not figurative) at finding an 
interpretation is not acceptable in terms of resources, the interpretation stage is 
split into 'pr imary interpretation' and the 'extended interpretation'. The primary 
stage classifies the input as belonging to a type of figure (e.g. 'They drank all the 
bottles' as C O N T A I N E R F O R C O N T E N T metonymy) and the second stage tries to find 
the actual interpretation. Failure of the primary stage is taken to indicate that the 
input is not metaphorical. As mentioned earlier, the extent of the individual stages 
varies f r o m type to type. Some types may not need an extended interpretation in 
all cases, while others require a considerable amount of processing in the primary 
stage and less in the extended stage and so for th . 
Apprec ia t ion 
Appreciation ( in a non-localised way) is clearly beyond the scope of not only this 
work but presumably also beyond the scope of (current) NLP systems. What does 
i t mean to make "an aesthetic judgement about what has been understood" [Gibbs 
1994] and what is necessary to appreciate figurative language? Clearly, there has 
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to be a basis for an aesthetic judgement, and this basis would have to encompass 
a very detailed speaker/hearer model, extensive world knowledge, access to vast 
amounts of contextual knowledge and explicit information about conversational 
goals and textual structure (what is appropriate, what is pleasant for the text-sort 
in question). Although the L O L I T A system provides some of these requirements, at 
least in a rudimentary fo rm, we do not believe that there are models of appreciation 
of linguistic understanding f rom any discipline that can readily be implemented, 
nor that localised theories w i l l yield satisfying results. 
First steps towards a crude fo rm of appreciation can be taken, however. By 
analysing the input , classifying i t and storing the occurrence together w i th the 
analysis for future reference, a statistical evaluation of the frequency of any given 
type and the converging of instances of a generic metaphor, i.e. a basic corpus 
analysis regarding figures, can be carried out. Although this would enable a coarse 
stylistic analysis of the fo rm ' X idioms have occurred in the text, X metonymies 
of the P R O D U C E R F O R P R O D U C T type... ' which is an interesting possibihty in 
itself, i t is a far cry f r o m a real model of appreciation. This is, however, no real 
drawback, as the task of appreciation is not one of our goals, since appreciation 
"[ . . . ] is not an obligatory part of understanding hnguistic meaning [ . . . ]" [Gibbs 
1994] and, therefore, can be neglected in the framework of this enterprise. 
Representat ion 
The task of representation comprises a number of distinct sub-tasks. As we sub-
scribe to the knowledge-based view, one aspect of representation concerns figurative 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge about the fo rm of figures (for individual types see Sects. 
5.3.2-5.3.7), their instances and extensibility, their possible hierarchical structure 
and the concepts which can be involved in a type of metaphor as well as the relation 
the concepts have when seen in the hght of the particular figure. 
To give an example, the C O N T A I N E R F O R C O N T E N T metonymy has the linguistic 
f o r m of expressing the contents of a container through the use of the container, 
which is the relation the figure establishes between those concepts. I t can be 
instantiated in many forms (almost unrestrictedly, as long as the schema is kept) 
although some forms seem (through frequent use) more apt. To avoid wearisome 
repetit ion of the 'drink a bottle ' example, let us consider 'my handbag was stolen' 
instead. Even i f the handbag in question is retrieved later on, the incident w i l l sti l l 
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be referred to as theft of the handbag, although the contents of the handbag are 
usually of greater importance and, expensive designer handbags aside, the target 
of thieves. This metonymy has no extensions, but stands in a hierarchical (sub-
type) relationship to W H O L E F O R P A R T / P A R T F O R W H O L E figures and in a super-
type relation to generic instances such as B O T T L E F O R B E V E R A G E and individual 
instances of related figures ('The kettle has boiled'). 
The knowledge about the form and relation between figures is expHcitly stored 
as natural language (NL) information in the SemNet in the form of events (c.L Ap-
pendix B . l ) . In this way, all parts of the system have immediate access to knowledge 
about metaphors. This is an explicit modelling of knowledge that might or might 
not be subconscious in humans. This evidential insecurity poses no problem for 
us, since we do not claim cognitive adequate modeUing and since i t does not mean 
that L O L I T A is 'more conscious' of the knowledge stored expHcitly. I f at all , i t 
is an improvement wi th respect to other systems, where the distinction between 
algorithm, knowledge about metaphors and other knowledge is not made as clearly 
as in our model and impl ic i t ly represented aspects contribute considerably to the 
performance. The effect of representing metaphoric knowledge in the SemNet is 
twofold; first i t extends the knowledge base ( K N B ) wi th detailed linguistic knowl-
edge and, second, makes all of the knowledge stored in SemNet available to the 
figurative processing sub-system. This, in turn, has two entailments. 
On the one hand, i t must be stressed that the knowledge about metaphors is 
not 'alien' to the structure and the type of LOLITA's other Hnguistic, world and 
encyclopaedic knowledge. On the contrary, we only make use of the concepts and 
structures used in the rest of the system, which. On the other hand, this latter 
point makes life slightly more difficult for the figurative sub-system, as i t has to 
extract various forms of knowledge f rom the SemNet, instead of being able to rely 
on customised information structures (see Sect. 5.2.4). But the overall benefits of 
mutual knowledge exchange, the fact that no discrepancies can arise f rom a shared 
K N B (which might be the case i f separate representations were chosen) and the 
savings in terms of resources (no additional coding, maintenance only for one K N B , 
a N L knowledge engineering interface) outweigh this slight difficulty. 
The knowledge about metaphors (schemata) is arranged hierarchically in our 
model. I t is possible to extend generic or more abstract schemata by using the 
knowledge L O L I T A provides about the concepts participating in the schema, thus 
enabling us to traverse the hierarchy of schemata in both the upward and downward 
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directions (important in the recognition stage), and to generate new and valid 
schemata 'on the fly' (important for deeper interpretation and learning/extending 
metaphorical knowledge). 
The knowledge for all types of tropes (apart f rom comparison statements, but 
w i t h the exception of comparison statements which are reducible to conceptual 
metaphors) is represented uniformly in this fashion. Although the ini t ia l hierarchy 
for idioms is flat, and contextual metonymies cannot ini t ia l ly be represented in this 
way, but once a contextual metonymy is encountered, i t is added to the SemNet in 
a uni form fashion. 
I t should be noted that the input/extension of the knowledge about metaphors is 
possible via the N L interface of L O L I T A . The hierarchical ordering of metaphorical 
schemata was, in the first instance, considered to be fixed taxonomicaUy, i.e. a 
P R O D U C E R F O R P R O D U C T metonymy is the super-type of a A U T H O R F O R W O R K 
metonymy which in turn is the super-type of a P L A Y W R I G H T F O R D R A M A and 
C O M P O S E R F O R C O M P O S I T I O N metonymy. But such an approach might give rise to 
possible inconsistencies between the knowledge about metaphorical forms and the 
other knowledge in the K N B . The hierarchical organisation of figurative knowledge 
has to follow the organisation of the concepts involved in the figures to allow for 
'holes' in the system's knowledge and areas of low granularity, to make the best 
use of areas of high granularity, and, most importantly, to keep in synch wi th 
any dynamic update of the system's K N B . Therefore, the events representing the 
figurative schemata of knowledge-based tropes are not ordered hierarchically as 
such, but obtain their hierarchical ordering through the ordering of the knowledge 
about their parts. 
Other representational tasks certainly include the results of figurative process-
ing, be they positive or negative. This means that not only wi l l one or more 
possible interpretations have to be represented, but also that in the case of failure 
to find an interpretation, this has to be recorded as well. I t is generally not a 
good idea to regard an algorithm as a black box, to feed i t some input and wait 
excitedly for some output without being able to keep an eye on what is happening 
in between. This is even more important in a large-scale system (as opposed to 
smaller, domain-dependent KNBs, where the topology of the representation, due 
to its l imi ted size, might be known by heart) where robustness and coverage require 
a system to deal appropriately wi th input outside its scope. To elaborate on this: 
i t is not acceptable for the processing to stop for any reason or not to produce any 
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results. So the worst-case scenario should be that a statement is made about what 
was done and what the result of the action was, even i f no output of the expected 
f o r m is produced. 
As i t is impossible (for a non-toy system) to anticipate all possible states that 
might arise during processing, we have taken the approach of internally document-
ing each step taken. Following the requirements of integration, the information is 
stored in the SemNet in a fo rm that is accessible by all other parts of the system 
and lends itself to N L generation. Thus i t is possible to obtain 'intelligent' results, 
even in the case of failure of the intended processing. W i t h regard to avoiding a 
black box model, the path taken by our algorithm in arriving at an interpretation 
is documented as well, again using the SemNet as the common data structure to 
store information. The documentation includes the type of metaphorical resolu-
t ion appHed to the input, whether the application was successful or not, and any 
entailments the successful or failed interpretation has, thus making the chain of 
metaphorical reasoning (see Sect. 5.3.1 and Fig. 5.12) explicit and therefore acces-
sible to evaluation and revision. The chain of metaphorical reasoning serves as a 
representation of the side effects of the interpretation, such as a statement of the 
metaphorical relation between the concepts and the input (x is seen as y in the 
light of the figure z). 
Expl ic i t ly representing detailed information about figures also forms the basis 
of extension, learning, and type change. By extension we mean i t would be a valid 
yet restricted achievement to be able to recognise and interpret only those portions 
of input for which processing facilities (in the fo rm of metaphoric knowledge) have 
been provided beforehand. Systems that put emphasis on their process model may 
take this stance, but the need for robust and useful processing makes i t necessary 
to process as large a percentage of input as possible wi th a hmited number of rules 
and knowledge. So the representation has to facihtate the systematic extension of 
coded knowledge to cover related cases. By using the SemNet as a basis for our 
representation (thus having a rich knowledge structure on hand), the possibility of 
extending metaphoric knowledge is given. For example, the conventional metaphor 
S T A T E S A R E L O C A T I O N S might be present in the K N B in the form of E N T E R I N G 
S T A T E A S S T A T E C H A N G E ( ' fal l into a depression', 'enter Xemacs', 'go into re-
ceivership'). The antonym, hyperonym and synonym relations already present in 
the SemNet can be utilised to extend the given metaphoric knowledge to capture 
systematically related schemata. The extent to which the existing relations can be 
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used has to be delimited on the algorithmic side, however, as free extension along 
all possible lines of concept relations would over-generate. 
Type change is a side effect that has not been a primary goal of this work, yet 
holds interesting possibilities. I t concerns the classification of a given figurative 
expression as belonging to a type of figure and the possibility of dynamicaUy re-
asserting this classification. A n a priori classification of any expression can only 
be made on the basis of vast amounts of hnguistic and world knowledge. As 
L O L I T A (hke any other current NLP system) lacks this amount of knowledge, 
any classification that is made by the system might ini t ia l ly be 'wrong'. Thus a 
dynamic re-classification as soon as relevant new information is available can help 
to correct in i t i a l (bona fide) misjudgements. I f , for example, input along the lines 
of 'a warm welcome' is encountered, and the figurative analysis finds a conventional 
metaphor relating warmth to affection^ whereas there is no lexicahsed reading of 
'warm' as affectionate (the only possible lexicalised reading being based in turn 
on the AFFECTION AS WARMTH metaphor, which for the sake of the argument we 
shall ignore), the input wiU be classified as an instance of a conventional metaphor. 
As Plantinga noted wi th respect to the dimension of novelty, a dimension that 
is impl ic i t ly echoed in our classification: "But a 'dead' metaphor is not dead for 
everyone. Children, for example, are frequently puzzled by a 'dead' metaphor 
such as 'out to lunch'. [...] What is 'dead' and what is ' f ive ' does not depend on 
the linguistic expression, but upon the mental model of the language processor." 
Plantinga 1989]. I f a figure that is new to L O L I T A has rightly been classified 
as novel, but subsequently similar expressions are encountered, the metaphor wi l l 
'age' as far as L O L I T A is concerned. This is possible on the basis that metaphors 
and their instances (realisations) are linked and that events in the SemNet (newly 
acquired concepts and their relation) are referred to by a unique number whereby 
a higher number indicates a recently acquired concept. As mentioned before, this 
is only a sideline, although a promising one. Therefore no metric, which should be 
based on empirical results of corpus analyses, is available to determine the age at 
which a change f r o m one type to another should occur. Yet i t enables the system 
to model novelty and conventionalisation (up to idiomaticity) to a certain extent, 
aided by the fact that the representation of metaphoric knowledge in the central 
SemNet structure itself is freely accessible and modifiable. 
^A well-established metaphor, c.f. 'To give someone the cold shoulder', 'He is an old flame of 
hers', ' I cannot warm to him' , 'She has such a cold, logical mind'. 
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5.2.2 Types of figures 
In this section, a classification of types of figurative language is presented which is 
not based on the traditional criteria which are often derived f rom classical sources, 
but on the needs of computational treatment, wi th emphasis on the L O L I T A frame-
work, the operations to be performed on the input (see Sect. 5.2) and the adopted 
knowledge-based approach. The computational needs are multidimensional in as 
far as they consist of different criteria such as the depth of processing (see Sect. 
5.2.1), the k ind of knowledge that is needed for the different depths of process-
ing, whether reasonable shortcuts can be taken to process them, and how their 
representation is best achieved. 
There are different ways of classifying figures, such as the degree to which they 
are conventionalised: 
• Lexicalised figures ('leg of table', 'head of department'), where the listing of 
an additional word sense is sufficient to accoimt for the meaning, even though 
the expression might be derived f rom a metaphoric principle 
• Fixed meaning correspondences, allowing for l i t t le variation and not implying 
any significant further cross-domain relations (instances of personification and 
metonymies such as ' I B M said') 
• Highly conventional figures (metonymies such as PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT), 
which are productive and have systematic instances (AUTHOR FOR WORK) 
• Conventional figures (LIFE AS JOURNEY, COMPETITION AS PHYSICAL AG-
GRESSION), which are generic cross-domain mappings wi th many possible 
instantiations 
• Novel figures, which are variations, extensions and combinations of the other 
classes, otherwise they could not be interpreted. 
Other dimensions include: 
• What kind of knowledge is needed to be process them, i.e. to complete 
individual resolution levels for the figure in question. 
• The depth of resolution required to arrive at a sufficient interpretation. Con-
ventional metaphors such as 'being in trouble', 'swallowing a l ie ' are mo-
tivated by conceptual schemata, but do not generally entail many related 
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cross-domain correspondences (they do not imply extensions of the metaphor 
they are based upon above the level of other lexicalised material, e.g. 'get 
out of trouble again'), therefore a less thorough analysis is sufficient and a 
more constrained representation and resolution might in individual cases be 
the most efficient option. 
• The processing stage at which a sufficient resolution can be achieved. Simple 
figures may not need an interpretation as such, accepting them (instead of 
rejecting them as anomalous) can be considered appropriate, depending on 
the N L task performed. 
Allegory 
The textual scope of allegory is, by definition, above the phrasal level, i.e. there 
have to be at least two phrases in close contextual proximity which are metaphoric 
and whose metaphoricity is closely related. The main impact of an allegory is on 
the resolution level of appreciation. The individual metaphors must be analysed 
and a connection between them must be made in order to distinguish a chain 
of unrelated (i.e. coming f rom different domains) metaphors f rom an allegory. 
Moreover, i t is to be expected that other parameters such as the speaker/hearer 
relation and the situation of the allegory (in a literary text, presented as a speech, 
the authorship, the purpose of the text containing the allegory) play a role in the 
f u l l appreciation of the trope. As neither the resolution level of appreciation nor 
any higher contextual analyses are wi th in the scope of this work, allegories wi l l not 
be considered in this framework. The basic functionality which is the goal of this 
work can, however, serve as a basis for the recognition of allegories, as the analysis 
of the individual figurative expressions making up an allegory (classification and 
storage/representation) is provided for. 
Analogy 
Analogy is similar to metaphor in that each involves two concepts or domains, but 
analogy (in its prototypical sense of ' A is to B as C is to D ' ) is more explicit. Of 
course, at one end of the continuum where the explicitness is low, analogy intersects 
w i t h metaphor and comparison statements. Analogy in the prototypical sense is 
not of concern to this work, as the 'meaning' of the analogy is not figurative. There 
are, however, more opaque analogical expressions and the intersection of research 
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i n the fields of metaphor and analogy shows that the phenomena are related to a 
certain extent. For example, 'the electrons orbit the nucleus like the planets the 
sun' could easily be classified as an analogy; 'the atom is like the solar system' 
exhibits characteristics of a comparison statement (being an implici t analogy); and 
a single cross-domain mapping between the domain of solar systems and physical 
models like 'the orbit of the electron' can not easily be explained as an analogy 
i f the metaphorical background of systematic correspondences between the two 
domains is not considered. 
Antonomasia 
Antonomasia is a figure founded in stylistic and rhetoric motivation. Its behaviour 
and instances can be expressed by figures f rom the class of metonymies and idioms, 
and i t w i l l , therefore, not be treated as a separate entity. 
Emphasis 
As w i t h allegory, the significant point of emphasis is on the resolution level of 
appreciation. As far as a semantically 'more poignant expression' is used, the 
content of an emphasis can be captured by the type of metonymy. The analysis 
(on the resolution level of appreciation) of pragmatically motivated uses cannot be 
captured without a detailed pragmatic model. 
Euphemism 
The notion of 'taboo domain' and positive/negative connotation are, again, directed 
more towards appreciation. The lexical fo rm of euphemisms, especially since they 
are motivated by cultural and other extra-hnguistic factors and thus convention-
alised wi th in a speaker community, can be resolved using the class idiom. 
Hyperbole 
One aspect pertains to the appreciation of hyperbole, namely the heightened emo-
tive impact. The underlying meaning of the expression, however, has to be made 
explicit i f comprehension (interpretation) and further processing involving the ex-
pression are required. I f , for example, an utterance like 'he drank a gallon of mi lk ' 
Chapter 5: Processing figurative language in LOLITA 91 
is encountered, i t is at least necessary to arrive at the meaning 'he drank a large 
amount of mi lk ' . A number of conventionalised hyperbolae can be treated using 
the class idiom. 
Generally speaking, a prototypical dimension is needed to resolve hyperbolae. 
F lu id intake by humans, for example, prototypically ranges f rom xrnltoy m l over a 
period of t ime, waiting for someone to arrive at an appointed time is prototypically 
l imi ted to a range wi th in a couple of minutes to less than an hour. 
I t should be noted that those metric prototypes are highly context dependent 
and that there is graded acceptability, decreasing wi th the degree to which the 
prototypical range is exceeded. But i t is not possible to determine for a set of 
prototypes just when the acceptabihty drops too low and the utterance has to be 
classified as hyperbole. 
The amount of t ime spent waiting at a bus stop has a different prototypical 
range f r o m the t ime spent waiting for one's turn at the dentist's, which in turn 
is different f r o m waiting in a queue at the Post Office. I t is not surprising that, 
as Gibbs noted, "[there] is no published experimental research in understanding 
hyperbole and understatement" [Gibbs 1993]. As the 'exaggeration' of one dimen-
sion central to hyperbole can only be detected on the basis of prototypical ranges 
(realised as world knowledge or as lexical information) and this information is not 
currently available i n the L O L I T A system, hyperbolae (and understatement) wi l l 
not be treated in this framework. 
Idioms 
As opposed to tradit ional views, idioms form a continuum f rom fixed to more flex-
ible expression, i.e. some idioms can undergo a change in lexical material without 
losing their idiomatic meaning. 
Gibbs distinguishes between 'lexical flexibility' of idioms and 'semantic produc-
t i v i t y ' [Gibbs 1994]. Lexical flexibility means that parts of the idiomatic expression 
can be changed without affecting the meaning of the idiom. "For instance, some 
idioms, such as button your lip, can be changed (to, e.g., fasten your lips) without 
loss of meaning" [ibid.]. In other cases, the change w i l l result, according to Gibbs, 
in a (subtle) modification of meaning but no loss of idiomaticity; "For example, the 
id iom break the ice can be altered to fo rm shatter the ice, which now has the mean-
ing of something like ' to break down an uncomfortable and stiff social situation 
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flamboyantly in one fel l swoop!' " [Gibbs 1994 . 
This is an interesting observation, although i t is not quite clear why there should 
be no (subtle) change in meaning when 'fasten' substitutes 'button' , whereas there 
is a change when 'shatter' substitutes 'break'. But depending on the depth of the 
analysis, the change in the latter example can be neglected, since the main direction 
of the interpretation w i l l s t i l l be to 'break down an uncomfortable social situation'. 
Idioms may not be the most striking of figures, but their ubiquity and their 
product ivi ty as part of or motivation for other types of figures makes i t necessary 
to include them in a model of real text figurative language analysis, as they do 
not follow the compositionality principle and cannot, as described above, be fu l ly 
accounted for by lexicographic methods. 
Irony 
In addition to the linguistic devices indicating an instance of irony (modals, hyper-
bole, exclamatory phrases, intonation), pragmatic and non-linguistic factors have 
to be taken into consideration as well, e.g. given an utterance 'Very nice weather, 
isn't i t ? ' in a context where the weather is not nice at all. A closer examination 
reveals some further problems relating to the figure of irony: 
Irony is defined as the expression of the opposite of the intended meaning 
BuBman 1990]. Although this definition is not very clear, i t is acceptable as 
intui t ive . But what exactly does 'the opposite' mean, and, most important, what 
might 'intended meaning' be? I t is possible to state the opposite of any meaning 
only after the meaning has been understood in the first place, leading to a circular 
definition. To narrow down the range of possible 'intended meanings', the recog-
ni t ion of irony relies on the violation of t ru th conditions, beliefs and contradictory 
discourse elements (c.f. the example above). 
The context is of central importance, even more so than wi th other tropes. 
I t seems that both types of context (linguistically speaking context and cotext) 
are important for the recognition and interpretation of irony, namely; the actual 
linguistic context (cotext) and the situation of the speaker and hearer in the real 
world as well as non-linguistic (context) communicative information (e.g. gestures). 
In many cases, both context types are hidden or at least not easily retrievable, for 
example in cases where presupposed knowledge is assumed. For example, A says 
to B 'There won't be many people in town, so we can go shopping'. The town 
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is f u l l of people and B says to A 'Hardly anybody in town today' to indicate (a) 
that A's statement was untrue and (b) that this was noted and caused a certain 
reaction f r o m B. 
Irony, as a subtle means of communication, hardly ever works where one of the 
contexts is left open, A case where one makes a statement only to contradict i t 
straightaway is hard to conceive of and certainly not prototypical case of irony. 
This leads to the conclusion that the 'expression of the opposite' (the negation 
or some fo rm or denial of something which has already been asserted a good degree 
of belief) operates on information not readily available in text and the surface struc-
ture of discourse. Data f rom a deep discourse analysis, belief and speaker/hearer 
models (roles a speaker and hearer play wi th respect to the conducting of dis-
course, presupposed, assumed and actual shared beliefs) in conjunction wi th world 
and situational knowledge (knowledge about defaults such as expected behaviour, 
proto]typical relations between concepts and between participants in discourse, 
default expectations, scripts) is needed to be able to retrieve possible meanings on 
the basis of the given 'opposite' meaning. 
The negation can take many forms, including purely pragmatic and non-lingu-
istic ones. The same holds true for the presuppositions, which may also lie outside 
the scope of linguistic description. Consider the utterance 'nice weather' made in 
unpleasant weather conditions. I t can be a reaction to the promise that i t would 
not rain today; i t can be said to someone who saw/heard/read the same weather 
forecast as the speaker (indicating nice weather) to make a comment about the 
rel iabil i ty of weather forecasts; i t can be used to indicate that even worse weather 
had prevailed in the past few days etc. Consider 'thank you' as a response to queue 
jumping or an unkind act such as being hit by someone. Here the presupposed (if 
indeed i t is legitimate to construe any presupposition) default is well outside the 
realm of linguistics. I f one assumes that unfriendly behaviour is not the norm, 
postulating that fr iendly behaviour is normally rewarded wi th 'thank you', the 
negation would lie i n the reward of unfriendly behaviour. 
The amount of world knowledge needed for a thorough interpretation of irony 
(given that the recognition of irony can be accomplished), which should also encom-
pass the motivation for the use of irony and its background (the presuppositions) if 
i t is to be satisfying, is too large for a successful treatment of irony at the present 
stage. 
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These points lead to the following conclusion: Recognition of irony seems out-
side the scope of this work since many primarily non-linguistic sources of informa-
t ion have to be considered i f more than very few 'shallow' instances of irony are 
to be captured. Since even recognition of ironic expressions is not achievable, the 
interpretation of ironic utterances has to be postponed for the time being. Despite 
being an interesting area of figurative language, irony w i l l thus play no further role 
in the current framework. 
Litotes 
As litotes does not affect the meaning of an utterance in quite the same way and 
on the same level as, for example, metonymy, but seemingly has more impact on 
the stylistic level (the appreciation stage of linguistic understanding), we shall not 
concern ourselves wi th processing figurative expressions of this type. A future 
refined stylistic model [Emery 1994], would, however, certainly benefit f rom being 
capable of analysing and generating this figure. 
Metonymy 
The classical definition of metonymy as relating terms on a causal, spatial or tempo-
ral basis or via genus/species and part/whole relations certainly has to be extended, 
as attributes and features of a concept can also be used to denote another concept. 
The classical relations holding between concepts involved in a metonymical expres-
sion stem f r o m the early days of scholarly treatment of metaphor rather than f rom 
empirical evidence. 
The relations which hold between the source term (present in the metonymical 
expression) and the target term (denoted by the source term) are manifold, but 
yet restricted in a systematic way. 
The ubiquity, productivi ty and conventional and systematic structure of met-
onymies has been unarguably shown by Hnguistic and psychological researchers 
and is backed up by indisputable empirical evidence. "Like metaphors, metony-
mies are not random or arbitrary occurrences, to be treated as isolated instances. 
Metonymic concepts [...] are systematic in the same way that metaphoric concepts 
are." [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. " I claim [...] that there are various metonymic 
models in our conceptual system that underlie the use of many kinds of figura-
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t ive and conventional expressions such as O B J E C T USED FOR USER. Many of 
these models depend on conventional cultural associations, which reflect the gen-
eral principle that a thing may stand for what it is conventionally associated with" 
Turner 1987]. Nevertheless, metonymy has not received the same amount of at-
tention as 'metaphor', as reflected in the following quotation "My aim in discussing 
tropes other than metaphor is partly motivated by a desire to stem the inflation 
of metaphor to the status of master trope. Figurative language researchers in 
the cognitive sciences have been especially guilty of ignoring tropes other than 
metaphor" [Gibbs 1993]. Surprisingly, no attempt to draw up a hierarchical ac-
count of metonymical concepts, comparable to the 'Master Metaphor List ' [Lakoff 
et al. 1995] has been made in the light of the conventional metaphor view. Usually, 
i f they mention metonymy at all , treaties of figurative language give some selected 
metonymical relations between concepts, and then only enough to prove a point 
or to make the underlying principle understood. The classification presented in 
Fig. 5.2 can be seen as a first attempt'^ at giving an account of a small section of 
the hierarchical structure of metonymical schemata, gathered f rom texts and the 
literature. 
Although the current trend in the scholarly treatment of figurative expressions 
is not to subsume metonymy under metaphor (where metaphor is used to mean 
expression of one concept in terms of another), we do not feel i t is necessary to 
honour this approach. I t is based on the notion that in the case of metaphor, the 
concepts involved come f rom different conceptual domains, whereas in the case of 
metonymy, they come f rom one domain. Gibbs gives the following criterion for 
distinguishing metaphor f r o m metonymy: "A convenient way of distinguishing the 
two types of figurative trope is to apply the 'is like' test. I f a non-literal comparison 
between two things is meaningful when seen in an X is like F statement, then i t is 
metaphorical; otherwise i t is metonymic" [Gibbs 1994]. 
We regard metonymies as a more restricted way of expressing one concept 
in terms of another one, following conventional schemata governing the possible 
relations between the concepts. Yet we subscribe to the notion expressed by Lakoff 
and Johnson that metaphor "is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in 
terms of another, and its primary function is understanding" [LakofF and Johnson 
1980], whereas metonymy "has primari ly a referential function, that is, i t allows us 
^ I t could be argued tha t relations 1 to 4 are special cases of the par t -whole/whole-par t schema, 
bu t this is subject to idiosyncrat ic ontological preferences. 
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Schema Source Target Example 
1 cause effect They live f rom hunting 
1.1 producer product Jake bought a B M W 
1.1.1 author work She likes Janowitz 
1.1.1.1 poet poetry He reads Goethe 
1.1.1.2 composer composition(s) She likes listening to Bach 
2 person office Clinton stopped the bi l l 
3 office person The director rang earlier 
4 part whole They need a good head for the job 
4.1 species genus Vipers and snakes (for reptiles) 
4.1 object used user Table 3 wants more salt 
5 whole part America (for the USA) 
5.1 raw material product Jake burnt rubber 
5.2 place(name) associated concept 
5.2.1 place(name) entity 
5.2.1.2 place(name) inst i tut ion Eton, 10 Downing Street 
5.2.1.2.1 place(name) industry Silicon Valley, The City 
5.2.1.2.2 place(name) company Wolfsburg ( V W ) , Windscale 
5.2.1.2.3 place(name) government London, Paris 
5.2.2 place(name) occupiers The House of Commons 
5.2.3. place(name) • event (s) Three Miles Island, Chernobyl 
5.3 container content She drank a bottle 
5.4 genus species Mortals (for men) 
5.5 inst i tut ion representatives The school sent h im home early 
6 concrete abstract He refused the crown 
Fig. 5.2: Tentative semantic classification of types of metonymies 
to use one entity to stand for another" [ibid.]. 
Diachronically, metonymies find their way into the lexicon and lose their met-
onymical status, e.g. to lynch after the American judge Lynch or algorithm after 
the Persian mathematician Al Chwarismi. I n those cases which can be of interest 
to other disciplines, we consider the meaning to be fixed and the metonymical 
principles at work, at least as far as the lexical material is concerned, to be finished. 
This means that there is no change in meaning and therefore no need to apply any 
f o r m of resolution/interpretation, as the meaning can be retrieved most efficiently 
by lexicon-lookup. 
There are other grades of novelty, besides conventionality and a fixed lexical 
meaning. Through their conventional status, some types of metonymy are rather 
fixed. That is, there is a highly conventionalised relation between the concept men-
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tioned and the concept referred to, as is the case wi th CONTAINER F O R C O N T E N T 
metonymies such as 'He had two glasses already'^, whereas others are fairly flexible 
and productive (schemata higher in the abstraction hierarchy, such as PART F O R 
W H O L E ) . 
Since fixed correspondences between concepts by definition need less processing 
if knowledge about them is available, we propose a continual class of metony-
mies, ranging f r o m conventional metonymies (productive schemata such as PART 
F O R W H O L E ) over fixed metonymies (highly conventionalised schemata such as 
C O N T A I N E R F O R C O N T E N T which yet cannot be Hsted as additional word senses) 
to very restricted simple figures (correspondences which are almost one to one and 
so highly conventionalised that they require only a very shallow resolution). 
A phenomenon outside the dimension of conventionality is the role of context. 
Some metonymies follow the conventional schemata, yet refer neither to ontolog-
ically nor semantically but contextually related terms. As Gibbs noted about an 
example given by Lakoff and Johnson: other contexts "permit the use of refer-
ring functions that are not sanctioned outside those situations. For instance, the 
metonymic sentence 'the ham sandwich is getting impatient for his check' makes 
l i t t l e sense apart f r o m some specific context as when one waiter informs another 
that his customer, who was served a ham sandwich, wants to receive the check" 
Gibbs 1993]. This class of metonymies that draw on contextual knowledge is the 
force behind the next class of figures we propose, namely, contextual figures. 
I n the following, the classes of simple tropes, fixed metonymies and contextual 
metonymies w i l l be discussed in detail; the conventional metonymies are a subclass 
of the conventional figures and discussed in Sect. 5.2.2. 
Simple tropes 
Simple tropes are a class based on computational and knowledge requirements and 
are a subclass of the fixed metonymies. Although they might be derived f rom con-
ventional figures, synchronically they have a rather fixed meaning and appear wi th 
a high frequency, and for these reasons a fast and shallow analysis is necessary and 
sufficient. They combine instances of metonymy, synecdoche and personification. 
^ I n th is and some other cases, one migh t state tha t the expression is s imply el l ipt ic ( ' I finished 
the bo t t l e of mineral water', but consider other examples such as 'This room is get t ing excited', 
'The house went quiet ' , where an extension to e.g. 'All the people in this room are get t ing excited', 
'Everybody and everything in the house went quiet ' seem somewhat contrived. 
Chapter 5: Processing figurative language in LOLITA 98 
Apart f r o m knowledge about the concepts involved, they mainly require knowledge 
about their fo rm and possible instances and no or very l i t t le other knowledge (if 
no deeper analysis is required, as wi th most cases). Examples are highly conven-
tionahsed metonymies/personifications hke 'Ford said...', 'The university does not 
allow you to. . . ' , 'The school sent her home...' where one concept is convention-
ally described in terms of another concept, but there is variation as regards the 
instantiation of the concepts used on the surface; all of the above examples involve 
organisations but denote different parts of the organisation. The task of recognis-
ing simple tropes amounts to establishing whether or not the concepts f rom the 
input stand in a figurative relation laid down by the fo rm of simple tropes. There 
is no or only very l i t t l e concept extension required (c.f. Sect. 5.2.4), as ontological 
and taxonomic knowledge of the desired depth is available in situ ('Ford' being an 
organisation, 'saying' being an act prototypically performed by humans). Inter-
pretation amounts to either accepting the input as being figurative or additionally 
deriving a l i teral meaning which might be required for subsequent processing. As 
there are no entailments, no extended interpretation is needed. 
Fixed metonymies 
Fixed metonymies are mono-domain partly conventional, partly conceptual ground-
ed mappings. They are a subclass of conventional figures, characterised by the fact 
that the apparatus needed for recognition is less complex, due to a clear relation be-
tween the concepts such as C O N T A I N E R F O R C O N T E N T . They, too, need knowledge 
about the concepts involved, knowledge about their fo rm and, more importantly 
than in the case of simple tropes, knowledge about possible instances (more generic 
and more special instances). They also require ontological knowledge. As we do 
not rely on our ontology to be omniscient, world or contextual knowledge is used 
to make up for missing ontological knowledge, some cases require shallow world 
knowledge in their own right. The method wi th which the K N B is consulted to 
retrieve the relevant knowledge is discussed in Sect. 5.2.4. 
Consider typical examples of fixed metonymies such as A U T H O R FOR W O R K 
or C A P I T A L F O R G O V E R N M E N T . The mapping indicates an almost one-to-one 
correspondence, but the actual realisation of the schemata may vary to a great 
extent. I f , for example, the input expression contains a concept of which we know 
that one of its features is 'being an author', we can relate i t to the A U T H O R FOR 
W O R K schema. If , however, no such knowledge is available for the input concept. 
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concept extension is required (c.f. Sect. 5.2.4). I f the input involves a concept of 
which we know through episodic or world knowledge that one of its features is 'being 
employed as technical writer ' , we have to extend the input concept and wi l l arrive 
at the knowledge that technical writers are authors, and we can then apply the 
schema. The same process is required for the C A P I T A L F O R G O V E R N M E N T schema. 
The name of a city alone wi l l not succeed in matching this particular schema (i t 
may succeed in matching against different schemata) unless i t is extended and 
we find out whether the city is a capital or not. Of course, the information on 
whether any given city is a capital or not is only present in the ontology in an ideal 
world. A fallback method is thus to carry over the concept extension into world 
and contextual knowledge. For example, i f the information that Berlin is a capital 
is missing in the K N B , but previous input to the effect that 'Berl in became what 
London had been for a long t ime' has been processed and information that London 
is a capital is present in the K N B , this information can be used in the concept 
extension. 
Recognition of fixed metonymies therefore requires a certain amount of concept 
extension, typically along ontological and taxonomic paths, in order to make a 
definite statement about whether the concepts f rom the input relate to concepts 
featuring in a fixed metonymical relation. Interpretation calls for the checking of 
the relation derived f r o m a fixed metonymical schema against the actual input 
concepts. Extended interpretation of fixed metonymies consists of stating the figu-
rative relation between the input concepts and their meaning in the framework of 
the figure. 
There are constraints on the applicability of metonymical schemata''. These 
constraints pr imari ly apply to the generation of figurative language. Generation 
needs a threshold of abstractness, above which the use of a schema is not per-
missible. This threshold should be computed dynamically f rom the 'root ' of the 
metonymical schema hierarchy, depending on how deep the hierarchy grows. P R O D -
U C T F O R P R O D U C E R for example, is a very abstract schema, situated 'high' in the 
hierarchy w i t h sub-schemata such as A U T H O R FOR W O R K , C O M P A N Y FOR P R O D -
U C T , W I N E - G R O W I N G R E G I O N F O R A P P E L L A T I O N , C H A T E A U F O R W I N E . I f the 
only applicable schema available to the generation module relating to the concepts 
that are to be realised is too abstract, generation of a metonymical expression is 
^One could hard ly say ' " M a r y was tasty ' meaning by Mary the cheesecake tha t M a r y made" 
[Gibbs 1994]. 
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not permit ted and thus cases like 'Mary is tasty' (see footnote 4) are avoided. The 
necessity of taking these constraints into account is part of the motivation for a 
hierarchical structure of metonymical schemata. As far as the analysis of figurative 
language is concerned, i t is sufficient to add information on the abstractness of a 
metonymical schema to the schema itself and to seek the most specific interpreta-
t ion; i f the only available, most specific interpretation is beyond an accepted level of 
abstraction, the input cannot be considered to reflect the metonymical principle of 
the schema (as i t is possible to construct part-whole and other relations for almost 
any two concepts). But a further point should be made about Gibbs' comment 
on the applicability of metonymical schemata. A contextual/idiomatic reference to 
the producer of a cheesecake or the cheesecake seems not so impossible after all. I f 
Mary is well known for her habit of bringing tasty cheesecakes to social gatherings, 
an utterance like 'That was a real Mary again' or 'Shh, the cheesecake can hear 
you' seems perfectly acceptable; but i t is dependent on the individual context, the 
role of which was touched upon earlier. The influence of context on the possibility 
to relate concepts via metonymic rules is reflected in the following class. 
Contextual metonymies 
I n contextual metonymies, the source and target concepts are linked by a schema 
f r o m a hierarchy of conventional metonymical mappings, not on the basis of onto-
logical or taxonomic, but rather contextual or episodic knowledge. This contextual 
knowledge can be very localised in idiosyncratic contexts, such as special words 
married couples develop over t ime, a secret code between a group of schoolchildren 
referring to common background knowledge (common examples are references to 
a teacher on the basis of a salient feature such as glasses, clothing, hairstyle); lo-
calised (slang that encompasses the background knowledge of a larger linguistic 
group, technical expressions); or universal but restrained by other means (script 
and plans, for example). Therefore, the knowledge required to handle contextual 
metonymies comprises the knowledge required for the treatment of fixed metony-
mies and contextual information. 
I t is obvious that the boundaries between contextual tropes and idioms are not 
clearly marked. This is, however, modelled and accounted for in our approach, 
as any in i t i a l classification can be revised on the basis of further occurrences of a 
figure and the information gained by processing more input (see Sect. 5.2.1). 
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The task of recognising and interpreting contextual metonymies consists in find-
ing a contextual referent that stands in a fixed metonymical relation to a concept 
f r o m the input; interpretation is similar to the mechanism employed for fixed met-
onymies. 
Personification 
By personification, we mean likening of an inanimate or abstract entity to a hu-
manoid, human or individual entity, appHcation of human attributes or features 
to non-human referents (entities, events, etc.). Depending on the point of view, 
personification could be regarded as a specialisation of the inverse antonomasia. 
synecdoche or metonymy. In general terms, personification is a metaphor where 
one domain is restricted to humans and human behaviour. Lakoff and Johnson 
define personification by saying: "A physical object^ is further specified as be-
ing a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences wi th 
non-human entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities" 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. Although personification spans a variety of types of 
tropes (conventional figures, metonymies, idioms), i t is a useful category since i t 
involves a clear surface marker. But as i t is a class denoting the content rather 
than the structure, i t receives no individual treatment. Its instances are processed 
using the mechanisms of other classes and only at a later point wi l l a classification 
as 'personification' be made on the basis of the conceptual content of the figure. 
Rhetorical question 
Although the meaning of a rhetorical question, i f the term meaning is applicable 
in this context, differs f r o m the compositional meaning of the phrase that is clas-
sified as rhetorical question, the processes involved are situated in the domain of 
discourse analysis, communicative goals and speech acts. A n indication of this is 
that rhetorical questions are subject to felicity conditions, i.e. they can fa i l i f the 
addressee does not understand that the question was a rhetorical one and answers 
i t . A discourse model is the appropriate place for the treatment of rhetorical ques-
tions, although they are traditionally listed alongside other tropes (presumably due 
^This is a unnecessary restr ict ion i n our opinion, events and abstract concepts can be involved 
i n a f igura t ive expression o f the type personification as well , c.f. a sentence like 'The conversation 
d ied ' . I n the wake of their def in i t ion , LakofF and Johnson themselves [LakofF and Johnson 1980] 
present examples like "L i fe has cheated me" and " In f la t ion is eating up our profi ts" 
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to the fact that figurative language was traditionally dealt wi th in the framework 
of poetics and rhetoric). 
Simile 
As the class of simile is motivated by surface criteria (the presence of an explicit 
comparison marker) but can be subsumed under the more general class of compar-
ison statements, we w i l l not consider i t in detail. I t has to be noted that, similar 
to personification, the existence of a clear-cut surface criterion can be utilised for 
the task of recognition. 
Synecdoche 
Although tradit ional classification makes a distinction between metonymy and 
synecdoche, there is no evident reason why the two types should not be subsumed 
under one, preferably the more general type. In contrast to personification and sim-
ile, the restriction to a specific type of semantic relation in the case of synecdoche 
does not establish a useful class of trope. Involving concepts that stand in a certain 
semantic relation might be of importance to the resolution level of appreciation, 
but the other stages can not make use of this information. In this we follow Lakoff 
and Johnson: "We are including as a special case of metonymy what traditional 
rhetoricians have called synecdoche where the part stands for the whole. In these 
cases, as i n other cases of metonymy, one entity is being used to refer to another" 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980 . 
Metaphor 
As discussed in Chap. 3 and Sect. 5.2.2, most theories and models have concen-
trated exclusively on comparison statements of the form ' A is B ' . The conventional 
theory of metaphor (see Sect. 3.2.5) however, uncovered a vast system of figurative 
schemata structuring cross-domain correspondences and the language expressing 
them. These 'conventional tropes' are another class we consider relevant for a 
computational model of figurative language processing. The name 'conceptual 
metaphors' means the same, but highlights the fact that those figures are based 
in the conceptual system. Since this dimension is not a primary concern for our 
work, whereas the dimension of conventionality is, we use the term 'conventional 
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figures'. 
Conventional figures 
The super-class of all knowledge-based tropes. I f the body of examples presented 
by various authors on the conventional (conceptual) metaphors is examined, i t be-
comes clear that they subsume a range of tropes under the heading conventional 
metaphor, such as metonymies ( C O N T A I N E R FOR C O N T E N T ) , the class of conven-
tional figures we are discussing ( C O M P E T I T I O N AS P H Y S I C A L A G G R E S S I O N ) , analo-
gies and proverbs (which are described by Lakoff [Lakoff 1993] as being instances 
of the G E N E R I C IS SPECIFIC metaphor) and 'novel' metaphors (poetic, creative 
metaphors, for which Lakoff argues convincingly that they have to be based on 
conceptual/conventional metaphors, otherwise they would lack the basis for their 
interpretation). 
Our defining criterion for this class is that a figure has to fit into the conventional 
figure system whose existence and pervasiveness has been shown by Lakoff and 
others and that i t cannot be represented in one of the lower classes. This means 
that although an expression like 'swallow a lie ' is captured by the conventional 
metaphor I D E A S A R E F O O D ('devour a book', 'warm up a theory'), an efficient 
resolution should aim at processing i t at the smallest possible cost. Since highly 
conventionalised figures like the one mentioned do not usually entail anything, i t is 
advisable to process them as idiomatic expressions. There are two points to note. 
Of course we cannot assume an a priori knowledge about which class an expression 
belongs to. I f ' to swallow a lie ' is encountered for the first t ime and no idiomatic 
knowledge is available, the processing w i l l have to derive the meaning by other 
means, such as applying the conventional metaphor I D E A S A R E F O O D . But i f in 
the course of further processing more instances of the figure are encountered, i t is 
sensible to let the trope percolate down towards a more conventionalised class (see 
Sect. 5.2.1). The other point concerns the fact that even though such an expression 
should be handled efficiently, i t is, for various reasons, not enough to simply replace 
the input w i t h a l i teral paraphrase. Therefore, the conceptual grounding should 
be taken into account as well, that is, for possible tasks such as appreciation and 
subsequent processing, the fact that the expression is based in the I D E A S A R E F O O D 
metaphor should be kept in mind, whatever the resolution level. In doing so, the 
basis for simpler processing of figures in the same text (which w i l l certainly pick up 
on a chosen metaphorical paradigm) and for styHstic analysis as well as enrichment 
Chapter 5: Processing figurative language in LOLITA 104 
of the linguistic content of the K N B is created. 
The nature of conventional figures deserves a further investigation, as they are 
the super-class of other types, e.g. fixed metonymies. Although a conventional 
metaphor such as C O M P E T I T I O N AS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION seems to describe 
a straightforward and almost one-to-one correspondence between concepts (any 
concept related to competition can be expressed, adhering to the constraints set 
out i n the mapping trough a concept related to physical aggression), there is more 
to this than meets the eye. 
First of all a conceptual metaphor involves two distinct domains which are re-
lated on the basis of the metaphor. Secondly, the mapping between the concepts is 
different f r o m the correspondences in other figures. There is no one-to-one corre-
spondence (as in basic idiomatic cases), some-to-one (as wi th variations of idioms), 
or one-to-some (instances of fixed metonymies, such as 'To read Shakespeare', where 
Shakespeare can stand for any of the author's work, poetry or drama). 
In the case of conventional figures, a systematic, extensible web of correspon-
dences between domains is introduced, whereas i t is neither possible nor necessary 
to extend the concept relation WORK F O R AUTHOR. Concepts f rom the source do-
main correspond to concepts in the target domain, but not necessarily on the basis 
of structural similarities between the domains; the correspondence is determined 
by the metaphorical mapping, or as Lakoff put i t : "Each conventional metaphor, 
that is, each mapping, is a fixed pattern of conceptual correspondences across con-
ceptual domains. As such, each mapping defines an open-ended class of potential 
correspondences across inference patterns" [Lakoff 1993 . 
In the case of the C O M P E T I T I O N AS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION metaphor, one of 
the direct correspondences would be that 'competing businesses' can be metaphor-
ically seen as contestants in a (physical) fight. But there are other additional and 
systematic correspondences, such as 'advertising' - 'strike a blow', 'new products' 
- 'weapons', and the correspondences are carried over into other domains as well; 
i n a physical fight, striking a blow wi th a weapon can cause injuries, and injuries 
are can be metaphorically seen as harm to the contestant, in this case, a business. 
Although there exist highly conventionalised cross-domain correspondences, 
which govern not only linguistic expressions but also reasoning, the recognition 
and pr imary interpretation is most important in the current framework. Instead of 
signalling a semantic or other category violation, an utterance such as ' I B M ended 
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the battle with Apple' should be accepted and assigned an interpretation. The fact 
that during the battle, Apple may have dealt IBM a blow with its advertising cam-
paign, that IBM may have launched an attack by challenging Apple in court and 
so forth may well be part of the metaphor and even the text, but they should not 
be computed pre-emptively. The fundamental assumption is to avoid unnecessary 
work. If any of the elaborations on the metaphor ('deal a blow', 'launch an attack') 
are encountered in the same portion of input as the original metaphor ' IBM ended 
the battle with Apple', the fact that the figure was resolved in the first instance 
and classified as being an instance of the COMPETITION AS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION 
metaphor will help resolution of the further instances. An extensive computation 
to find as many members of the 'open-ended class of potential correspondences 
across inference patterns' is not, however, needed by any component of the current 
parent system, and should therefore not be considered, appealing as the task may 
seem. 
There is also a range of conciseness as regards the cross-domain mapping itself. 
Simply stating that a concept from the domain of physical aggression can denote 
a corresponding concept from the domain of competition might not be enough, 
as it would allow for many odd utterances to be classified as instances of the 
COMPETITION AS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION metaphor. As the criteria of robustness 
dictate that no assumption should be made about the well-formedness of the input, 
more specific mappings have to be used for recognition of conventional figures. 
They can either be represented statically (as in Martin's work, where case-role 
correspondences restrict the applicability of conventional metaphors [Martin 1990]) 
or dynamically (making use of the developing knowledge available in the rest of the 
system). The second approach was chosen in our model for reasons of consistency 
(see also Sect. 5.2.1). This leads to a dependency from the rest of the system, 
but in terms of integration and re-use, it is a decision that was favoured over the 
introduction of external, inaccessible structures which would only be of localised 
use. A compromise is to add more detailed knowledge about the mappings in the 
form of NL information, which is knowledge that is not of immediate benefit to the 
system as a whole, but integrated and accessible for the figurative sub-system. 
A class of figures between conventional tropes and their open-ended cross-
domain correspondences and metonymies with their limited concept relations are 
the conventional metonymies. They are more flexible and more productive generic 
metonymical schemata with respect to their instantiations than the fixed met-
Chapter 5: Processing figurative language in L O L I T A 106 
onymies and limited in comparison to conventional figures in that there are not 
numerous possible cross-domain relations, thus they are some-to-some mappings, 
an example of this class is the CAUSE FOR E F F E C T metonymy. 
The recognition of conventional figures requires knowledge about the schemata 
and becomes more secure with knowledge about the mapping established by the 
schema. Normally, a considerable amount of concept extension (c.f. Sect. 5.2.4) is 
necessary to find out about whether the input can be classified as an instance of a 
conventional schema. Moreover, world and episodic knowledge is required to ensure 
the applicability of the schema to the input. To clarify this, given input like ' IBM 
ended the fight with Apple', i t would be venturesome to assume that the utterance 
is indeed an instance of the COMPETITION AS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION metaphor, 
on the basis of a partial match (fight is a concept from the aggression domain). 
Humans, however, find no difficulty in classifying this instance correctly. But the 
background knowledge to the effect that IBM and Apple are businesses operating 
in the same market to a certain degree, and that businesses operating in the same 
market tend to compete in a capitalist economy is present and suitable to bolster 
up the hypothesis about the metaphor. Concept extension, therefore, gathers in-
formation from all available sources including the context, and will, depending on 
the richness of the data available, succeed in correctly classifying figurative input 
as such. 
The primary interpretation has to rely on knowledge about the mapping or the 
structure of the two domains to find a correspondence. In the above example it 
has to consider that (hypothesising it is dealing with a COMPETITION AS PHYSI-
C A L AGGRESSION on the basis of 'fight') a fight has antagonists (and will assume 
that I B M and Apple fill this role). Having satisfied initial requirements, the in-
terpretation will then have to find information that meets the requirements of the 
competition domain (that the antagonists are competitors and that a fight thus 
can correspond to competition of a non-physical kind). 
For the extended interpretation, rich and highly interconnected world and ency-
clopaedic knowledge is required. The example cited does not necessarily require an 
extended interpretation, but consider the metaphor LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL AC-
T I V I T Y IS A JOURNEY and its sub-schema L I F E IS A JOURNEY. Al l the implications 
this schema has (the mappings that can be made) need background knowledge if 
one wants to bolster up the interpretation beyond mere recognition. Some of the 
possible mappings are [Lakoff et al. 1995]: 
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• The person leading a life is a traveller 'He sails through life', 'He was speeding 
in the fast lane' 
• Life states are locations 'He regarded his childhood as a prison' 
• Long-term purposes are journey destinations 'My goal is to become professor', 
'He reached his retirement in good health' 
If there is no or very little knowledge about journeys, information such as that 
a journey follows a path, that it has stages, a starting and an end point, that a 
person can use different means of transportation such as cars, legs, planes, that the 
path has a spatial dimension and the journey a temporal an spatial dimension, that 
there are impediments to travel and so forth, the interpretation will be limited to 
the recognition and expansion of the schemata to whatever knowledge is available. 
This is even more obvious in the 'childhood as prison' example. Recognition poses 
no problem, childhood is a life state and a prison is a location, but knowledge about 
the restraining qualities of a prison has to be available, otherwise the input can 
only be accepted as a conventional figure and classified as an instance of the L I F E 
STATES A R E LOCATIONS metaphor. 
The implicit knowledge associated with concepts and the subtle relations that 
are estabUshed by a metaphor are the most prominent features of the last class of 
figures, which will be presented in the following. 
Comparison statements 
Comparison statements (see also Sect. 3.2.3) can either be literal or non-Hteral 
Ortony 1979, Centner et al 1989, Centner 1989]. They are not knowledge-based 
in the sense that there exists knowledge about generic forms of comparisons and 
rules for their instantiation, as is the case with e.g., the fixed metonymies. On the 
surface, one concept is compared to another concept in a comparison statement. 
This means that attributes of the tenor concept (c.f. Sect. 3.2.4) or its relations to 
other concepts are compared to the attributes and relations of the vehicle concept 
(c.f. Sect. 3.2.4). This seemingly simple statement becomes problematic under 
close scrutiny. 
The most important question pertaining to comparison statements is: which 
attributes and relations are compared and how are they compared. The analogy 
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approaches [Gentner 1983, Gentner 1989, Gentner et al. 1989, Holyoak and Tha-
gard 1989b] assumed that structural similarity played a central role in finding which 
information from the tenor domain is compared to which information in the vehicle 
domain. This notion was found to be sufficient only for analogies. For the many 
cases of 'predicate introduction metaphors' (c.f. Sect. 3.2.3), different criteria have 
to be used. This leads to a first distinction between analogical comparison state-
ments and metaphorical comparison statements in addition to the previously made 
differentiation between literal and non-literal comparison statements ('encyclopae-
dias are like dictionaries' vs. 'encyclopaedias are like gold mines'). 
There is, in our opinion, no clear demarcation between literal, analogical and 
figurative comparisons, rather a continuum (see Fig. 5.3). It is difficult to classify 
many instances of comparison statements with absolute certainty. This uncertainty 
is echoed (it is hard to tell the cause from the effect here) in the various ways 
analogy, metaphor and literal expression are related in different schools of thought. 
The analogy approach [Gentner et al. 1989, Gentner 1989] regards analogy as the 
central phenomenon (c.f. Sect. 3.2.3) and metaphor as a special case, whereas the 
conventional view [Lakoff 1993, Veale 1995] argues for the opposite position. 
Literal Analogical Figurative 
Encydopaedias 
are (like) 
dictionaries 
A' 
Encyclopaedias 
are (like) 
databases 
Encydopaedias 
are (like) 
goldmines 
Fig. 5.3: Problematic classification of types of comparison statements 
Clearly, the interpretation of Hteral comparisons differs from the interpretation 
of non-literal comparisons. Whereas an encyclopaedia really is Hke a dictionary, it 
is only metaphorically like a gold mine. But where does one draw the line between 
the 'neighbouring' classes of literal and analogical or analogical and figurative com-
parisons, respectively? Is an encyclopaedia really like a database? Is it more like a 
database than like a dictionary? There is no problem in saying that literally, it is 
more like a database than like a gold mine, but no general assertion can be made. 
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The reason for this, it seems, is the context dependency of such comparisons. 
Whether a comparison is seen as literal, analogical or figurative depends on the 
transfer of information from the vehicle into the tenor domain. Or, vice versa, 
the type of transfer made determines the type of comparison statement we are 
dealing with. Finding the exact kind of information transferred, however, amounts 
to the interpretation of a comparison statement. To give an example: in the lit-
eral comparison statement 'encyclopaedias are (Hke) dictionaries', the important, 
salient features of dictionaries are transferred to the concept of encyclopaedias. As 
mentioned above, this transfer does not require pre-existing information about the 
tenor domain (encyclopaedias) in order to take place. On the contrary, such hteral 
comparisons are often used to convey new information about the tenor [Ortony 
1979]. Amongst the salient features of dictionaries are: 'being a reference work', 
'consisting of alphabetically sorted entries', 'entries consist of heads and explana-
tory text' and 'educational value'. Note that there is no requirement for the hearer 
to possess knowledge about the tenor of the comparison. A suitable vehicle is cho-
sen to ensure the correct transfer of (presumably) as many features as possible; but 
always in a certain context. Consider the utterance 'encyclopaedias are (like) the 
classical authors'. In that figment of linguistic imagination, namely, zero context, 
it would have to be taken as a figurative comparison. But in the context of a 
bookseller who has difficulties in selling his stock of encyclopaedias, it is almost (if 
not completely) literal. Encyclopaedias are 'expensive', 'respectable', 'sell slowly'. 
The type of comparison, therefore, is context dependent. Thus, the type of 
transfer that is made is also context dependent. The relevance of this is that, in 
order to assign an interpretation to an utterance, we must be able to decide which 
information is important (in the context) and how it is transferred, literally or 
metaphorically. Therefore, the knowledge required for the interpretation of com-
parison statements not only comprises detailed knowledge (taxonomic, ontological, 
world knowledge, e.g. about attributes) of the concepts involved in the comparison 
statement and the relations of those concepts to other concepts, but also contextual 
knowledge. 
The task of recognising comparison statements in the input relates to the de-
cision of whether an utterance is Uteral or non-literal, but has some more basic 
aspects as well. Until a thorough corpus analysis proves that this notion has to be 
revised, the form of the input is seen as sufficient for the triggering of the recogni-
tion. Any concept relation of the 'is-a' form ('all x are z', 'a; is like z\ 'a; is the z of 
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?/') is considered to be a comparison statement. But not all concepts are deemed 
to be of immediate interest in a comparison. Plainly attributive, identity or class 
inclusion relations such as 'Jake is lazy' or 'Neurosurgeons are surgeons' are not 
to be treated in this model. Yet they have to be filtered and, thus, be analysed 
first in order to be put aside (see Sect. 5.3.7). Of course, this means that even for 
the recognition of comparison statements, complex knowledge is needed, especially 
taxonomic knowledge to detect class inclusion, identity and similarity. 
To return to the interpretation of comparison statements, a modified model of 
salience (im)balance [Ortony 1979] is put to use to distinguish between types of 
comparison statements. This aids the how side of the comparison, namely, how 
are attributes and features of the vehicle concept compared to the attributes and 
features of the tenor concept. It also fits in with the problem of the asymmetry of 
comparison statements, as discussed in Sect. 3.2.3, since pre-existing (structural) 
similarities are not a necessity, rather a transfer of information about the vehicle to 
the tenor concept is performed. This touches upon the what side of comparisons, to 
wit; which type of information is transferred. In order to decide which information 
from the vehicle is applicable to the tenor in the mode designated by the how side, 
a modified versions of Carbonell's invariance hierarchy [Carbonell 1982] and Veale's 
Veale 1995] triangulation and squaring rules (c.f. Sect. 3.2.6 and Figs. 3.8, 3.9) 
are employed. Modification was necessary because Carbonell's theoretical model is 
satisfied upon finding the highest ranking match in the invariance hierarchy ("The 
key to the process is that comparisons along the higher-invariance entries in the 
hierarchy are preferred. Once a high-invariant property is found, no lower ones are 
considered" [Carbonell 1982]). This will be a successful strategy only if the KNB 
is known to be perfect, a demand often met by domain-dependent or small-scale 
system, but incompatible to the domain independence and robustness requirements 
of the LOLITA system. Conversion of Veale's rules proved necessary for reasons of 
efficiency (c.f. the discussion of Veale's model in Sect. 3.2.6). A detailed discussion 
of how the mechanisms mentioned work can be found in Sect. 5.3.7. 
5.2.3 Knowledge structures 
For the successful handling of figurative input on the basis of a knowledge-based 
approach, various knowledge structures are, of course, a further prerequisite. The 
important types of knowledge needed in our model and their manifestation in the 
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LOLITA system are discussed below. 
Taxonomic and ontological knowledge 
Clearly, one fundamental type of knowledge that is needed has to represent what 
exists and if and how the existing things relate to one another. 
The systems view of what there is in the world is captured in ontological knowl-
edge. How the existing concepts, objects, events can be structured in terms of sub-
and super-type relations; class inclusion and similarity are expressed as taxonomic 
knowledge. In the KNB of the LOLITA system, there are various hierarchies rep-
resenting taxonomic knowledge. All concepts within the SemNet are treated in 
a similar fashion as far as this knowledge structure is concerned, i.e. events and 
entities are both located in a hierarchy specifying their taxonomic status within the 
world knowledge. For example, (see also Fig. 2.2), the most generic concept for an 
event is 'event' and its representation in natural language is 'something happens'. 
Any event will be a sub-type of this generic event, as is the event of 'liking some-
thing'. The event of 'somebody Hking coffee' in turn is a sub-type of the latter, 
and the event of 'Joe liking coffee' is a taxonomically subordinate to the event of 
'somebody liking coffee'. Entities are arranged accordingly in a taxonomic order. 
Apart from the basic requirement of needing to know what does exist from the 
point of view of the system, this type of knowledge is needed for concept extension 
(see also Sect. 5.2.4), decisions on class inclusion and similarity as well as the 
computation of conceptual proximity (see Sect. 5.2.4). 
World knowledge 
Although it could be argued that the type of knowledge described in the last 
section forms part of 'world knowledge' we do not, in this context, mean the all-
encompassing, diffuse type of world knowledge. By world knowledge, we mean how 
concepts relate and interact outside the taxonomic organisation of knowledge. This 
indicates that definitional knowledge, for example, forms part of world knowledge 
in this sense. By this we mean knowledge that, in a more general fashion, explicates 
the relations between concepts, the connection between concepts and events, and 
so forth. For example, the knowledge that spheres are round is to be classified 
as world knowledge. By consulting the taxonomic knowledge, we can derive that 
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a ball, being a proper sub-type of a sphere^, is round, too. Prototypes, a kind 
of knowledge present in SemNet, belong to the category of world knowledge, too. 
They restrict the scope of concepts that can connect to another concept (usually in 
the form of agency and event) to a certain class of concepts and thus are partially 
comparable to Wilks' pseudo-texts (see Sect. 3.2.2.2), which make a statement 
about characteristic concept relations (e.g. 'cars consuming fuel'). In the SemNet, 
the prototypes are not as specific as pseudo-texts, which also have characteristics 
of episodic knowledge. Instead, the contain knowledge about common concept 
relations, e.g. animate agents being capable of dying or fiuids typically flowing. 
For some classes of tropes such as simple figures and fixed metonymies, this could 
be encoded into the figurative knowledge, i.e. we encode that containers hold liquid 
instead of deriving this information from episodic knowledge each time or failing 
if this derivation is not possible because there is no episodic knowledge to that 
effect available. But this would mean that coding figurative knowledge would be 
more complicated and less open and, even worse, it would mean that a cache of 
idiosyncratic knowledge that was inaccessible and not modifiable by the common 
methods were placed within the KNB. For the resolution of comparison statements, 
world knowledge is a necessity if a deeper interpretation is required, as becomes 
obvious, if one considers that it represents the non-taxonomic (i.e. 'interesting') 
links between concepts. 
Episodic knowledge 
Episodic knowledge is comparable to the non-definitional part of Wilks' pseudo-
texts. Prototypes in LOLITA play a more abstract role by encoding informa-
tion about prototypical conditions that have to hold in a given concept relation. 
Episodic knowledge, on the other hand, can be seen as an instantiation of this 
prototypical knowledge (definitional knowledge that has not been pre-coded into 
the system's KNB but was derived from input, either directly or with the use of 
the system's reasoning facilities) or as non-definitional knowledge representing any 
concept relation that has not been part of the KNB before. Input like 'Roberto 
owns a red motorbike', for example, conforms to the prototypical knowledge that 
humans are owners, but instantiates this knowledge and is non-definitional. It ex-
tends the SemNet with knowledge about 'motorbikes', 'ownership' and 'Roberto' 
^Inheritance of properties within the SemNet is, of course, not quite as simple as the example 
suggests. But within this context, the depth of detail seemed appropriate. 
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alike. Definitional episodic knowledge can be derived from the input (e.g. from 
input like 'Rick is a lecturer', it can be derived that 'Rick works at a university'. 
Depending on the amount of world knowledge available about lecturers and univer-
sities, the derivational process can go even further) or it can be explicitly present 
in the input (e.g. 'the sun always sets in the west''^). Episodic knowledge exists 
in the SemNet in the form of previously processed input and the changes to the 
SemNet caused by it (by adding new concepts or modifying the relations between 
concepts on the basis of the input). 
Contextual knowledge 
The ability to choose context referents and their conceptual relations to the rest 
of SemNet and the input is needed for managing contextual metonymies and in 
order to account for context dependent shifts in focus. These shifts influence the 
conceptual proximity, for example, of concepts (see Sect. 5.2.4) and the appro-
priateness and selection of figurative interpretations. To illustrate this point, the 
sentence 'she reads Shakespeare' can mean different things depending on whether 
it occurs in the context of poetry, where 'Shakespeare' is likely to refer to verse 
or in the context of drama, where it presumably refers to one or more plays by 
'Shakespeare'. A prototypical means for selecting competing interpretations on 
the basis of contextual knowledge has been implemented. 
Contextual knowledge also serves a more fundamental purpose, namely, helping 
to establish whether the input is to be taken literally or not. For example, the 
sentence 'the King lost his head' is likely to be meant literally in the context of 
a revolution or plot, whereas in the context of confusion, a non-violent crisis or 
illness, it is more likely to be an idiomatic expression denoting the loss of the 
King's reasoning facilities to a certain extent. 
Figurative knowledge 
Clearly, the knowledge-based approach makes it a necessity to have access to fig-
urative knowledge, i.e. knowledge about the form, type and organisation of (con-
ventional) figures. After some consideration, we decided that the best method of 
''Of course, factors sucti as quantification play a crucial role in this context, and a substantial 
amount of work is devoted to tliis aspect, but for the sake of the argument, an overly simplistic 
view is presented here. 
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representing figurative knowledge was to make use of the SemNet in the same way 
the KNB is used to represent all the system's knowledge. This means that figurative 
knowledge is simply represented in the SemNet in the form of events and concepts. 
Thus, it is not only possible to use existing NL interfaces to SemNet to modify, 
check, update and input figurative knowledge, but all the knowledge contained 
within the SemNet becomes available to the figurative sub-system, while figurative 
knowledge is available to all other parts of the system (see also Appendix B . l ) . 
Moreover, this shared representation facilitates the coding of figurative knowledge 
(easily extensible via NL input, using, for example, the query application module 
of the LOLITA system, c.f. Sect. 2.3) and ensures that no discrepancies arise 
between non-shared parts of information. 
5.2.4 Methods 
In order to enable the system to process figurative input, a set of methods sup-
porting the general, knowledge-based algorithm have to be implemented. These 
methods are presented in the following. 
Masking 
Since some types of the knowledge required for the resolution of figurative input 
are not directly available, but nevertheless implicitly present in the SemNet, they 
have to be derived from ontological knowledge and/or the knowledge contained 
in events. This derivation is performed by a process called masking. Masking 
is collecting information from the SemNet by applying a mask to the SemNet 
structure. Attributes of concepts can, for example, be collected by examining 
events in which the concepts appear in the role of subjects, and the object slot is 
filled by an adjective. 
By abstracting, attributes of classes of concepts can be derived. Examples 
of attributes of fruit contained in the SemNet might be that apples are green, 
lemons and bananas are yellow. One of the super-types of apples and lemons 
and bananas is f ru i t , one of the super-types of green and yellow is colour. 
By collecting lists (i.e. sets) of concepts and abstracting, it is possible to derive 
knowledge from the SemNet that is not explicitly present. Masking is not a fully 
developed, independently applicable method at the moment, but rather a localised 
Chapter 5: Processing figurative language in L O L I T A 115 
way of making good use of the rich knowledge in SemNet in areas where it is not 
explicit enough for the task at hand. The usability and success of this method 
nevertheless make it an approach that deserves further investigation. 
Triangulation 
The method of triangulation is used as a heuristic for ranking cross-domain map-
pings in the algorithm for comparison statements. It was derived from the triangu-
lation rule presented by Veale [Veale 1995], but there are fundamental differences 
between Veale's triangulation and our method. In Veale's model, triangulation 
operates prior to the domain comparison and forms the basis for the interpreta-
tion. In our model, it operates during the domain comparison to reject unlikely 
mappings and, additionally, after the domains have been compared, acting as a 
filter, preferring cross-domain correspondences that satisfy the triangulation rule 
over those which do not. 
During the phase of domain comparison, triangulation collects concept relations 
which are similar in both domains (according to the information contained in the 
SemNet). During the later stage of building the interpretation, it again operates 
on the cross-domain correspondences, favouring those that satisfy the triangulation 
rule in some way (see Fig. 5.4). 
Kiiife 
Scalpel Chopper 
(^^make u s e o f ^ 
Supenype relation 
Similari ly reinforced 
by triangulalion 
Conceptual relation 
Comparison or 
figurative similarity 
Fig. 5.4: Example of the triangulation rule 
Concept extension 
Concept extension (conceptually) extends the input in a certain way, depending 
on the type of trope under consideration. This means that concepts related to the 
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input concept(s) in varying degrees are considered to be of importance to the recog-
nition and interpretation of the input. Like masking, this is a localised method. 
For example, simple tropes need little (if any) concept extension and the extension 
is limited to the ontological dimension. 'Close' super-types and information about 
the 'family' of the input concept(s) (c.L Sect. 2.2.1) are considered to be important 
(e.g. ' I B M ' is an organisation and a company, 'the school' is an organisation and 
an institution). Fixed metonymies make wider use of the ontology, typically need-
ing an extension of the input towards all super-types as well as towards 'similars' 
of closely related concepts (and their super-types) and, if necessary, to instances 
of close super-types (see Fig. 5.5). Contextual metonymies require analysis of 
contextually related concepts rather than an investigation of ontologically related 
concepts. Idioms in their most simple form require no concept extension at all, 
but in order to account for 'lexical flexibility' and 'semantic productivity' [Gibbs 
1994] (see Sect. 5.2.2), very closely related concepts (e.g. concepts connected to 
the input by a 'similar' or 'instance' arc) are considered during the processing of 
idioms as well. 
Fig. 5.5 helps to visualise the process of concept extension, using an example 
(see also Appendix A.2) of the fixed metonymy variety. During processing of e.g., 
the sentence 'she writes a thesis about Shakespeare', the input concept 'Shake-
speare' is extended to its immediate (ontological and taxonomic) super-types, in 
our example 'versifier', 'playwright' and 'author'. Additionally, the taxonomy is 
traversed upwards from the extended concepts, thus adding 'producer', 'mortal' and 
'being' to the extension. At that time, the input is further extended to concepts 
standing in a 'similar' relation to these recently collected ones and to immediate 
sub-types of them ('artist' and 'adult' in the case of 'mortal' as well as 'scriptwriter' 
and 'co-author' in the case of 'author'). Non-circularity and termination of the al-
gorithm are guaranteed by the fact that this kind of SemNet traversal (as far as 
the SemNet is concerned from the point of view of a taxonomic ordering) can be 
regarded as similar to going up a tree, starting at the leaves. In addition, no work 
is done twice, i.e. if one concept is included in the extension by following one 
particular path, this path will not be traversed again when approaching it from a 
different direction. 
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Cscriptwi-iter^ 
Fig. 5.5: Example of concept extension: fixed metonymy 
Conceptual proximity 
The computation of conceptual proximity implements the notion of salience (im-) 
balance (see Sect. 3.2.3) as proposed by Ortony [Ortony 1979]. The intersection 
of properties of concepts is compared to the number of non-shared properties in 
relation to the total number of properties the concepts have. It should be noted 
that conceptual proximity is a dynamic rather than static relation, due to the 
fact that it is computed on the basis of the existing SemNet representation. The 
well-known semantic distance measure (N.B. 'semantic distance' in the SemNet 
framework differs from the traditional notion of semantic distance. For a detailed 
discussion see Short) bases the proximity of concepts on the measure of how many 
links in a semantic network are traversed when going from a starting node to a 
target node. [Short 1996]. Moreover, the traversal and counting of traversed links is 
usually performed on a static taxonomy. Conceptual proximity, on the other hand, 
is based on a degree of conceptual closeness, i.e. the amount of shared properties. 
These properties are not restricted to attributes (e.g. being a container, having a 
colour) but computed on the basis of sets of properties. The more information that 
is taken into account, the better, but any amount will give sound results. This is 
due to properties of the SemNet representation formalism, namely distributivity 
and non-linearity. For a more detailed discussion of these, see Short. [Short et al. 
1996]. 
Although the current model of conceptual proximity works completely satisfac-
torily, there is one direction in which it could be developed further: very abstract 
properties (such as 'being an object' or 'being animate') get the same weight as 
more concrete properties (such as 'being skilled' or 'eating fish'). This will not 
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influence the computation of conceptual proximity if the ratio of abstract and con-
crete properties is the same for the concepts being compared (i.e. if there is detailed 
data on the concepts available or concepts on the similar levels of abstraction are 
compared). However, it does result in inaccuracies if lesser known concepts or con-
cepts situated at different levels of abstractness are compared. Until properties get 
different weights according to their abstractness, this inaccuracy has to be caught 
(as is currently the case) by defences outside the conceptual proximity algorithm. 
One of these defences currently at work checks the abstractness of the vehicle 
that is compared to the tenor before conceptual proximity is computed. An example 
of this mechanism can be seen in the debugging output below (Fig. 5.6). For details 
Jake i s something 
Topic more detailed/better known than vehicle; 
Vehicle either abstract or (remote) super-type of topic; 
weak relat ion. 
Fig. 5.6: Conceptual proximity debugging output 
and examples of the conceptual proximity/salience (im)balance mechanism used in 
the processing of comparison statements, see Sects. 5.3.7 and Appendix B.3. 
5.3 Processable figures 
This section discusses examples of the processing of the types of figurative ex-
pression presented in Sect. 5.2.2. Before giving details, the general algorithm is 
outlined. 
5.3.1 General algorithm 
The algorithm for knowledge-based figures is distinct from the algorithm for com-
parison statements. The algorithm for handling knowledge-based figures is outlined 
below, followed by the algorithm for comparison statements. 
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Fig. 5.7: Overview of the algorithmic analysis of figurative language 
Knowledge-based figures 
The resolution algorithm consists of three main stages, namely, type-dependent 
concept extension, metaphoric knowledge consultation and initial interpretation. 
In addition, figurative reasoning documents the system's behaviour and decisions 
during processing (see also Sect. 5.2.1). A graphic representation of the main 
functional units of the algorithm is given in Fig. 5.7, showing the stages for the six 
types of figures (see Sect. 5.2.2) handled in this framework. 
The non-literal analysis is triggered either by the detection of a constraint vio-
lation or by an explicit request to the figurative resolution module. The problems 
of relying on a constraint violation are discussed in Sect. 3.2.2, and it has to be 
noted that, since they severely Hmit the scope of figurative analysis, constraint 
violation detection has only been added as a bonus. During normal processing, 
a literal and figurative interpretation can be sought concurrently and, taking the 
limitations of the actual, non-parallel implementation into account, the order in 
which an analysis is performed is irrelevant. If, however, no hteral interpretation is 
found, the 'not believe literally' event is added to the chain of figurative reasoning 
(c.f. Fig. 5.12 and Appendix B.2.7). 
At the first stage, according to the type of trope, the input is extended along 
conceptual paths which are determined by the type. Concept extension is a lo-
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calised way of cutting down on the processing cost associated with brute force 
methods of handling information from semantic networks (see Sect. 5.2.4). For 
fixed metonymies (see Sect. 5.3.3 and Fig. 5.5) for example, concept extension 
concentrates on ontological and meronymic relations, whereas contextual metony-
mies (c.f. Sect. 5.3.4) require emphasis to be put on contextual information. 
Input concern 
Fig. 5.8: First stage of knowledge-based algorithm: concept extension 
The extended concepts are compared to figurative knowledge stored in the Sem-
Net (see Fig. 5.9). This approach (data-driven) was preferred over the alternative, 
an extension of the concepts involved in the figurative knowledge (expectation-
driven), as it requires less processing while at the same time it is more successful 
in finding relevant matches and provides an easier means of ranking matches hier-
archically (from specific to general, e.g. PLAYWRIGHT FOR DRAMA, ARTIST FOR 
A R T - F O R M , PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT) . 
Idiom 
metonymy 
metaohor 
Fig. 5.9: Second stage of knowledge-based algorithm: knowledge consultation 
If a match between the (extended) input and stored metaphorical knowledge is 
found, the recognition stage is successfully completed. It should be noted, however, 
that conventional figures often require the presence of two domains or concepts 
(c.L Carbonell's "X is used to mean Y in context Z" [Carbonell 1982]). To give an 
example, in the input ' I killed emacs', an instance of the MACHINES A R E P E O P L E 
metaphor or, more precisely the 'cessation of function is kiUing' sub-case of the 
metaphor [Lakoff et al. 1995], only one concept appearing in the figurative schema 
is explicitly present in the input, namely, 'k i l l ' . The results of concept extension 
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and figurative knowledge lookup for conventional figures are, therefore, filtered 
through a function preferring 'double matches' with metaphoric schemata over 
'single matches'. In this case, 'emacs' will , for example, be extended to 'software' 
and 'process'. Therefore the schema will receive two hits, one from 'k i l l ' and one 
from 'process', and thus satisfies the 'preferred schema' constraints. However, the 
'preferred schema' rule is not brittle, but merely a preference. This approach 
was taken for reasons of coverage and robustness. Consider the example ' IBM 
ended the fight with Apple', where only 'fight' is present in the input. If, for 
one reason or other, the information that IBM and Apple are competitors cannot 
be retrieved by concept extension and, subsequently, the schema COMPETITION 
AS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION receives only one hit (from the extension of 'fight' to 
physical aggression), it will in the absence of a preferred schema still be considered 
as a valid basis for a metaphorical interpretation of the input. 
If an acceptable figurative interpretation was found, the ' is-a tropetype' and 
'believe is-a tropetype' events (c.f. Fig. 5.12) are built in the wake of the figurative 
reasoning. 
Should the interpretation of the input be required, the 'other' side of the fig-
urative knowledge (schema) is looked up (see Fig. 5.10). It serves as the initial 
interpretation of the input. For example, in a AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymy, 
'work' will be considered to be the initial interpretation of 'author' in the context 
of the metonymy. Depending on the type of trope and the input, this is either the 
fu l l interpretation or only the starting point for an extended interpretation. 
to denote tnetonymy 
Fig. 5.10: Third stage of knowledge-based algorithm: initial interpretation 
The extended interpretation makes use of either the SemNet or the comparison 
statement engine to elaborate the interpretation. To give an example, in a case 
where the input ' I read a lot of Shakespeare' matches against the AUTHOR FOR 
WORK schema, the extended interpretation would try to instantiate the initial 
interpretation ('work') in accordance with the input. If knowledge to the effect 
that Shakespeare was the author of plays and poetry were present in the KNB, 
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'work' could be instantiated to 'drama' and 'poems', respectively. Currently, an 
extended interpretation can only be achieved by either keeping detailed figurative 
knowledge in the SemNet or by working in a well-modelled domain, which, on the 
other hand, reduces processing time. The fact that the resolution algorithm solely 
depends on the available knowledge (and its structure) might make it vulnerable 
(e.g. in domains of low granularity in the KNB), but is deemed to be of great 
benefit in that it keeps the figurative sub-system in synchronisation with the rest 
of the system. 
The comparison engine is responsible for instantiating conventional figure inter-
pretations. Whereas it is comparatively easy to recognise the input 'our relationship 
hit a dead-end street' as an instance of the LOVE AS JOURNEY metaphor, the recog-
nition alone will not provide enough information on the state of the relationship 
in question. Therefore, the comparison engine has to provide the information on 
how concepts relating to journeys can be used to (metaphorically) describe rela-
tionships. As the 'love-as-journey' example presented in Appendix A.6 shows, it is 
capable of doing so. The integration of the results of the comparison engine with 
processing of other types has, however, not been finished yet. This is due to the 
limited scope of this project and its initial goals, which were namely investigate the 
feasibility and implement the functionality of a broad range of figurative processing 
in a robust, real-life, albeit prototypical fashion. 
Finally, on the basis of the initial interpretation, the interpretation event or 
events (if there is more than one possible interpretation for the input) are built 
and stored in the SemNet. 
Comparison statements 
The algorithm for comparison statements differs from the algorithm for other types, 
since knowledge about conventional figures cannot (at least not easily) be utilised 
for the detection and analysis of comparison statements. For a graphic representa-
tion of the major steps in the algorithm for comparison statements see Fig. 5.11. 
First, some fundamental properties of the input are checked. If the input does 
not satisfy the form of a comparison (i.e. if there is no generic is-a relation between 
the concepts, which can take different surface forms such as 'X is like Z', 'all X are Z' 
or 'my X is a Z in that respect'), it is passed back to the calling function. Likewise, 
consultation of the SemNet shows whether there is enough information available 
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Fig. 5.11: Decision tree for the handling of comparison statements 
on the input concepts. If not, processing cannot be guaranteed to be successful. If 
enough information is available on the vehicle but not the tenor, both a figurative 
and a literal interpretation are sought, as it is impossible to decide on the relation 
between the two concepts. The criteria of robustness and integration dictate that 
the algorithm cannot possibly stop and print an error message. This might be 
acceptable in a debugging configuration or in an application fully dedicated to non-
literal processing, but since the non-literal analysis sub-system is providing services 
to various other robust parts of the LOLITA system in the present configuration, 
it must not corrupt the performance and robustness of those other parts. 
Clearly, no comparison is possible if the unknown concept is the vehicle. In 
this case, the input is passed back. Currently, the prototype does not record 
a failure by building a new event in the SemNet, stating that the system was 
incapable of analysing the input and giving the reason for this failure, as happens 
in the course of processing other types of tropes (c.f. Fig. 5.7 and Appendix 
B.2.7). This is due to the fact that, in our opinion, it is easier to verify input as 
being a figurative comparison reliably, but it is not possible to reliably say that 
a given input is neither a figurative nor a literal comparison and thus erroneous, 
e.g. in the case of comparison statements the tertium non datur does not hold. 
Therefore, underdetermined input is passed back and treated using the system's 
default mechanisms of acceptance or rejection. 
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This means in the case of two formerly unknown concepts appearing in the input 
that the usual mechanisms of, e.g., determining the family value of the concepts (by 
means of prototypical information and pragmatic rules) is applied, and the input is 
taken as bona fide literal comparison or class inclusion statement (e.g. 'computers 
are machines'). 
If the initial checks were passed, if there is information on the concepts being 
compared available in the SemNet, and if the input satisfies the form of a com-
parison statement, further properties of the concepts are analysed. If a relation of 
identity, weak identity (i.e. similarity or conceptual closeness), class inclusion or 
sub-/super-type already exists between the input concepts, the input is positively 
taken to be a literal comparison or class inclusion statement and handled as such. 
If the concepts do not stand in a previously estabhshed relation, their famihes 
(i.e. ontological information on them stored in the SemNet) are analysed. Should 
the concepts involved not belong to the same or similar families (e.g. 'human' 
and 'inanimate manmade'), it is to be expected that there is a salience imbalance 
between the concepts, thus conceptual proximity is not computed in order to save 
resources. The input is then treated as a figurative comparison. 
It should be noted that the measurement of family incompatibility is not based 
on binary, brittle rules. Within the pragmatic analysis of input in LOLITA, there 
exists a function for the ranking of family distance and thus compatibility, e.g. 
'human' and 'animal' are closer than 'human' and 'cognition'. For reasons of inte-
gration (compatible families should be compatible in all sub-systems of LOLITA) 
and ease of development (re-use of code already written and tested), the compari-
son algorithm makes use of this function too, thus resulting in a flexible treatment 
of conceptual distance (in this case based on the taxonomy given by the knowledge 
engineer). 
If both concepts belong to the same or compatible families, conceptual proxim-
ity is computed (see Sect. 5.2.4) and a decision is made on this basis as to whether 
the comparison is literal or figurative. The conceptual proximity measure then 
determines whether the input is interpreted as literal comparison or as figurative 
comparison, or whether it is necessary to make both interpretations. 
The latter case arises, as mentioned before, if the tenor concept is not known 
and if the computation of conceptual proximity fails to clarify the relation between 
the input concepts. This happens only with a very small number of cases, namely. 
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cases where there is a sufficient and equivalent amount of information on both 
concepts available but conceptual proximity still fails to safely attribute a type 
of relation to the concepts. This can be caused by either one of the concepts 
having a large number of generic, abstract information attached to it (such as 
high-level ontological information) and little detailed information, by one concept 
being defined mainly in terms of events (i.e. a concept not already present in the 
SemNet occurred frequently in previous input without ontological or taxonomic 
information), by the concepts inhabiting more or less discrete areas of the SemNet, 
or by faulty data. Except in the case of faulty data, all those configurations could be 
resolved by additional methods, but since testing showed that this does not occur 
with a worrying frequency, it was not considered to be essential. Moreover, and 
more importantly, it is not so much of a problem or shortcoming, since it does not 
mean that the analysis is impoverished or, indeed, that the system's performance, 
robustness and usability suffers. On the contrary, since no costly (and presumably 
sometimes even futile) attempt of deciding in situ on something hard to decide is 
made, the overall processing is kept at real-time speed. Furthermore, since both 
interpretations and their justification will be stored in the SemNet, they can be 
re-evaluated and revised as soon as additional information is available. 
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Fig. 5.12: Chain of reasoning in the analysis of figurative language 
In the following sections, individual examples of the processing and results 
for the types of figures presented in Sect. 5.2.2 are given. The NL input that 
was entered in a query session (see Sect. 2.3), is presented together with the 
interpretation in the form of NL as generated by the generation module from the 
portion of SemNet that was constructed in the course of processing the input and 
other relevant events built during the analysis of the input (for reasons of simplicity 
again in the form of NL output). Since the generator module is very powerful 
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and there are many ways of achieving varied NL (for a thorough discussion, see 
Smith [Smith 1995]), the shortest, most simple and, where appropriate, long NL 
generation (NLG) of events is given. 
Wherever possible, the input was taken from the literature on existing systems 
for the computational treatment of figurative language and the relevant source for 
each example is cited. For further examples, see Appendix A.1-A.6. 
5.3.2 Simple tropes 
The simple tropes are derived from conventional figures such as PEOPLE ARE MA-
CHINES ('he broke down'), MACHINES ARE PEOPLE ('the car is thirsty') and par-
ticularly generic schemata such as PART FOR WHOLE. Their ubiquity makes it 
necessary to process them quickly, and their conventionality makes it possible to 
arrive at a satisfying depth of interpretation with Hmited effort (see Sect. 5.2.2). 
In the current implementation, a constraint violation triggers the processing, al-
though the recognition and interpretation algorithm can also operate independently 
of the signalling of a constraint violation. Seen in isolation, this configuration 
can be regarded as similar to Wilks' preference semantics and pseudo-texts [Wilks 
1975b, Wilks 1978] and Fass' met* method [Fass 1991]. It should of course be kept 
in mind that the resolution system as a whole is capable of avoiding shortcomings 
of the above models (for a discussion, see Sect. 3.2.2), but the choice of using a 
constraint violation as a trigger (limited to the treatment of simple tropes) was 
made so that our solution can be compared to the models mentioned. 
Concept extension in the case of simple tropes is very limited. Either the 
information necessary for processing is available directly from the input concept 
(in the form of 'controls', such as the family type of the concept), which means 
that no SemNet lookup is needed, or limited extension to, e.g., the super-type(s) 
is sufficient. 
There might, of course, be cases where this fast and shallow mechanism will 
fail to correctly detect input as figurative. It should be kept in mind, however, 
that the simple tropes and their resolution algorithm are based on computational 
needs; a 'shallow' NLP task operating under time constraints requires fast results. 
Thus this lowest level of resolution will be sufficient and exhibits the best cost-
benefit correlation. If no literal interpretation for the input is found and the simple 
resolution yields no positive results either, the next higher level (involving more 
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processing) of the resolution algorithm can be consulted. It is important to note 
that 'higher' tiers in the algorithm are capable of analysing the 'lower' types, e.g. 
the fixed metonymy algorithm handles simple tropes and the conventional figure 
algorithm can resolve simple tropes, fixed metonymies and idioms. Due to their 
very nature, only comparison statements are not integrated into this hierarchy. 
One reason why there are discrete solutions is to enable the system to use the 
method best suited for the task at hand, e.g. to handle figurative input with 
the highest possible success rate at the lowest possible (processing) cost. Others 
include the wish to have a workbench for experimenting with different methods 
of resolution within an NLP system and the possibility of modelling type change 
(i.e. a frequently used 'fixed metonymy' might change its type to 'idiom') as well 
as the software engineering demand for transparent, modular solutions instead of 
complex, monolithic black boxes. 
The way in which NLP tasks and the different levels of the resolution algorithm 
should interact is, of course, a question of integrating the current solution. The 
answer should, in our opinion, be based on a corpus analysis. One of the two models 
used the different levels as a sort of filter. An attempt was made to process input 
at the lowest level, i.e. the entry point for resolving figurative input was the simple 
trope part of the figurative resolution algorithm. If processing was not successful, 
the next higher level was invoked. Thus, the total cost of processing in the case 
of a failure was higher than would have been the case if the conventional figure 
resolution had been the starting point. On the other hand, if the input could be 
handled adequately on a lower level, the total processing cost is lower than would 
have otherwise been the case. The current configuration does not automatically 
pass unresolvable input on to the next higher level, but lets the user (or other 
parts of the system) select resolution methods individually. Only if more than 
one compatible resolution method is activated (e.g. 'conventional metaphor' and 
'simple tropes') is the built in default to first apply the lower resolution method 
and then to pass the input on if this fails. 
After the stage of concept extension, metaphoric knowledge is consulted to see 
if the extended input relates to a simple trope. If a match is found, the input 
is abstracted in accordance with the trope under consideration. For reasons of 
simplicity and speed, the modified input is not passed back for re-evaluation each 
time an abstraction is made. Instead, all possible abstractions are made at once, 
and the appropriate ones collected. The calling function can thus select the best 
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interpretation (although the built-in default selects the least generic interpretation). 
This procedure is comparable to Wilks' preference semantics (see Sect. 3.2.2) 
in that it uses prototypical information present in the SemNet (c.f. Sect. 5.2.3) to 
detect at what time the resolved input fits the prototype and to Fass' abstraction 
hierarchy (Sect. 3.2.2) in that it works by abstracting from the input. While 
the analogy to Wilks' approach [Wilks 1975b] extends to the prototypes from the 
SemNet (stating preferences for, e.g., case role fillers), the abstraction is, unHke 
Fass' abstraction hierarchy [Fass 1991], the abstraction is guided by the metaphoric 
knowledge, not by the topology of the abstraction hierarchy. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that simple tropes mainly deal with 'actions', 
e.g. figurative use of verbs. Although it is hard to speak of the figurative use of a 
part of speech without, at the same time, taking up a substitutionist stance (the 
figurative portion of the utterance is to be replaced by a literal paraphrase), the 
figurative use of other or more than one part of speech seems, in our experience, 
to belong to other classes of figures. 
The example of a simple trope to be presented here originally comes from Wilks' 
work on preference semantics [Wilks 1975b] and is cited again by Fass [Fass 1991]. 
The input to the system was 
my c a r d r i n k s g a s o l i n e . 
In the course of normal processing within the query application, this caused prag-
matics to signal an incompatibility between the agent ('car'), an 'inanimate man-
made entity', and the prototypical knowledge about the action ('drinking'), which 
is to be performed by 'animate' agents (see Sect. 5.2.3). 
Processing was started at the lowest level of figurative resolution and in the first 
instance, simple trope concept extension was limited to looking up information di-
rectly associated with the concept of 'car'. This produced taxonomic information 
to the effect that 'car' is a 'machine', 'inanimate' and 'manmade'. In the next 
step, the metaphoric knowledge contained in the SemNet was consulted to see if 
there was a schema suitable for the input, namely, some figurative knowledge meet-
ing the requirements of a correlation between 'inanimate', 'manmade' 'machines' 
and 'animate agents'. This, of course, is the case with personifications and, more 
precisely, the MACHINES AS PEOPLE metaphor [LakofF et al. 1995'. 
It should be obvious that no incompatibility of prototypical and actual infor-
mation (comparable to preference breaking or constraint violation in other models) 
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would be necessary in order to arrive at a figurative reading of the said input. Due 
to the fact that a figurative resolution can expHcitly be requested and that concept 
extension will operate on the all input concepts, the same figurative knowledge 
will yield the same results, regardless of whether or not an incompatibility arises. 
Nevertheless, it lies in the very nature of the simple tropes and the corresponding 
algorithm that they are resolved quickly. NLP tasks such as fast parsing do not 
need a ful l interpretation of the input, but rather the capability of accepting input 
that would, according to brittle, 'literal' semantics. He outside the scope of the 
system's understanding facilities. Hence it is permissible to let the processing of 
simple tropes be triggered by a prototype incompatibihty. Even more so, as the 
figures subsumed under the heading of simple tropes can be processed at other lev-
els of the resolution algorithm, such as fixed metonymies and conventional figures, 
where prototype incompatibility does not feature as a triggering condition. 
Since in this case no literal interpretation was found (regardless of whether the 
triggering condition was a prototype incompatibility), the 'literally not possible' 
event is built, stating that according to present knowledge, the input has no literal 
interpretation (see also Fig. 5.12). The following is the NLG of the 'literally not 
possible' event. 
Short NLG: A c a r d r i n k i n g g a s o l i n e i s l i t e r a l l y not p o s s i b l e . 
Long NLG: The c a r t h a t i n p u t s d e s c r i b e and t h a t you c o n t r o l d r i n k i n g 
g a s o l i n e t h a t i t consumes i s l i t e r a l l y not p o s s i b l e so I b e l i e v e t h a t 
i t d r i n k s i t i s a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n . I draw i n f e r e n c e s by u s i n g a simple 
r e s o l u t i o n because I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t i t d r i n k s i t . 
In the long NLG, the causal relationship between the events (giving the figurative 
reasoning its name) can be seen. Since the information contained in the input is, 
according to LOLITA's knowledge, not literally possible and there exists figurative 
knowledge about the concepts involved, implying that the input is a figure of the 
type personification, the fact that the input is of the this type is recorded in the 
'is tropetype' event. 
Short NLG: A c a r d r i n k i n g g a s o l i n e i s a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n . 
Long NLG: The c a r t h a t i n p u t s d e s c r i b e and t h a t you c o n t r o l d r i n k i n g 
g a s o l i n e t h a t i t consumes i s a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n . I draw i n f e r e n c e s by u s i n g 
a s i m p l e r e s o l u t i o n because I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t i t d r i n k s i t . 
Since this 'knowledge' has to be tied to a source in order to fit into the SemNet 
structure and since it cannot be taken as definitional, the 'believe is a tropetype' 
event is generated. It states that the system came to the conclusion that the input 
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is a figure of a particular type on the basis of the triggering conditions (see Fig. 
5.12). This separation is necessary for reasons of potential revision and coherence 
in the SemNet; as there is a difference in stating that condition a holds or that 
condition a is believed to hold on the basis of other conditions and rules by which 
it can be deduced. 
Short NLG: I b e l i e v e t h a t a c a r d r i n k i n g g a s o l i n e i s a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n . 
Long NLG: I b e l i e v e t h a t the c a r t h a t i n p u t s d e s c r i b e and t h a t you c o n t r o l 
d r i n k i n g g a s o l i n e t h a t i t consumes i s a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n because i t i s 
l i t e r a l l y not p o s s i b l e . I t consumes i t because I draw i n f e r e n c e s by u s i n g 
a s i m p l e r e s o l u t i o n . I draw them by u s i n g a simple r e s o l u t i o n because I do 
not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t i t d r i n k s i t . 
The next event built in the course of resolving a simple trope reflects the fact that 
the system attempts an interpretation (for want of a better NL representation, 
this is mirrored in the phrase 'to draw inferences'). It already appears in the long 
NLG of the 'believe is a tropetype' event shown above. The type of reasoning 
used in this process is given as well, namely, 'simple resolution', the algorithm for 
simple tropes. This information is important if more than one method or level of 
resolution is used for any given input. 
Since the matter conveyed by the input does not conform to the system's knowl-
edge of the world (in other words since it is not literally possible from the point of 
view of the semantics, pragmatics and knowledge of LOLITA), the system cannot 
attribute a high degree of befief to i t . This is reflected in the construction of the 
'not believe literally' event. 
Short NLG: I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t a c a r d r i n k s g a s o l i n e . 
Long NLG: I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t the c a r t h a t i n p u t s d e s c r i b e 
and t h a t you c o n t r o l d r i n k s g a s o l i n e t h a t i t consumes because I b e l i e v e 
t h a t i t i s a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n . I t consumes i t because I draw i n f e r e n c e s by 
u s i n g a si m p l e r e s o l u t i o n . I draw them by u s i n g a simple r e s o l u t i o n . 
The act of interpreting the input in the light of the applicable figurative knowledge 
is presented as the drawing of figurative inferences (see above) or 'draw inferences' 
event. Again, the causal relationship between the events is given as well and can 
be analysed through the long NLG. 
Short NLG: I draw i n f e r e n c e s by u s i n g a simple r e s o l u t i o n . 
Long NLG: I draw i n f e r e n c e s by u s i n g a simple r e s o l u t i o n because I do 
not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t the c a r t h a t i n p u t s d e s c r i b e d r i n k s g a s o l i n e 
t h a t i t consumes. I t consumes i t because I draw them by u s i n g a simple 
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r e s o l u t i o n . You c o n t r o l i t . 
In the long NLG of the 'draw inferences' event, the interpretation of the input 
can already be seen. One possible reading of the long NLG would in this example 
suggest that 'the car consumes [gasoline] because [the system draws inferences]'. 
Of course this ambiguity is due to the fact that the NLG, especially the long form, 
had to be kept as simple as possible; thus a construction hke ' I believe that the 
car consumes gasoline and does not drink i t , as is said in the input because by 
reasoning about the input and consulting figurative knowledge and coming to the 
conclusion that the input is a personification I have no option but to prefer the first 
reading' was out of the question. What is meant by the 'because I draw [inferences]' 
is that 'the input means X because I have reason to believe so'. In addition, the 
reason for this is also given, namely the type of resolution (in this example 'using 
a simple resolution'). 
Finally, the interpretation event itself is built. As mentioned in the introduction 
to the simple tropes, an abstraction from the input (guided by the trope type) is 
performed and, if no other function or module makes use of the collection of all 
interpretations, the least generic interpretation is used in the interpretation event. 
Short NLG: A c a r consumes g a s o l i n e . 
Long NLG: The c a r t h a t i n p u t s d e s c r i b e and t h a t you c o n t r o l consumes 
g a s o l i n e t h a t i t d r i n k s because I draw i n f e r e n c e s by u s i n g a simple r e -
s o l u t i o n . I t consumes i t because I draw them by u s i n g a simple r e s o l u t i o n . 
In the long NLG, the 'describe as' event is realised as well. This event belongs to 
the simple figurative reasoning (see also Appendix B.2.7) and expresses the fact 
that by using the figure the input concept is described in terms of some other 
concept, in this example (a personification) in terms of 'humans'. 
Long NLG: I n p u t s use human f e a t u r e s i n order to d e s c r i b e the c a r t h a t you 
c o n t r o l and t h a t d r i n k s g a s o l i n e . I t consumes i t because I draw i n f e r e n c e s 
by u s i n g a s i m p l e r e s o l u t i o n . 
5.3.3 Fixed metonymies 
In the case of fixed metonymies, the task of recognition relies on finding a match 
with stored metaphorical knowledge for the input. Although a constraint violation 
can be an indication of a figurative meaning, it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for the presence of a figurative expression of the type fixed metonymy. 
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This becomes obvious if one considers the sentence 'she is writing a thesis about 
Shakespeare', for example, where 'about Shakespeare' might refer to the person 
'Shakespeare' or, in accordance with the well-established figure of either PART FOR 
WHOLE, PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT or its instance AUTHOR FOR WORK, to the 
whole or one particular work by 'Shakespeare'. 
As described in Sect. 5.2.4 (see also Fig. 5.5), concept extension for fixed met-
onymies is more elaborate than for simple tropes. Yet the very nature of fixed 
metonymies allows one to concentrate on ontologically and taxonomically related 
concepts and to additionally consider concepts similar to (e.g. synonyms) or stand-
ing in a super-type relation to the ones collected in the first step of ontological and 
taxonomic extension. The input to be presented as an example for the handling 
of the type fixed metonymy was taken from examples given in Fass' article on the 
met* method [Fass 1991]. The system's input was 
D e n i s e drank the b o t t l e . 
Concept extension leads from the input 'bottle' to the concept 'container', which is 
taxonomically and ontologically closely related to 'bottle'. Since the system does 
not find a literal interpretation it can assign a sufficient degree of belief to, the 
'literally not possible event' is built to record this fact. 
Short NLG: Denise d r i n k i n g a b o t t l e i s l i t e r a l l y not p o s s i b l e . 
Figurative knowledge lookup, on the other hand, results in a match with the CON-
TAINER FOR CONTENT metonymy. A CONTAINER FOR CONTENT metonymy ex-
presses the content (of a container) through the container itself; this conceptual 
match between the extended input and figurative knowledge (c.f. Fig. 5.9) is re-
flected in the long NLG of the interpretation event shown below. Accordingly, the 
'is tropetype', 'believe is a tropetype' and, subsequently, the 'not believe literally' 
events are generated and added to the SemNet: 
Short NLG: Denise d r i n k i n g a b o t t l e i s a metonymy. 
Short NLG: I b e l i e v e t h a t Denise d r i n k i n g a b o t t l e i s a metonymy. 
Long NLG: I b e l i e v e t h a t Denise d r i n k i n g a b o t t l e i s a metonymy because 
she drank i t i s l i t e r a l l y not p o s s i b l e . 
Short NLG: I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t Denise drank a b o t t l e . 
Long NLG: I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t Denise drank a b o t t l e because 
I b e l i e v e t h a t she drank i t i s a metonymy. 
The interpretation of the input (in the light of the assumption that it is a metony-
my) is then made by consulting the 'other' side of the figurative schema CONTAINER 
FOR CONTENT metonymy (c.L Fig. 5.10). As mentioned above, a CONTAINER FOR 
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CONTENT metonymy uses a container to denote the content (of this container). Un-
like with simple tropes, the exact figurative schema that leads to the interpretation 
is recorded as well (as can be seen in the long NLG). 
Short NLG: Denise drank a content. 
Long NLG: Denise drank the content that the conta iner- f or-content met-
onymy that uses a container may describe because I draw inferences . 
Of course it would be beneficial if one could determine the exact relationship 
between the input concept and the concept denoted by the figure ('bottle' and 
'content of the bottle' in the example above). Experiments have shown that it 
is not possible to arrive at a satisfying linking of these concepts. The possible 
relations vary too much in their nature. Consider the following metonymies: 'the 
university told him to apply' for 'the post-graduate office told him to apply', 'the 
Shakespeare we read last term' for 'the play by Shakespeare we read last term' 
and the 'bottle' example just cited. One solution would have meant that each 
schema (such as CONTAINER FOR CONTENT) would include the exact nature of 
the relation between the concept appearing in the surface form of the expression 
and the denoted concept (e.g. 'the content of the particular container'), because 
even a generic relation for only one type of metonymy (e.g. PART FOR WHOLE) is 
not specific enough (c.f. the relation between 'post-graduate office' and 'university' 
and 'content' and 'bottle'). Moreover, this would, if at all feasible, contravene the 
very idea of having a hierarchy of generic and specific instances of a schema and 
a match on the basis of concept extension. Instead, a generic relation is assumed 
which, because of its approximate nature, is not realised through NLG. Instead, 
the relation can be retrieved by the 'name' of the figure, 'container-for-content' in 
the above example, and by consulting the SemNet to find out in which relation 
containers and contents stand. Thus, the representation of figurative knowledge 
is kept simple, and no asynchronicity can arise between the portion of the KNB 
holding the figurative knowledge (in particular the relation between the input and 
the denoted concept) and the rest of the KNB. If, however, no episodic or world 
knowledge on the relation of the two concepts is available, the generic relation 
grounded in the figure is still available as a last resort. 
Should there be more than one interpretation, while there is no contextual in-
formation that can be used towards disambiguation (c.f. Sect. 5.2.3) all plausible 
interpretations (e.g. literal and figurative) have to be considered. The figurative 
sub-system does not rank interpretations; in the whole LOLITA system, accept-
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ability of the input or, to be precise, the information conveyed by or meaning 
behind the input depends on the degree of befief the system can attribute to the 
input. Thus, in a case where there is, for example, a vahd literal and figurative 
interpretation for the input, the analysis has to consider a higher level of infor-
mation such as the context or the discourse setting to come to a conclusion about 
which interpretation to prefer. This task clearly lies outside the scope of this work. 
Competing figurative interpretations, however, were of interest in the framework 
of this project, and cases where there is more than one figurative interpretation 
were examined. A prototypical means of ranking them has been implemented, tak-
ing the context of the input into account (c.f. the 'read Shakespeare' example in 
Appendix A.2). 
5.3.4 Contextual metonymies 
With contextual metonymies, constraint violation can be no more than an in-
dication that there is a portion of figurative input. Only by going through the 
recognition stage of the algorithm, can anomalous input be distinguished from a 
contextual metonymy. In other words, if the input violates constraints and the 
recognition algorithm fails to establish that the input can be classified as a contex-
tual metonymy, we have to assume that the input is anomalous. 
Contextual metonymies are related to anaphora and fixed metonymies, but re-
quire additional knowledge in the form of valid metonymical relations and detailed 
knowledge about the ontological and taxonomic status of possible context referents 
as well as knowledge about concepts which are related to these. Thus the concept 
extension for contextual metonymies differs from the concept extension for fixed 
metonymies and simple tropes. 
Concept extension is performed mainly along the lines of context referents. A 
portion of context (i.e. previous input) is checked for occurrences of possible refer-
ents of the input concept(s). These referents are not restricted to the same surface 
form; they can be either the same concept, sub-types of the same concept, super-
types of the input concept, synonyms, instances or generalisations of the input, 
or concepts which are similar to the input. Since previously analysed (new) infor-
mation is stored in the SemNet in the course of normal processing, even episodic 
relations between the input concept and context referents can be easily retrieved. 
The collection of concepts obtained by this context-based concept extension 
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is then checked with regard to whether one or more of its members stands in a 
plausible metonymical relation to the input concept. It should be noted that, in 
the prototype, this check is performed in situ in the function responsible for recog-
nising contextual metonymies. It currently handles a set of generic metonymical 
relations such as CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED, PART FOR WHOLE or USER FOR 
USED. Eventually, this functionality should be integrated with the other resolu-
tion modules in order to add contextual resolution capabilities to all other types 
of non-literal analysis. Owing to the scope of this work as well as the main thrust, 
namely, to provide an analysis for a broad range of figurative expressions rather 
than in-depth treatment of a few selected examples (see Sect. 4.2), it was consid-
ered to be more important to show whether analysis of figurative expressions of the 
type contextual metonymy (besides others) is possible and how it can be achieved. 
If the concept extension and check against metonymical relations is successful, 
the concepts satisfying the constraints of standing in a contextual as well as a 
metonymical relationship to the input are passed on to the interpretation function, 
which will then construct the relevant events, i.e. mirror LOLITA's beliefs about 
the meaning of the input and its relation to the pre-existing knowledge stored in 
the SemNet. 
The input for the following, slightly overused example of a contextual metony-
my was taken from LakofF and Johnson [Lakoff and Johnson 1980], because of its 
widespread use in the literature. 
A customer entered a restaurant and ordered a sandwich. Mow the sandwich 
i s wai t ing f o r the b i l l . 
Without the figurative sub-system, input that does not fit in with the system's 
view of the world is attributed a low degree of behef, but not rejected in a binary 
fashion. If additional information makes previous input acceptable, a high degree of 
believe is attributed to i t . If a literal interpretation is impossible and the figurative 
resolution is activated, a further distinction is made between literally acceptable 
input and input which is not acceptable when understood literally but possibly 
acceptable when understood figuratively. In our example, since no literal interpre-
tation is found, the input is marked as being 'literally not possible' by building the 
corresponding event. 
Short NLG: A sandwich wait ing f o r a b i l l i s l i t e r a l l y not poss ible . 
And the systems beliefs are mirrored in the 'not believe literally' event. 
Short NLG: I do not be l i eve l i t e r a l l y that a sandwich waits f o r a b i l l . 
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The first step in resolving this contextual metonymy consists in extending the in-
put concepts, similar to the concept extension used for fixed metonymies. The 
subsequent step is unique to the algorithm for contextual metonymies; the collec-
tion of context referents for the initial concept(s) as well as the extended concepts. 
In our example, the ontological extension of 'sandwich' (and 'bill ') does not lead 
to any contextual matches as such. Context lookup, on the other hand, shows 
that the concept 'customer' is related to the input concept 'sandwich' by means of 
episodic knowledge, making the 'customer' the owner/user of the 'sandwich'. Thus, 
later metonymical relation lookup succeeds for the 'customer' 'sandwich' concept 
pair. On the basis of the assumption that 'customer' and 'sandwich' stand in a 
metonymical relation, the input satisfies the requirements for being classified as 
metonymy. Consequently, the 'believe is a tropetype' event is added to the Sem-
Net: 
Short NLG: I b e l i e v e t h a t a sandwich w a i t i n g f o r a b i l l i s a metonymy. 
Since it has been established that there holds a valid metonymical relation between 
•J 
'customer' and 'sandwich', the interpretation of the input consists in recording the 
fact that the customer is waiting and not the sandwich. 
Short NLG: A customer w a i t s f o r a b i l l . 
Long NLG: The customer who ordered the sandwich t h a t w a i t s f o r a b i l l and 
who w a i t s f o r a b i l l w a i t s f o r a b i l l because I draw i n f e r e n c e s . I draw 
them because I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t i t w a i t s f o r a b i l l . 
It should be kept in mind that the result of the interpretation does not consist in a 
replacement or literal paraphrase. Although the interpretation event built can be 
seen as a literal paraphrase, it reflects the system's beliefs about the input in the 
light of figurative knowledge. Instead of ascribing a low degree of belief to the in-
put, as would have been the case without figurative resolution, the input proper is 
accepted and in addition the meaning behind the input is made explicit. Moreover, 
the connection between input, interpretation and KNB is recorded. 
As for the readability of the long NLG of the interpretation event, the prob-
lems mentioned in connection with the 'draw inference' event (c.f. Sect. 5.3.2) 
apply here, too. Since all the information contained in the NLG stems from the 
SemNet and it was our aim not to create unnecessary new nodes in the semantic 
network or to go out of our way of basing the NLG on the contents of the SemNet 
('canned messages'), the linguistic quality of the long NLG is questionable. In a 
refined implementation, where long NLG of figurative reasoning would serve not 
only as debugging aid, measures would have to be taken to ensure that there are 
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no ambiguities left i n the long NLG^. 
5.3.5 Conventional figures 
As is the case w i t h the other knowledge-based figures, a selectional restriction viola-
t ion is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for the presence of a conventional 
figure. Thus, the only feasible way of recognising input as fitting the criteria of this 
class leads through recognition on the basis of metaphoric knowledge. For the f u l l 
interpretation of conceptual metaphors, rich and highly interconnected world and 
encyclopaedic knowledge are required to elaborate the relation between the con-
cepts that are only outlined in the metaphoric knowledge schemata. The following 
example of a metaphoric knowledge schema can help to illustrate this thought; 
LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS A JOURNEY, sub-schemata LIFE IS A 
JOURNEY. 
A l l the implications this schema has (the metaphorical mappings that can be 
made, c.f. Sect. 5.2.1) need background knowledge i f one wants to bolster up the 
interpretation beyond mere recognition. Some of the possible mappings of the LIFE 
IS A JOURNEY metaphor mentioned above are (the examples are taken f rom [Lakoff 
et al. 1995]): 
The person leading a life is a traveller 'He sails through l i fe ' "He was speeding in 
the fast lane' 
Life states are locations 'He regarded his childhood as a prison' 
Long-term purposes are journey destinations ' M y goal is to become professor' 'He 
reached his retirement in good health' 
Means for achieving purposes are routes ' I ' l l t ry a different approach' 
I f there is no or only very l i t t l e knowledge about journeys, knowledge such as the 
fact that a journey follows a path, has stages, has a starting and an endpoint; that a 
person can use different means of transportation such as cars, legs, planes; that the 
path has a spatial dimension and the journey a temporal an spatial dimension; that 
there are impediments to travel and so for th , the interpretation w i l l be l imited to 
the recognition and expansion of the schemata to whatever knowledge is available. 
*In our example, something along the lines of 'On the basis of figurative resolution of the 
input, I believe that i t is the customer who ordered the sandwich (that is said to be waiting for 
a bi l l ) , who is waiting for a b i l l ' . 
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The concept extension stage for conventional figures is a combination of the 
methods mentioned so far; information on, e.g., the family of the input concepts 
is gathered as well as ontological and taxonomic information. Moreover, concepts 
related to the input concepts by means of episodic knowledge (i.e. previous input) 
are integrated into the collection of concepts gathered during concept extension. 
Thus i t is not necessarily more complex than wi th other types, but more thorough, 
since the possibihties of expressing one concept through another concept are not 
as l imi ted as in the case of a conventional figure. 
The algorithm for conventional figures can be used to resolve other types, 
namely, the other knowledge-based figures (wi th the obvious exception of con-
textual metonymies), as mentioned in Sect. 5.3.2. To this end, the additional 
step of type determination has been integrated into the algorithm (c.f. Fig. 5.7). 
Af te r a match w i t h figurative knowledge for the extended input has been found, 
the type of figure the input matches wi th is determined, so that possibly necessary 
alterations in the further processing can be taken into account. Details on how the 
N L representation of figurative knowledge is used in this process can be found in 
Appendix B.2.4. 
The following example of a conventional figure, an instance of the MACHINES 
AS PEOPLE metaphor [Lakoff et al. 1995], was taken f rom [Mart in 1990]: 
I k i l l e d emacs. 
Since the word senses of 'kiUing' known to the system prototypically restrict their 
agent to an animate entity, no literal interpretation is found, and hence the ' literally 
not possible' and 'not behave Hterally' events are buil t . Again, i t should be kept in 
mind that there is no anomaly detection at work; a figurative interpretation for a 
conventional figure is sought i f and when the resolution sub-system is activated, not 
when a constraint violation is detected. The events mentioned are used to record 
the fact that a l i teral interpretation has failed. For other events, e.g. events adding 
the knowledge that a figurative interpretation has failed, see Appendix B.2.7 and 
the examples of the rejection of anomalous input in Appendix A . l . 
Short N L G : You k i l l i n g emacs i s l i t e r a l l y not p o s s i b l e . 
Long N L G : You k i l l i n g emacs t h a t you ter m i n a t e d i s l i t e r a l l y not p o s s i b l e 
so I b e l i e v e t h a t you k i l l e d i t i s a metaphor. I draw i n f e r e n c e s because I 
do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t you k i l l e d i t . 
Short N L G : I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t you k i l l e d emacs. 
Long N L G : I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t you k i l l e d emacs t h a t you 
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t e r m i n a t e d because I b e l i e v e t h a t you k i l l e d i t i s a metaphor. I draw 
i n f e r e n c e s because I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t you k i l l e d i t . 
Concept extension yields a collection of conceptually related information for 
the input 'emacs', among them 'process', 'computer program', 'software', 'system', 
'computer' and 'machine'. The figurative knowledge that machines can be de-
scribed in terms of people, especially the CESSATION OF FUNCTION IS KILLING 
metaphor [Lakoff et al. 1995] present in the SemNet, matches wi th the extended 
input; thus the system has reason to believe that the input is a metaphor and 
builds the corresponding 'is tropetype' and 'believe is a tropetype' events: 
Short N L G : You k i l l i n g emacs i s a metaphor. 
Long N L G : You k i l l i n g emacs t h a t you t e r m i n a t e d i s a metaphor. I draw 
i n f e r e n c e s because I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t you k i l l e d i t . 
Short N L G : I b e l i e v e t h a t you k i l l i n g emacs i s a metaphor. 
Long N L G : I b e l i e v e t h a t you k i l l i n g emacs t h a t you terminated i s a 
metaphor because you k i l l e d i t i s l i t e r a l l y n o t p o s s i b l e . I draw i n f e r e n c e s 
because I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t you k i l l e d i t . 
As the name of the CESSATION OF FUNCTION IS KILLING metaphor suggests, 
' k i l l i ng ' in the context of this particular metaphor is used to denote that the cessa-
t ion of funct ion is caused by an active agent. Additionally, the figurative knowledge 
tells us that 'cessation of funct ion ' in the context of software means to 'terminate' 
the processing. Before the interpretation of the input is sought, the 'preferred 
schema' constraint is checked (see also under knowledge-based tropes in Sect. 5.3). 
In order to be classified wi th absolute certainty as an instance of the MACHINES AS 
PEOPLE or CESSATION OF FUNCTION IS KILLING metaphor, the input should con-
ta in elements f r o m the 'k i l l ing ' and 'machines' conceptual domain. This constraint 
is satisfied since ' k i l l ing ' is explicitly present in the input, and concept extension of 
'emacs' also yields a positive result for the 'machines' domain. Thus, the following 
interpretation of the input is performed by the system: 
Short N L G : You t e r m i n a t e d emacs. 
Long N L G : You t e r m i n a t e d emacs t h a t you k i l l e d because I draw i n f e r e n c e s . 
5.3.6 Idioms 
While working on the classification of tropes, we found that idioms follow 'normal ' 
semantics more closely than other types of figures, but they appear to be more out-
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standing to the average speaker/hearer than other, highly conventionalised figures, 
such as PART FOR WHOLE metonymies. Often, they consist of ordinary words in 
ordinary combinations, such as 'spill the beans', 'kick the bucket' or 'not his cup 
of tea'. This means that the criterion of a constraint violation based on semantic 
or grammatical patterns does not lend itself to the task of recognising idiomatic 
expressions in the input. Instead, figurative knowledge has to be consulted and at-
tempts have to be made to match the input against i t . Of course, pattern-matching 
methods in the traditional sense w i l l not be of much use; otherwise an idiom could 
be seen as an additional entry in the lexicon or as a special word sense of a com-
plex phrase. This would effectively reduce the set of recognisable idioms to the 
ones already listed in the system's K N B . Moreover, i t would completely rule out 
any possibility of accounting for the principles of 'lexical flexibility' and 'semantic 
product iv i ty ' observed by Gibbs (see also Sect. 5.2.2 and [Gibbs 1994]), i.e. of 
recognising, accepting and interpreting idiomatic input i f i t fails to conform ex-
actly to some pre-defined form. W i t h our conceptual matching on the other hand, 
where the meaning behind an utterance and its constituents is taken into account, 
the necessary flexibility and a broader coverage than any 'dumb' pattern match-
ing or lookup could provide is achieved. Algorithmically, this conceptual pattern 
matching manifests itself in the stage of concept extension, where information con-
ceptually related to the input is considered to be of interest, alongside the input 
proper (i.e. the pure fo rm as used in traditional pattern matching). 
Before the figurative resolution sub-system was integrated into L O L I T A , the 
system's abiUty to handle idioms was restricted to lexicaHsed idioms, i.e. expres-
sions that were listed as additional word senses and had been coded into the the 
system's K N B . In implementing the solution for figurative resolution, the capa-
bilities were extended to handle idiomatic expressions on the basis of figurative 
knowledge. I t was found that a distinction between two types of idiomatic expres-
sions should be made, namely, lexical idioms and compound idioms. The former 
type could be regarded as additional word senses of lexical material, but is not 
resolved on the basis of a pre-coded lexicon, listing its idiomatic sense. Instead, 
figurative knowledge is consulted, and the method of conceptual extension used to 
cover lexical flexibility and semantic productivity [Gibbs 1994]. The latter type, 
compound idioms, is of greater Hnguistic complexity than a single lexical i tem, 
i.e. a phrase, and resembles conventionalised figures such as simple tropes without 
having to conform to one fixed surface fo rm in our model. 
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I t has to be said that there is not much leeway in terms of flexibility in the 
prototype as far as the interpretation is concerned. While we can recognise a 
modified idiom through conceptual pattern matching, we can not yet transfer sys-
tematic modifications in the meaning, which correspond to the modification of the 
fo rm. Unfortunately, we could not find any theory on the correspondences between 
changes in the fo rm and systematic changes in the meaning of idiomatic expres-
sions. The scope of the work and the non-existent theoretical foundation made i t 
impossible to investigate this fine of enquiry any further; the necessity to allow for 
the variation principles mentioned, however, has been taken into account. 
No examples of idiomatic expression were found in the literature, thus the 
example presented here is a common (compound) idiom that appears in everyday 
speech. The system's input was 
Jake k i c k e d t h e bucket. 
W i t h idioms, the context plays an important role. While some contexts suggest 
an expression is to be understood literally, others suggest the same expression is 
to be taken as idiomatic. No judgement on the figurativeness of the input can be 
made in isolation. This is reflected in the figurative reasoning for idioms. Here, 
the ' l i teral ly not possible' event is not based on the degree of belief the system 
can at tr ibute to (the meaning of ) the input but on the likelihood of the particular 
interpretation in the context. As wi th the resolution of other types, nothing is 
replaced or substituted. The input as well as a possible interpretation is kept so 
that later stages, should they contribute to the context of the input, can decide 
on whether the l i teral or the figurative interpretation is to be chosen i f there are 
competing interpretations. Since there are no context referents implying a literal 
reading in our example, the 'not believe l i terally ' event is buil t . 
Short N L G : I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t Jake k i c k e d a bucket. 
Long N L G : I do not b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y t h a t Jake k i c k e d the bucket t h a t he 
k i c k e d because I b e l i e v e t h a t he k i c k e d i t i s an idiom. 
The ' l i teral ly not possible' event for this input is as follows: 
Short N L G : Jake k i c k i n g a bucket i s u n l i k e l y l i t e r a l l y . 
Long N L G : Jake k i c k i n g t h e bucket t h a t he k i c k e d i s u n l i k e l y l i t e r a l l y 
so I b e l i e v e t h a t he k i c k e d i t i s an idiom. 
Metaphoric knowledge consultation for idioms is different f rom the same process 
for other tropes. Since all of the system's knowledge is stored in the SemNet in the 
f o r m of concepts and since i t was considered to be of importance not to introduce 
new, task-specific data structures into the system, there is no way of recording 
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idiomatic meanings in a fashion similar to lexicographic methods, i.e. by listing 
them. This is especially true for compound idioms. Instead, i t is checked whether 
the (possibly) extended concepts of the input appear individually in figurative 
knowledge. As w i t h the preferred schema constraint discussed in the context of 
conventional figures (see above), the input is then examined to make sure that 
all of the concepts involved in the idiom are present. In other words, not every 
expression containing 'kick' , 'bucket' or an animate agent is necessarily an idiom, 
and the processing of the input as idiom is stopped as soon as i t has been established 
that i t does not conform to the expected conceptual structure. 
In our example, consultation of the metaphoric knowledge succeeds in finding 
that ' to kick the bucket' is an idiomatic expression and that the input concepts and 
their relations corresponds to the required form, so the 'is tropetype' and 'believe 
is a tropetype' events are added to the chain of figurative reasoning. 
Short N L G : Jake k i c k i n g a bucket i s an idiom. 
Long N L G : Jake k i c k i n g the bucket that he kicked i s an idiom. 
Short N L G : I be l i eve that Jake k i ck ing a bucket i s an idiom. 
Long N L G : I be l i eve that Jake k i ck ing the bucket that he kicked i s an 
idiom because he kicked i t i s u n l i k e l y l i t e r a l l y . 
The interpretation of a compound idiom differs sHghtly f rom the interpretation of 
a lexical id iom in that the syntactic fo rm of the interpretation may change sig-
nificantly, due to the fact that a (complex) phrase f rom the input is affected and 
not simply one (or more) lexical items. Fortunately, this does not cause many 
problems, since the resolution is performed on the level of concepts (or on a deep 
meaning level), not on the surface level or some intermediate deep syntactic level. 
The interpretation of the compound idiom as brought for th by the system was: 
Short N L G : Jake died. 
Long N L G : Jake died because I draw inferences . 
5.3.7 Comparison statements 
Comparison statements (see also Sect. 5.2.2) are not processed using the knowledge-
based approach of conventional figurative knowledge. Nevertheless, their handhng 
can be described as being knowledge-based to a high degree, too, because all the 
knowledge available wi th in the system is used for their treatment. Comparing the 
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domains or semantic vicini ty of the input concepts would be a much too costly 
when taken w i t h a large, highly interconnected semantic network such as SemNet, 
so instead a f o r m of concept extension takes place (see Sects. 5.3.2 - 5.3.6). This 
stages collects the information on the concepts that is deemed to be relevant for 
the comparison, e.g., prototypical acts ('surgeons use scalpels'), attributes ('sur-
geons are r ich ' ) , definitional relations ('surgeons are medics') as well as causal and 
functional relations ('surgeons treat patients'). 
This information then forms the basis of the comparison of the two concepts. 
The individual attributes and relations ( 'r ich' , ' treat ') are extended once more 
in order to arrive at conceptual matching and comparisons, not simple surface 
pattern matching of pre-defined attributes. Pieces of information that satisfy cer-
ta in requirements, namely, those of the triangulation rule (c.f. Sect. 5.2.4), are 
then taken to be linked across domains by the comparison or, in other words, to 
be (metaphorically) compared to one another. For the reasons mentioned above, 
comparison statements are of course not recognised by using a constraint violation 
or anomaly detection mechanism. Instead, the fo rm of the input is taken as a 
first indication that we deal w i th a comparison statement. Further checks on the 
concepts (and their relation) establish whether the input is a figurative or a literal 
comparison (see Sect. 5.2.2 for details). 
Before the addition of the new facilities for handling comparison statements, 
the system took input like 'butchers are surgeons' to be a statement about class in-
clusion and modified its knowledge into the direction of making butchers a subclass 
of surgeons. In other words, i f no gross contradiction or incompatibility arose f rom 
any input of the type comparison statement, the comparison was taken Hterally, 
thus establishing a new class relation containing new taxonomic knowledge that 
had to be added to SemNet. The implementation of the comparison statement 
algori thm changed this situation. Now a sentence like 'butchers are surgeons' is 
taken as a statement about butchers and their attributes, and the knowledge the 
system has about butchers. Although the system used to indicate the occurrence 
of a taxonomic mismatch (e.g. 'encyclopaedias are gold mines'), i t had no choice 
but to ' t rust ' its source of information and take the input as a genuine literal com-
parison statement. Consequently, the only signal that the input was exceptional 
consisted in the marking of the new information derived f rom the input as unproved 
and revisable. 
The first example of a (figurative) comparison to be presented was taken f rom 
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Veale 1995]. The system's input in a query session was: 
b u t c h e r s a r e surgeons. 
The f o r m of the input, a generic is-a relation, satisfied the first requirements of the 
recognition stage (for the individual processing steps, see also Fig. 5.11). Conse-
quently, the SemNet was consulted to see i f there was pre-existing knowledge on 
the two concepts being compared. As this was the case, the SemNet was checked 
for an already established relation between the concept 'surgeon' and the concept 
'butcher'. No relation was found and thus the 'famihes' of the concepts were anal-
ysed for compatibihty. Both concepts belonged to the same families, e.g. 'human', 
'professional'. 
Therefore, the conceptual proximity between 'butcher' and 'surgeon' had to be 
computed in order to establish whether the input was a figurative or Hteral com-
parison statement. As mentioned above, the episodic and world-knowledge closely 
associated wi th the two concepts as well as taxonomic information formed the ba-
sis for this computation. The computation resulted in a low conceptual proximity 
value for the concept pair and thus a non-literal interpretation was favoured by the 
system. This step corresponds to the 'proximity/ tr iangulat ion ' stage in Fig. 5.7. 
I t had been established that the input was a figurative comparison, therefore the 
corresponding events, 'is tropetype' and 'believe is a tropetype' were built : 
Short N L G : B u t c h e r s being surgeons i s a f i g u r a t i v e comparison. 
Short N L G : I b e l i e v e t h a t b u t c h e r s being surgeons i s a f i g u r a t i v e 
comparison. 
A t the same time, triangulation was performed on the knowledge associated wi th 
the two concepts (see Fig. 5.4). In the episodic knowledge about butchers and 
surgeons, there was a match between the acts performed by the two professions 
and the implements used. 
The concepts satisfying the triangulation rule constraints were passed to the 
funct ion responsible for performing the figurative interpretation (c.f. 'makein-
ter_figurative' i n Fig. 5.7) where i t was established whether they are vahd cross-
domain correspondences, based on the figurative comparison of 'butchers' and 'sur-
geons'. Accordingly, the following information was added to the SemNet in the form 
of new events which embody the system's interpretation of the input. 
Short N L G : A k n i f e i s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y a s c a l p e l . 
Long N L G : A k n i f e i s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y a s c a l p e l because I b e l i e v e t h a t 
b u t c h e r s b e ing surgeons i s a f i g u r a t i v comparison. 
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Short N L G : S l a u g h t e r i s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y surgery. 
Long N L G : S l a u g h t e r i s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y s u r g e r y because I b e l i e v e t h a t 
b u t c h e r s being surgeons i s a f i g u r a t i v e comparison. 
The cross-domain transfer of knowledge that is represented in relations, be i t 
episodic or world knowledge is performed only during a figurative interpretation of 
a comparison statement (c.L 'transferJeatures' in Fig. 5.7). I f a comparison state-
ment is deemed to be literal (class inclusion statements are of this type), transfer 
of (possibly abstracted) features takes place. Features in this context mean nat-
ural dispositions, physical attributes, etc. In the case of a figurative comparison, 
attributes f r o m the vehicle concept which have an equivalent in the domain of the 
tenor are also transferred. The relevant events expressing the transfer of attributes 
(c.f. 'transfer_attributes' in Fig. 5.7) for this example were 
B u t c h e r s a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y s k i l l e d . 
B u t c h e r s a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y r i c h . 
B u t c h e r s a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y surgeons. 
I t should be noted that in the NLG the fact is expressed that the features and at-
tributes are ascribed to the tenor on the basis of the figurative comparison. In the 
prototype, this is achieved by adding the adjective 'metaphorically'. As mentioned 
before, a more elaborate N L G of the events associated wi th the chain of figurative 
reasoning would improve readability and style, but was not considered to be of 
immediate interest in the framework of this project. 
Naturally, the depth of the interpretation (i.e. the amount of information that 
can be metaphorically ascribed to the tenor domain) depends on the information 
available on both domains or concepts. Without knowledge about the features, 
relations and attributes of both concepts, triangulation w i l l yield no result. More-
over, the interpretation could be regarded as shallow and impoverished because i t 
does not take all available information (in our case the whole of the SemNet) into 
account. The points to note are that the algorithm for the resolution of comparison 
statements was not designed as an evaluation of cognitive or linguistic theories. In-
stead, the principles of natural language engineering (NLE) and, most importantly, 
the constraint of integrating the algorithm into an existing, real-time, large-scale 
system made i t unavoidable to concentrate on an acceptable performance of the 
sub-system. 
Like the rest of the figurative processing sub-system, the comparison statement 
algori thm is performs in real t ime. There are no noticeable delays in comparison 
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to processing w i t h figurative analysis switched off. This performance is distinct 
f r o m other implementations dealing wi th non-literal analysis. Of three different 
implementations treating what we call comparison statements, presented by Veale 
Veale and Keane 1995], the best performed at 12.5 seconds for the resolution of a 
comparison statement (5.8 seconds in the incremental case of presenting the same 
comparison statement to the system again) and claimed to take all the available 
information into account. This information consisted of "a sample memory net-
work containing 284 concepts nodes and 1597 user-specified inter-concept relation 
links" [Veale and Keane 1995]. Clearly, the number of concepts and links is not 
comparable to the number of pieces of information in the SemNet. 
I n addition, the fact that the algorithm does not perform well i f no knowledge is 
available should not come as any surprise. Since no customised knowledge base or 
representation is used into which, consciously or unconsciously, a simplified world 
model and nothing but relevant relations has been encoded, the algorithm has to 
make use of what is available, w i th respect to the content and structure of the K N B . 
Moreover, i t seems unlikely that humans would be capable of understanding a hteral 
or figurative comparison i f they did not have sufficient knowledge about at least 
one concept. And finally, the fact that the figurative sub-system, and especially 
the comparison statement resolution fu l ly depends on the globally available, shared 
K N B ensures consistent and transparent behaviour of the system, especially since 
SemNet is not simply consulted during processing but constantly being updated 
by various components of the L O L I T A system (c.f. Sects. 5.2.1 and 5.3). 
Finally, let us consider a further example, taken f rom Ortony [Ortony 1979 . 
This shows that the ' interpretation', i.e. the cross-domain comparison established 
by the figure, depends on the knowledge available. Although humans would cer-
tainly find more cross-domain mappings that can be estabHshed on the basis of 
the comparison (see [Ortony 1979]), L O L I T A took the knowledge that was most 
closely related to the concepts, and since the amount was l imited, came up wi th 
one cross-domain feature transfer and two attribute transfers for the input, i.e. 
three interpretations or figurative inferences. The system's input was 
E n c y c l o p a e d i a s a r e g o l d mines. 
The input satisfied the formal constraints of a comparison statement (for the in-
dividual steps, see Fig. 5.11), both concepts were known, and there was no pre-
existing relation between the concepts. The families of the concepts, however, were 
not compatible and not even related in a way that made a literal comparison seem 
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likely (see also the discussion of family compatibility in the context of the algo-
r i t h m for comparison statements in Sect. 5.3.1). Consequently, the ini t ia l stages of 
the comparison statement resolution branched directly to the 'makeinter.figurative' 
(c.f. Fig. 5.7), and the events indicating the system's position towards the input, 
namely, 'is tropetype' and 'believe is a tropetype' were buil t . 
Short N L G : I b e l i e v e t h a t e n c y c l o p a e d i a s being gold mines i s a f i g u r a t i v e 
comparison. 
Long N L G : I b e l i e v e t h a t e n c y c l o p a e d i a s being g o l d mines i s a f i g u r a t i v e 
comparison so e n c y c l o p a e d i a s are m e t a p h o r i c a l l y mines. 
Short N L G : E n c y c l o p a e d i a s being gold mines i s a f i g u r a t i v e comparison. 
The outcome of triangulation suggested that ' information' and 'gold', which both 
stand in a 'contained by' relation to the respective concepts f rom the input is 
a candidate for a (metaphorical) cross-domain correspondence. Additionally, the 
at t r ibute of 'size' was transferred f rom the vehicle to the tenor domain by the 
' transfer.attribute ' stage (c.f. Fig. 5.7) of the resolution algorithm. The interpre-
ta t ion events bui l t are as follows: 
Short N L G : An i n f o r m a t i o n i s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y gold. 
Short N L G : E n c y c l o p a e d i a s a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y mines. 
Short N L G : E n c y c l o p a e d i a s a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y big. 
Long N L G : An i n f o r m a t i o n i s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y gold because I b e l i e v e t h a t 
e n c y c l o p a e d i a s being gold mines i s a f i g u r a t i v e comparison. 
Long N L G : E n c y c l o p a e d i a s are m e t a p h o r i c a l l y mines because I b e l i e v e t h a t 
e n c y c l o p a e d i a s b e i n g g o l d mines i s a f i g u r a t i v e comparison. 
Long N L G : E n c y c l o p a e d i a s are m e t a p h o r i c a l l y b i g because I b e l i e v e t h a t 
e n c y c l o p a e d i a s being gold mines i s a f i g u r a t i v e comparison. 
For more examples and the application of the comparison engine to a conven-
t ional metaphor LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS A JOURNEY, sub-schema 
LOVE IS A JOURNEY, see Appendix A.6. 
5.4 Integration and implementation overview 
The parent system of the figurative resolution sub-system, L O L I T A , is wri t ten 
mainly in the functional programming language Haskell [Hudak et al. 1994]. In-
cluding the code for non-literal analysis, the system consists (as of March 1996) of 
60380 lines of code, 11044 fines of ' C and 49336 lines of Haskell. 
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I t runs on a U N I X ^ workstation using either SunOS or Solaris-^". System re-
quirements vary w i t h the complexity of the task performed. While a typical query 
session runs in real-time wi th 36 M B of main memory, the analysis of complex 
newspaper articles (e.g. for M U C tasks and content scanning [Garighano et al. 
1993, Morgan et al. 1995, Costantino et al. 1996]) w i f l require around 80 M B of 
main memory for satisfactory speed of execution. 
The figurative resolution system consists of about 2000 lines of code, corre-
sponding to 20000 lines in a declarative language [Turner 1982]. The main part of 
the code for the prototype resides in one main module. The code for the individual 
trope types w i l l eventually be moved into separate files. In addition, coding was 
carried out in other modules, e.g. for interfacing the module to the rest of the 
system. A separate portion of code was required to realise the settings and options 
menu and additional work in the existing code deahng wi th pragmatics secured the 
integration of the figurative resolution wi th the estabHshed interpretation facihties. 
This code is distributed amongst approximately 130 functions containing the 
resolution functionality. Addit ional functions were coded to implement the inter-
facing/integration functionali ty and the options/settings sub-system. 
Full working integration into the L O L I T A system has been achieved. How-
ever, this integration is only a prototypical l inking of the non-literal sub-system's 
funct ional i ty to the rest of the system. Customised interfaces have to be buil t to 
allow individual applications (e.g. query) to make the best use of the functional-
i t y provided by the non-literal analysis. The design and implementation of such 
interfaces was, of course, not one of the goals of this project, as i t concentrated on 
a broad coverage of non-literal phenomena. Different applications have different 
needs w i t h regard to how they treat figurative language. For example, the dialogue 
application would rather use the interpretation of a metonymy (e.g. input like ' I 
read a lot of Shakespeare' might result in a response like 'Do you read plays or 
poetry?') whereas a language-tutoring application may well be content wi th ac-
cepting figurative input. Nevertheless, the sub-system has to provide information 
in a way that makes this information easy to use for other parts of the system, 
even more so when considering the N L E requirements of integration, flexibility and 
usability (see Sect. 2.1). Attent ion was paid to these requirements and we believe 
that those objectives have been met. 
^UNIX is a trademark of X/Open Company Ltd . 
^"Solaris and SunOS are trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
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From a system analytical point of view, the functionahty of the figurative resolu-
t ion is located in the area of pragmatic and semantic analysis of L O L I T A , interact-
ing w i t h both, and consulting the SemNet to obtain all the available information. 
From the different angle of interpretational stages, i t is located at the exact point 
where sense selection and creation [Gibbs 1994] is performed (c.f. Fig. 5.1). The 
non-literal analysis enhances this functionality in two ways. Firstly, i f sense selec-
t ion fails because, for example, a selectional restriction was violated, i t wi l l provide 
further sense creation functionali ty in addition to the semantics module. Secondly, 
i t provides supplementary sense selection by making previously inaccessible figura-
tive senses available (e.g. 'her thesis is about Shakespeare' has the literal reading 
'about the person or writer ' and an additional metonymic reading 'about the work 
of Shakespeare'). 
The following examples of how integration and open interfaces influenced the 
design may serve to illustrate the point. As mentioned in the context of the dis-
cussion of individual examples (Sects. 5.3.2-5.3.6), the figurative resolution sub-
system does not influence the usual interpretation process nor its results as such, 
because i t is i n no position to make assumptions about the direction into which a 
transformation should be performed. This is true of the general purpose figurative 
processing facilities; any non-literal functionality customised for an apphcation or 
a figurative analysis workbench should, of course, be extended to enable i t to deal 
w i t h all aspects of processing N L input in situ, clearly without losing rapport wi th 
the parent system. Instead of handhng its input in an idiosyncratic and opaque 
fashion, i t carries out its work alongside the standard processing, recording the 
steps taken, problems encountered and results achieved, and provides the means 
for other components of the system to make use of these resources. 
I t was assumed that the most important pieces of information resulting f rom a 
non-literal analysis i n the framework of a general NLP mechanism are the indication 
that figurative input was detected (recognition), what steps were taken to handle 
this input (figurative reasoning), and the outcome of the handling (interpretation, 
fa i l events). Moreover, the recognition part consists of important sub-parts which 
have to be covered in terms of recording them, such as the type of trope and 
context. 
A l l this information created by the non-literal analysis has been interfaced to 
the rest of the system, i.e. functions were coded to check for the existence of the 
information and to provide the means to access i t . A n abstract data type represent-
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ing a higher level interface to this information (as opposed to low level interfaces, 
providing access to information pertaining to one aspect of non-literal analysis, e.g. 
whether or not a portion of input has been resolved already, which method was 
used) was designed so that future application and task specific extensions of the 
analysis have a well-defined, common interface. For details, see Appendix B.5. 
The low level interface functions include: 
• 'has-been-analysed', which provides information on whether a concept rela-
t ion has been analysed by the non-literal resolution module. 
• ' is-trope', providing information on whether a concept relation has been clas-
sified as a trope and the type of figure. 
' interpretations-of-trope', which, given a concept relation (i.e. piece of Sem-
Net or input) returns the results of any kind of non-Hteral analysis. 
Addit ionally, i t was deemed necessary to allow for the revision and modification 
of the figurative reasoning and its results, for example, i f supplementary contextual 
information becomes available. Therefore, every single step of the processing is 
recorded in the globally accessible data structure SemNet. I f an application has 
to revise any of the non-literal sub-system's results, this is facilitated immensely 
by the explicitness of the representation. The problematic information (e.g. a 
classification as a specific type that has to be revised) can be picked up and all 
relevant information relating to the information to be revised is accessible and 
modifiable through the well-defined links. 
As far as the performance and complexity of the implementation are concerned, 
the following points are of importance. I t is impossible to evaluate a sub-system 
wi th in a larger framework of other components without a detailed evaluation set-
up, factoring out insignificant elements (at least wi th respect to the evaluation of 
the sub-system) such as the influence of the rest of the system (see [Smith 1995 
for a detailed, exemplary discussion of problems relating to the evaluation of NLP 
sub-systems). Because of this, i t is very difficult to evaluate the figurative sub-
system. Not only would the effort needed to design a sound evaluation set-up 
clearly lie outside the scope of this investigation, but also a simple, individual 
task whose accomplishment could be easily evaluated is lacking in the figurative 
resolution model. Moreover, i t is interconnected to so many other parts of the 
L O L I T A system and has to rely on their results and performance that the task of 
C h a p t e r 5: Process ing figurative language in L O L I T A 151 
finding a set-up which evaluates nothing but the non-hteral analysis seems well nigh 
impossible. A final diff icul ty in connection wi th the evaluation of the sub-system is 
that i t cannot be regarded as a monoHthic algorithmic complex. Its functionahty 
is divided into separate parts, and functions performing similar tasks are coded 
differently, specific to the type of trope they are dealing wi th . 
Nevertheless, an evaluation of some description is needed, especially against 
the N L E background, and there are some indications as to how the sub-system 
is performing. A l l the algorithms perform in real-time. There is no noticeable 
delay for either the successful or unsuccessful resolution of input, when compared 
to the processing without non-literal analysis. As is obvious f rom the description 
of the algorithms, a more complex concept extension (see Sect. 5.2.4) wi l l involve 
more processing and result in a higher processing time. Yet due to lazy evaluation, 
a feature of the programming language Haskell, this does not result in a linear 
increase in processing t ime requirements. 
However, there is a worst-case scenario which represents an extreme deviation 
f r o m the average case performance. I t is not clear how i t can be avoided, since i t 
is related to fundamental approaches and techniques used in the L O L I T A system. 
The worst case occurs when there is an attempted resolution of input containing 
an ungrammatical or unknown verb, using the conventional resolution (c.f. Sect. 
5.3.5). I t is an essential design issue of the L O L I T A system to accept ungrammat-
ical, erroneous or incomplete input, and on encountering such input, the system 
tries to find contextual, prototypical or world knowledge information enabling i t 
to, complete, correct and understand the input. In cases where this is not possible 
immediately, depending on the task, either the system requests more information 
f r o m the user, or ambiguities and errors are kept un t i l such t ime when additional 
information for disambiguation or correction is available. Unfortunately, i t is not 
possible to simply avoid any attempt at resolving input i f the verb is found to be 
ungrammatical or unknown. 
This is because incomplete information also occurs during normal processing, 
since input is processed incrementally and since the non-literal analysis is located 
at an early enough stage to allow i t to play a role in sense selection (as opposed 
to simply accepting what semantics and pragmatics pass on to the module, an 
approach that would defy the objective of the whole undertaking). Clearly, i t 
would be beneficial i f one could make the distinction between incomplete input 
that appears in the course of normal processing and incomplete input that resulted 
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f r o m the use of an ungrammatical or unknown verb. But since the coding was done 
in a side-effect free, functional programming language, no stack or flag can be kept 
to signal that the abstract machine entered a certain state. A time-out feature, 
stopping processing after, e.g., 1.5 seconds is also not a feasible solution either, 
since i t would not enable the system to make a distinction between anomalous, 
incorrect and possibly figurative input. 
Fortunately, the parsing module of L O L I T A and its interaction wi th the SemNet 
ensures that the worst case w i l l be l imited to the sentence or phrase in which the 
faul ty verb occurred. I f , for example, input of paragraph length is processed, the 
rest of the input w i l l be processed in real-time. I t was found that i t would have 
been inappropriate to spend a considerable amount of t ime working on a solution 
to remedy or by-pass this situation since input of the type under discussion is not 
encountered frequently enough to call for an instant solution. In this worst case, 
and depending on the complexity of the input sentence, processing takes between 
20 and 35 seconds to recover f rom the ungrammatical input and to signal that no 
resolution is possible. Although i t is a small consolation, the algorithm has been 
tested rigorously on input of this kind and, unlike in its in i t ia l versions, is now 
robust enough to recover in all cases. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the solution to the problems discussed in Sect. 4.1 
in detail. I t has shown how the knowledge-based approach to non-literal analysis 
of natural language input has been implemented according to N L E principles in 
the framework of the existing L O L I T A system and how f u l l integration has been 
achieved. 
Elements of the solution thus described in this chapter are the tasks and pre-
requisites connected to the processing of figurative natural language. Among the 
tasks identified (c.f. Sect. 5.2) and described are the recognition, interpretation 
and representation of non-literal language and figurative knowledge. The most im-
portant prerequisites outlined in this chapter are a suitable classification of tropes 
(presented in Sect. 5.2.2) and the knowledge structures (see Sect. 5.2.3) needed 
for a knowledge-based resolution of figurative input. 
I n addition, i t has been shown how auxihary methods (see Sect. 5.2.4) necessary 
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to arrive at the knowledge needed for the accomplishment of the resolution tasks 
can be utilised, and an overview of the algorithm for the treatment of figurative 
input is given in Sect. 5.3.1. Detailed examples of the algorithms at work, actual 
in- and output, are presented in Sects. 5.3.2-5.3.6, followed by technical details on 
the implementation of the functionali ty and its integration into the parent system 
L O L I T A in Sect. 5.4. 
The next chapter presents the evaluation of the undertaking described in this 
thesis on the basis of the measures and objectives laid out in Sects. 4.1 and 4.3, as 
well as an assessment of the project as a whole and a concluding outlook on promis-
ing areas and directions of research stemming f rom the analysis of the problem area, 
but which could not be covered by this project due to its l imited scope. 
Chapter 6 
Evaluation and conclusion 
I n this chapter, we analyse the extent to which the objectives of the work were 
met and evaluate the results of this analysis wi th regard to the methodological 
approach (c.f. Sect. 4.2), the goal set (see Sect. 4.1), and the problems outHned 
(c.f. Sect. 4.3). 
A short in i t i a l discussion of how the primary objectives were met is followed by 
a review of subordinate results and an analysis of how well the solution presented 
fits the natural language engineering (NLE) framework and its requirements. 
Finally, we assess what has been achieved in the work and provide an outlook 
of work that can be undertaken to extend the results and of promising directions 
for research which can be derived f rom the aims of this project. 
6.1 Primary objectives 
A l l the primary objectives (see Chap. 4) have been met. The comprehensive 
literature survey that takes findings f rom various disciplines into account as well as 
a thorough analysis of the state of the art allowed us to decide on the feasibility of 
the task of processing non-literal language in the L O L I T A framework. Moreover, i t 
provided us w i t h a means of distinguishing between promising approaches and less 
adequate ones as well as showing areas in the field where work remained to be done. 
This analysis resulted in the acceptance of the knowledge-based view of metaphor 
(c.f. Sect. 3.2.5.1) as basis for the solution presented in this thesis. I n order to 
arrive at the solution certain sub-tasks were necessary, and these were successfully 
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carried out; they included establishing a classification of types of figurative language 
more suited to a computational framework than the traditional ones and finding a 
suitable representation for figurative knowledge. The representation also touches 
upon the N L E principle of integration, as discussed below in Sect. 6.3. 
Since the solution has been successfully implemented and tested (this being 
an objective i tself) , the goal of extending the system's facihties in the direction 
of figurative language has been achieved: Non-literal input is distinguished f rom 
anomalous input, classified according to the system's knowledge about figurative 
language, accepted as such, and an interpretation of the greatest possible depth 
is sought. Consequently, information contained in non-literal utterances is made 
available to the system's other sub-parts, i.e. i t can be processed further using 
existing components. 
6.2 Secondary objectives 
As discussed in detail in Chap. 4, a traditional comparative analysis cannot be 
carried out. Nevertheless, i t is of interest to see how results f rom our solution com-
pare w i t h those of other approaches, keeping the differences between the particular 
intentions and environments in mind. 
Wi lks ' preference semantics (see Sect. 3.2.2) enabled a natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) system "to accept the abnormal", e.g. non-literal portions in its 
input [Wilks 1975b]. The augmentation of preference semantics wi th pseudo-texts 
Wilks 1978] extended the NLP system's capabilities to finding a (repair-view-
based) ' interpretation' for figurative input of some types of figures. Thus, a very 
basic detection, acceptance and interpretation mechanism was created for deviant 
input that can be semantically 'recovered' wi th the help of pseudo-texts. Our so-
lut ion is, also capable of accomplishing this. As mentioned before, the established 
knowledge structure of prototypes (c.f. Sect. 5.2.3) is comparable to pseudo-texts, 
when inevitably viewed in connection wi th the rest of the system's knowledge base 
( K N B ) . I t encodes knowledge about how concepts relate to each other prototypi-
cally, and thus enables our algorithm to find an interpretation for figurative input 
on the basis of the contents of the system's K N B . I t has to be pointed out, however, 
that Wilks used pseudo-texts in a way that abstracted f rom the actual input on 
detecting a constraint violation and then consulted the pseudo-text information 
to find a l i teral paraphrase for the input. In our solution, a constraint violation 
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is not a necessary triggering condition, and we do not hterally rephrase the input 
after seeking a fitting abstraction f rom the input which then results in constraint 
satisfaction. Although relatively simple bottom-up abstraction (for the sake of ef-
ficiency) takes place in the case of simple tropes (see Sect. 5.3.2), the abstraction 
is not regarded as the repaired, literal interpretation of the figurative input, nor is 
the abstraction performed on a static, detached ontology but on the contextually 
infiuenced and dynamically updated SemNet and, where possible, in a direction 
indicated by the type of trope. 
Fass' met* method (c.f. Sect. 3.2.2.2) provided a basic means of distinguishing 
between types of tropes such as metaphor and metonymy, and anomalous input. 
I t also used the methods of anomaly detection and abstraction. For finding the 
interpretation for the input, i t relied on a 'sister match' f rom the static ontology 
w i t h a concept f r o m the input. Our system is also capable of this but neither does 
i t rely on an anomaly detection nor does i t express preferences towards a literal 
interpretation (see the critique of Fass' met* method in Sect. 3.2.2.2). Of course, 
i t does not prefer figurative interpretations, either. Instead, i t tries to find all 
possible interpretations. Another advantage over the met* method is the ability 
of our system to arrive at a more complex classification of figures: whereas the 
met* method applies tests in a fixed order and w i l l classify input according to 
which test succeeds first (and enables a distinction between anomaly, metonymy 
and metaphor), our solution correctly classifies input as being of a certain type 
of figure, independently of the order of application of tests, and does so for more 
types of figures. When 'sister matches' are used in our model, they are not found 
in a static, pre-defined ontology but in the common, shared K N B of the SemNet, 
which means that the knowledge available to the figurative resolution sub-system 
is always up-to-date and, more importantly, dynamic. 
Martin 's M I D A S system [Mart in 1990] (see also Sect. 3.2.5.1) is comparable in 
some respects to our solution, too. I t was the first computational approach to use 
explicit figurative knowledge and, in contrast to previous implementations, seeks 
both l i teral and figurative interpretations. However, the figurative knowledge is 
contained in a customised, external representation. Moreover, since the relations 
between concepts holding in one domain are coded explicitly in great detail to 
facil i tate cross-domain transfer of relations, any extension of this knowledge wi l l 
be strenuous, i f at all feasible. Although figurative knowledge is extensible in 
M I D A S , this extension is l imi ted to correctly classifying a newly encountered trope 
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as a sub-type of a previously established one. The resulting hierarchical ordering 
of tropes is desirable, but not integrated into the rest of the system's knowledge. 
The approach taken wi th in the L O L I T A framework, on the other hand, keeps 
the figurative knowledge inside the one and only K N B , the SemNet. Thus, i t can 
be modified, revised and is accessible using the estabhshed interfaces. Moreover, 
no separate mapping structures are introduced. Cross-domain correspondences are 
computed on the contents of the SemNet, too. Again, this is beneficial, as i t bases 
the figurative interpretation on the whole of the most recent knowledge available. 
The same holds for the hierarchical ordering of instances of, e.g. metonymies. 
Since they inherit their ordering through the ordering of their components and the 
ranking of the components is based on the structure of the SemNet, no discrepancy 
between the general ontology and the ontology of figures can arise. 
Other aspects must also be mentioned, which cannot be compared to existing 
systems, either because no computational model has dealt wi th them or because 
they involve questions specific to the parent system. One such aspect is the exten-
sion of L O L I T A ' s facilities to deal wi th comparison statements in a more refined 
way. Before the implementation of the non-literal resolution system, comparison 
statements were either rejected on the basis of a semantic or pragmatic mismatch 
or taken as class inclusion statements. Now, i t is possible to distinguish between 
l i teral comparisons of varying degree (e.g. identity and inclusion) and figurative 
comparison statements, which w i l l both receive a more elaborate interpretation 
than before. Such an extension of existing abilities has also been achieved for 
idioms and anaphors. Whereas i t was previously not possible to treat idiomatic 
expressions appropriately i f they were not of the lexicalised idiom type, i.e. in-
cluded as additional word sense in the SemNet, they can now be resolved on the 
basis of figurative knowledge. This, in addition to the use of concept extension, 
means that no pattern matching is used in interpreting idioms. Instead, a flexible 
treatment of idiomatic expressions, or concept matching, allows a wide range of 
previously unresolvable input to be covered. Likewise, the existing facilities for 
anaphora resolution have been extended to include figurative anaphoric references, 
most prominently the contextual metonymies. The context-sensitive interpretation 
selection which prefers one of several competing interpretations on the basis of how 
well i t fits into the context can be seen as a higher order anaphoric resolution, too. 
As mentioned before, the foundation for generating natural language (NL) fig-
ures has been laid by integrating the figurative knowledge into the SemNet. Since 
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N L generation is based on the SemNet, all figurative knowledge contained within 
i t is available for generation purposes. Another secondary achievement that re-
sulted f r o m the well-suited representation is the ability to model type change (see 
also Sect. 5.2.1). The ini t ia l classification of input as belonging to a certain type 
of trope can be revised on the fly and dynamically. Thus i t is possible to model 
the ageing process of metaphors. A n obvious point that should be mentioned in 
this context is that, since figurative knowledge resides wi th in the system's K N B , 
i t is available to other parts of the system as well. Therefore, meta-linguistic rea-
soning, for example, can take place. And since the type, the interpretation (or 
unsuccessful attempt at interpreting) and other additional information is recorded 
when resolving figurative input, a basis for a (stylistic) corpus analyses has become 
available. 
6.3 Natural language engineering perspective 
In this section, a discussion of how well the solution presented conforms to impor-
tant aspects of N L E (c.f. Sect. 2.1) wi l l help to evaluate i f the objective of arriving 
at an N L E solution has been met. Although the key criteria for an N L E system 
apply to a system as a whole, i t is, of course, a necessity for any sub-component of 
a natural language engineered system to conform to the requirements derived f rom 
these criteria as closely as possible. 
• Feasibi l i ty 
As far as the aspect of feasibility is concerned, the figurative sub-system ful ly 
adheres to the requirements. Partly due to its good integration, partly due 
to design features, such as modularisation, i t does not make unreasonable 
demands on resources such as memory allocation and execution time. As 
mentioned before (see Sect. 5.4), non-literal analysis is performed in real-
t ime, and the requirements on main memory allocation are insignificant in 
the context of the system. 
• Robustness 
Robustness is a crucial criterion. Any non-robust component can corrupt 
the system's overall robustness. This is true for both aspects of robustness, 
namely, (1) the coverage of the system or sub-system and (2) the behaviour in 
the case of erroneous input, input outside the pre-defined scope of permissible 
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input and other sources of errors. The coverage of the figurative analysis 
sub-system is not a priori restricted. I t depends on the amount of figurative 
knowledge that is available as well as on the size and quality of the rest of 
the K N B . W i t h i n these l imits , to our knowledge, total robustness has been 
achieved. During testing, no cases have been encountered where erroneous 
input resulted in a failure of the non-literal analysis sub-system. In cases 
where incomplete or incorrect data are passed on to the sub-system (see 
also the discussion of the worst-case scenario in Sect. 5.4), the average-case 
behaviour can be adversely affected. However, the sub-system recovers even 
in this case. I t is, of course, very important not to make weak assumptions 
or to take incorrect decisions at such an early stage of analysis as the one 
at which the sub-system is located (c.f. Fig. 5.1). Thus, the solution is 
designed to ensure that, in case of doubt, all possible decisions are taken 
and revisable ones are kept revisable. The mechanism implementing the 
chain of figurative reasoning can serve as an example of this (c.f. Fig. 5.12 
and Appendix B.2.7). I t records all important steps taken by the algorithm 
during processing and the reason for taking them. Therefore, the processing 
is open to easy revision. I f there is insufficient information available to make 
a final decision, the requirements of robustness dictate that the decision is 
postponed un t i l sufficient information is available. By adhering to this rule, 
overall robustness is increased, because no error is carried over into other 
modules, and no unjust decisions w i l l induce a negative effect on subsequent 
stages of processing. 
• Scale 
The N L E criterion of scale does not apply to the sub-component in question 
directly. Since i t is integrated into a larger system and receives most of its 
scale related parameters f rom the parent system, e.g. vocabulary size and 
grammar coverage, i t depends on the framework to f u l f i l these requirements. 
The coverage of the module, on the other hand, is comparable to one of 
the two aspects of robustness (see above). However, i t is obvious that the 
implementation and design of a sub-component should ensure that scale is not 
l imi ted f r o m the very start by design features. This means that extensions 
and open architecture are of great concern, even for sub-parts. 
These requirements have, in our opinion, been met. Since the figurative 
analysis module makes f u l l use of all the information contained in the SemNet, 
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its coverage is the same as that of the parent system. Any input that can 
be processed by other modules can be processed by the non-Hteral analysis 
component. Clearly, coverage is also infiuenced by the amount of figurative 
knowledge available. In this context, i t is important to note that the figurative 
knowledge can be extended via simple N L interaction. 
• Integration 
The criterion of integration not only makes the obvious demand that any 
sub-part has to be Hnked to the system's other modules, but also requires the 
component's interaction to ensure that no unfounded assumptions are made 
about other parts (see also the discussion of the worst-case scenario above). 
Moreover, any solution should be designed as independently as possible to 
be of general use to an array of other components. This is especially true 
for solutions that provide basic functionality, such as non-literal analysis, 
which has to be regarded to some extent as providing semantic and pragmatic 
functionality. 
Not only has the most basic requirement of integration been met, i.e. the non-
literal analysis has been fu l ly integrated into the existing L O L I T A system, 
but the other aspects mentioned above are covered, as well. For example, 
independent guards wi th in the individual algorithms make sure that incom-
plete input or erroneous data passed on to the figurative module do not result 
in robustness problems or wrong results. In keeping wi th the criterion of ro-
bustness and feasibility (efficiency), the least possible amount of processing 
is aimed at and the problem recorded, where possible in such cases. The fact 
that the solution provides basic functionality is reflected in the openness of 
the design. Since the project concerned itself wi th a broad-coverage, proto-
typical implementation, no refined customised interfaces have been designed. 
Instead, i t was guaranteed that all necessary information is easily accessible. 
Thus, individual applications can make use of whatever information they re-
quire i n the context of non-literal analysis. The seamless integration into the 
existing K N B and the sharing of information between the rest of the system 
and the figurative module as well as the augmentation of the K N B by the 
non-hteral analysis are another indication of how closely the solution followed 
the requirements of the N L E criterion of integration. 
• Mainta inabi l i ty 
High internal modularisation, the distribution of functionahty on discrete 
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functions and analogous implementation of comparable functionality (e.g. 
concept extension and figurative reasoning, see also Fig. 5.7), and the use 
of pre-existing structures (such as the SemNet and internal data structures 
used elsewhere in the L O L I T A system) ensure, in our opinion, a high main-
tainabil i ty of our solution. 
• F lex ib i l i ty 
The criterion of flexibility does not play a central role in our solution. A 
component of such fundamental nature has to be open rather than flexible. 
By definition, i t need not be able to adapt to different tasks and domains 
but must allow other applications dealing wi th different domains to operate 
on its functionality. In this respect, our solution fulfi ls the requirements 
of flexibility in that i t provides all the functionality needed wi th regard to 
non-literal analysis in the framework of the L O L I T A system without being 
dependent on a single task to request this information, nor being restricted 
to providing this functionali ty in a l imited domain. 
• Usabi l i ty 
As is the case wi th the criterion of flexibility, usability is not directly appli-
cable to a sub-part of an N L E system in the traditional sense. However, even 
a component of a N L E system should be of high usability in that i t is useful 
for other parts of the system. As mentioned above, we believe that this is 
the case wi th our solution. I t provides the necessary functionality wi thin the 
resolution of figurative N L input and does so in a way that enables an array 
of applications to make use of this functionality. Although the non-literal 
analysis is of l i t t l e relevance to end-users, its user-friendliness is of impor-
tance to academic users. The possibility to extend the figurative knowledge 
via N L interaction, the 'intelligent' traces of the figurative reasoning and the 
division of the non-literal analysis capability between discrete types of tropes 
manifest, in our opinion, a high degree of user-friendliness. 
6.4 Achievements 
I n our opinion, the work reported in this thesis represents a successful project. 
The overall achievement has been the implementation and integration of an op-
erational figurative NLP analysis component, following N L E principles. To this 
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end, numerous sub-tasks had to be identified and completed. Related theoretical 
and computational work f rom various disciplines was thoroughly analysed to de-
termine whether any existing approaches could serve as a basis for a distinctive 
N L E treatment of the problem of processing figurative language. Moreover, the 
tradit ional classification of tropes and the confiicting definitions of figures were 
re-evaluated to create a foundation on which the solution could be based. A clas-
sification of figures based on computational requirements rather than traditional 
definitions and an overview of types of knowledge needed for the successful process-
ing of various types of figurative expressions on the basis of the preferred knowledge 
based approach have been given. In this context, the requirements and problems 
of processing figurative language in a real system as opposed to an evaluation con-
figuration were discussed, as well. The sub-tasks also included the introduction 
and adaptation of auxiliary methods, such as concept extension, masking, triangu-
lation and conceptual proximity computation. These methods, partly heuristics, 
are essential to ensure that the solution avoids the problems of feasibility other 
approaches are faced wi th . The functionality needed for processing non-literal lan-
guage has been explained, and a prototypical, robust, domain independent and 
open implementation that conforms to the N L E principles has been realised and 
integrated into the parent system. 
These implementations and the outline of the requirements in the framework 
of the knowledge-based approach have, in our opinion, shown that deep techniques 
are needed. By analysing the requirements of adequate processing of figurative 
language beyond the scope of ' toy' systems or systems whose primary goal i t is to 
evaluate a cognitive or linguistic theory, i t became clear that only deep techniques 
would provide enough power to tackle the problems involved without encountering 
either computational problems such as intolerable (sometimes factorial) complexity 
or shattering response t ime or, at the other end of the spectrum, without arriving 
at a solution that is severely l imited in size or coverage, for example. The basis for 
treating even seemingly basic figures cannot be provided by any kind of pattern 
matching or exhaustive ontology, as there cannot be such a thing, especially since 
context w i l l influence the relation between concepts; c.f. semantic vs. conceptual 
distance. This is even more so the case, i f no bui l t - in safeguarding mechanisms 
in the fo rm of l imi ted domains or application frameworks are available. Addit ion-
ally, a broad-coverage solution has to be robust and flexible to the utmost extent. 
These features can only be achieved i f great care is taken during design and imple-
mentation. Owing to the adherence to N L E principles in all stages of LOLITA's 
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development, the solution presented exhibits those features. 
6.5 Future work 
The scope and main thrust of this project did not allow all the interesting and 
important directions of research related to the field of processing figurative language 
to be pursued w i t h equal intensity. This section presents some promising directions 
of research that are derived f rom the project work. The clarification of the practical 
questions would contribute towards an extension of the solution, the pursual of 
theoretical objectives would contribute towards the field as a whole while at the 
same t ime delivering additional results for the evaluation of the current solution. 
Probably the most extensive and promising project concerns figurative corpus 
work. The automated input of the Master Metaphor List [Lakoff et al. 1995], after 
its conversion to a suitable format would allow for an array of tests and projects. 
As mentioned in Sect. 6.3, an extension of figurative knowledge is possible via NL 
interaction. Since the L O L I T A system is capable of processing texts in batch mode, 
arriving at an automated augmentation of the figurative knowledge by reading in 
the Master Metaphor List and subsequent corpus work (both on the figurative 
knowledge itself and on text corpora which are processed wi th the help of this 
knowledge) would, at the same time, test and improve the coverage of the solution. 
I n addition, i t would allow the collection of a range of empirical data, such as 
stylistic analyses. 
Another practical undertaking would entail the (partial) implementation of var-
ious approaches to non-literal processing in the framework of the L O L I T A system. 
This would allow an approximation of a comparative analysis of different, com-
putational or non-computational theories of metaphor wi th L O L I T A as a testbed, 
since L O L I T A provides the facilities for the implementation of other theories, such 
as the analogy approach or sub-symbolic approaches (see Chap. 3). 
On a smaller scale, the design and implementation of prototypical ranges, that 
means the integration of an additional information structure into the SemNet, 
would allow the common figures hyperbole and understatement to be processed in 
the framework of the solution presented. Unfortunately, this is not yet possible 
(for a discussion of the reasons, see Sect. 5.2.2). Although the addition of these 
ranges would not mean that changes in the structure of SemNet are inevitable. 
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the work involved is considerable, since the ranges and their applicability can be 
derived only through a comprehensive corpus analysis. 
A n idea derived f r o m informal findings during the work on this project would 
combine automated knowledge acquisition wi th (not necessarily machine readable) 
corpus work. I t has been claimed by Lakoff [Lakoff 1993] that all metaphors are 
covered by the conventional metaphor approach. While he argues that 'novel' 
metaphors are reducible to conventional schemata, we found examples where com-
parisons statements are clearly based on conventional metaphors. Therefore, the 
question of whether the conventional metaphor approach can be helpful in reducing 
the processing involved when resolving comparison statements is of great interest, 
even more so i n a framework where efficiency is an important factor. This investiga-
t ion would furthermore serve a theoretical purpose: i f a conventional metaphorical 
schema is at work behind the scenes of comparison statements, which are generally 
treated as analogy, this would have entailments for the argument regarding the 
pr ior i ty of metaphor over analogy. 
On a more theoretical basis, an investigation into the implications the latest 
findings on metaphor or non-Hteral versus literal meaning have for a semantic 
theory seems to be a necessary and promising venture. As has been discussed, 
for example i n Chap. 3, traditional truth-conditional semantics have problems in 
accounting for figurative speech. Semantics, on the other hand, form the bedrock of 
a complex NLP system like L O L I T A . Thus, a thorough analysis of the requirements 
and impHcations current (cognitive science) work on metaphor has on theories 
of meaning and an investigation into which semantic formalisms are capable of 
accommodating figurative meaning without the shortcomings of the classical ones 
seem to be a necessity. 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the results of the project have been evaluated under two different 
aspects. Firstly, they were, as far as possible, compared to the results of related 
computational work. This evaluation showed that the achievements equal or excel 
comparable work, at least when we take into consideration the most important 
requirement for this undertaking, namely, its real-life applicability in a large-scale 
NLP system. Secondly, the outcome of this project was analysed in the light of 
the estabHshed criteria for a natural language engineered system. I t was shown 
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that i t conforms to the important N L E requirements. In conclusion, the positive 
evaluation was followed by a discussion of what has been achieved in the project 
and directions of work stemming f rom the project which were unfortunately outside 
its scope. 
Appendix A 
Examples of figurative processing 
in L O L I T A 
This section presents the results of the resolution of examples of the types of tropes 
defined in Sect. 5.2.2, as produced by the non-literal analysis component of the 
L O L I T A system using the 'query' apphcation interface to the L O L I T A system. 
The source of the example is given i f the input was taken f rom the literature on 
metaphor. The input and the relevant events (the natural language representation 
of the system's knowledge) generated by the resolution algorithm are stated. Where 
appropriate, short and long natural language generation (NLG) is given, short 
version first. The names of the individual events are described in Sects. 5.3.2-
5.3.6. 
A . l Simple tropes 
Input : M y car drinks gasoline [Wilks 1978 . 
Interpretat ion: A car consumes gasoline. The car that inputs describe and that 
you control consumes gasoline that i t drinks because I draw inferences by using a 
simple resolution. I t consumes i t because I draw them by using a simple resolution. 
D r a w inferences: I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. I draw inferences 
by using a simple resolution because I do not believe literally that the car that 
inputs describe drinks gasoline that i t consumes. I t consumes i t because I draw 
them by using a simple resolution. You control i t . 
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Not believe l i terally: I do not beheve literally that a car drinks gasoline. I do 
not believe li terally that the car that inputs describe and that you control drinks 
gasoline that i t consumes because I believe that i t is a personification. I t consumes 
i t because I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. I draw them by using a 
simple resolution. 
Bel ieve is a tropetype: I beheve that a car drinking gasoHne is a personification. 
I believe that the car that inputs describe and that you control drinking gasoline 
that i t consumes is a personification because i t is Hterally not possible. I t consumes 
i t because I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. I draw them by using a 
simple resolution because I do not believe literally that i t drinks i t . 
Is tropetype: A car drinking gasoline is a personification. The car that inputs 
describe and that you control drinking gasoline that i t consumes is a personification. 
I draw inferences by using a simple resolution because I do not believe literally that 
i t drinks i t . 
L i t e r a l l y not possible: A car drinking gasoline is literally not possible. The 
car that inputs describe and that you control drinking gasoline that i t consumes 
is l i teral ly not possible so I beHeve that i t drinks i t is a personification. I draw 
inferences by using a simple resolution because I do not believe Hterally that i t 
drinks i t . 
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Input : Jake was owned by the motorbike. 
Interpretat ion: A motorbike controlled Jake. The motorbike that owned Jake 
and that inputs describe controlled h im because I draw inferences by using a simple 
resolution. 
D r a w inferences: I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. I draw inferences 
by using a simple resolution because I do not believe literally that the motorbike 
that inputs describe owned Jake. 
Not believe l i terally: I do not believe literally that a motorbike owned Jake. I 
do not believe l i terally that the motorbike that inputs describe owned Jake because 
I believe that i t owned h im is a personification. 
Bel ieve is a tropetype: The motorbike that inputs describe owning Jake is 
l i teral ly not possible so I believe that i t owned h im is a personification. 
Is tropetype: A motorbike owning Jake is a personification. The motorbike that 
inputs describe owning Jake is a personification. 
L i t e r a l l y not possible: A motorbike owning Jake is literally not possible. The 
motorbike that inputs describe owning Jake is literally not possible so I believe 
that i t owned h i m is a personification. 
O t h e r events: Inputs use human features in order to describe a motorbike. Inputs 
use human features in order to describe the motorbike that owned Jake. 
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Input: My feet are torturing me. 
Interpretation: Feet torment you. Feet that inputs describe and that you control 
torment you because I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. They torment 
you because I draw them by using a simple resolution. They torture you. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. I draw inferences 
by using a simple resolution because I do not believe literally that feet that inputs 
describe torture you. They torment you because I draw them by using a simple 
resolution. They torment you. 
Not believe literally: I do not believe literally that feet torture you. I do not 
believe literally that feet that inputs describe and that you control torture you 
because I believe that they torture you is a personification. They torment you 
because I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. They torment you because 
I draw them by using a simple resolution. 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that feet torturing you is a personification. 
Is tropetype: Feet torturing you is a personification. Feet that inputs describe 
and that you control torturing you is a personification. They torment you because 
I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. They torment you because I draw 
them by using a simple resolution. 
Literally not possible: Feet torturing you is literally not possible. Feet that 
inputs describe and that you control torturing you is literally not possible so I 
believe that they torture you is a personification. They torment you because I 
draw inferences by using a simple resolution. They torment you because I draw 
them by using a simple resolution. 
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Input: The square owns the house. 
Resolution method: Simple resolution, automatically passed on to conventional 
metonymy resolution, since no initial interpretation was found. Neither the latter 
method nor literal analysis succeeded in finding an interpretation, thus the fail 
events were generated (see also Fig. 5.7). 
Fail event: I do not believe that a square owns a house. I do not beheve that a 
square owns a house because I do not find a literal interpretation and do not find 
a figurative interpretation with a conventional resolution. 
Other events: I do not find a hteral interpretation and do not find a figurative 
interpretation with a conventional resolution. I do not find a literal interpretation 
and do not find a figurative interpretation with a conventional resolution so I do 
not believe that a square owns a house. I do not find a Hteral interpretation. I do 
not find a figurative interpretation with a conventional resolution. 
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Input: The circle owns the house. 
Interpretation: Organisations own a house. Organisations own a house because 
I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences by using a simple resolution. I draw inferences 
by using a simple resolution because I do not beheve literally that the circle that 
inputs describe owns organisation's house. 
Not believe literally: I do not believe literally that a circle owns organisation's 
house. I do not beheve literally that the circle that inputs describe owns organisa-
tion's house because I beheve that it owns it is a metonymy. 
Believe is a tropetype: I beheve that a circle owning organisation's house is a 
metonymy. The circle that inputs describe owning organisation's house is hterally 
not possible so I believe that it owns it is a metonymy. 
Is tropetype: A circle owning organisation's house is a metonymy. The circle 
that inputs describe owning organisation's house is a metonymy. 
Literally not possible: A circle owning organisation's house is hterally not pos-
sible. The circle that inputs describe owning organisation's house is literally not 
possible so I believe that it owns it is a metonymy. 
Other events: Inputs describe a circle. Inputs describe the circle that owns 
organisation's house. Inputs use human features in order to describe a circle. 
Inputs use human features in order to describe the circle that owns organisation's 
house. 
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Input: Happiness murdered the baron. 
Resolution method: Simple resolution, passed on to conventional metonymies. 
As in the above example, neither a Hteral nor a figurative interpretation was found 
for the input. Therefore it was classified as anomalous and attributed a low degree 
of belief. 
Fail event: I do not believe that a happiness murdered a baron. I do not believe 
that a happiness murdered a baron because I do not find a literal interpretation 
and do not find a figurative interpretation with a conventional resolution. 
Other events: I do not find a literal interpretation. I do not find a figurative 
interpretation with a conventional resolution. 
Appendix A: Examples of figurative processing in L O L I T A 173 
A.2 Fixed metonymies 
Input: Denise drank the bottle [Fass 1991 . 
Interpretation: Denise drank a content. Denise drank the content that the 
container-for-content metonymy that uses a container may describe because I draw 
inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. I draw inferences because I do not believe 
literally that Denise drank a bottle. 
Not believe literally: I do not beheve literally that Denise drank a bottle. I do 
not believe literally that Denise drank a bottle because I believe that she drank it 
is a metonymy. 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that Denise drinking a bottle is a metonymy. I 
believe that Denise drinking a bottle is a metonymy because she drank it is Hterally 
not possible. 
Is tropetype: Denise drinking a bottle is a metonymy. 
Literally not possible: Denise drinking a bottle is Hterally not possible. Denise 
drinking a bottle is literally not possible so I believe that she drank it is a metonymy. 
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Input: Ted played Bach [Fass 1991]. 
Comment: This example illustrates how different levels of abstraction in the 
metaphoric knowledge result in a varying degree of depth in the interpretation. 
Since no knowledge about 'composers producing music' was present in the SemNet, 
the information that 'Bach is a composer' did not lead to an instantiation of the 
generic 'artist-for-art-form' metonymical schema to 'composer-for-music'. 
Interpretation: Ted played art. Ted played art that the artist-for-art-form 
metonymy that uses an artist may describe and that he played because I draw 
inferences. I draw them because I do not believe literally that he played Bach. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. I draw inferences because I do not believe 
literally that Ted played Bach. 
Not believe literally: I do not beheve hterally that Ted played Bach. I do not 
believe literally that Ted played Bach because I believe that he played him or her 
is a metonymy. 
Believe is a tropetype: I beheve that Ted playing Bach is a metonymy. I believe 
that Ted playing Bach is a metonymy because he played him or her is literally not 
possible. 
Is tropetype: Ted playing Bach is a metonymy. 
Literally not possible: Ted playing Bach is hterally not possible. Ted playing 
Bach is literally not possible so I believe that he played him or her is a metonymy. 
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Input: I read Shakespeare. 
Comment: This example clearly shows the benefit of relying on the SemNet as a 
shared knowledge base (KNB). The generic 'author-for-work' figurative knowledge 
is, without additional knowledge-engineering instantiated into 'poet-for-poetry' and 
'playwright-for-drama', since 'Shakespeare' is, as far as the SemNet is concerned, 
an instance of both. If the selectional mechanisms is at work, the most appropriate 
of the interpretations is selected on the basis of contextual information. 
Interpretation: You read poetry. You read poetry that the work-for-author 
metonymy that uses a versifier may describe because I draw inferences. 
You read a drama. You read the drama that the work-for-author metonymy that 
uses a playwright may describe because I draw inferences. 
You read a work. You read the work that the work-for-author metonymy that uses 
an author may describe because I draw inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences by using a conceptual resolution. I draw 
inferences by using a conceptual resolution because I do not believe literally that 
you read Shakespeare. 
Not believe literally: I do not beUeve literally that you read Shakespeare. I do 
not believe literally that you read Shakespeare because I believe that you read him 
or her is a metonymy. 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that you reading Shakespeare is a metonymy. 
I believe that you reading Shakespeare is a metonymy because you read him or her 
is literally not possible. 
Is tropetype: You reading Shakespeare is a metonymy. 
Literally not possible: You reading Shakespeare is literally not possible. You 
reading Shakespeare is literally not possible so I believe that you read him or her 
is a metonymy. 
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A.3 Contextual metonymies 
Input: A customer entered a restaurant and ordered a sandwich. Now the sand-
wich is waiting for the bill [Lakoff and Johnson 1980 . 
Comment: The prototypical chain of figurative reasoning produces seemingly con-
tradictory NLG. Of course the sentence ' The customer who ordered the sandwich 
that waits for a bill [...] ' should read 'The customer who ordered the sandwich that 
is said to be waiting for a bill [...] ' . Although these points do not affect the overall 
quality of the results and could be remedied, the readability of the NLG would suf-
fer, in our opinion. Since the NLG, especially the long form, also serves debugging 
purposes, no steps have been taken to improve the quality. For further processing 
only the short form of the NLG, which is always correct natural language is used. 
Interpretation: A customer waits for a bill. The customer who ordered the 
sandwich that waits for a bill and who waits for a bill waits for a bill because I 
draw inferences. I draw them because I do not believe literally that it waits for a 
bill . 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. 
Not believe literally: I do not believe literally that a sandwich waits for a bill. 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that a sandwich waiting for a bill is a metonymy. 
Is tropetype: A sandwich waiting for a bill is a metonymy. 
Literally not possible: A sandwich waiting for a bill is hterally not possible. 
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Input: Jake uses a Macintosh. The Macintosh finishes his homework first. 
Interpretation: Jake finishes homework. Jake finishes homework because I draw 
inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences by using a contextual resolution. I draw 
inferences by using a contextual resolution because I do not beheve literally that 
the Macintosh finishes homework. 
Not believe literally: I do not believe Hterally that the Macintosh finishes home-
work. I do not believe Hterally that the Macintosh finishes homework because I 
believe that it finishes them is a metonymy. 
Believe is a tropetype: I beHeve that the Macintosh finishing homework is a 
metonymy. I believe that the Macintosh finishing homework is a metonymy because 
it finishes them is literally not possible. 
Is tropetype: The Macintosh finishing homework is a metonymy. 
Literally not possible: The Macintosh finishing homework is Hterally not possi-
ble. The Macintosh finishing homework is Hterally not possible so I beHeve that it 
finishes them is a metonymy. 
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A.4 Conventional figures 
Input: I killed emacs [Martin 1990 . 
Interpretation: You terminated emacs. You terminated emacs that you killed 
because I draw inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. I draw inferences by using a conceptual reso-
lution because I do not believe literally that you killed emacs that you terminated. 
I draw them because I do not believe hterally that you killed it . 
Not believe literally: I do not beheve hterally that you kiUed emacs. I do not 
believe literally that you killed emacs that you terminated because I believe that 
you killed it is a metaphor. I draw inferences because I do not believe literally that 
you killed i t . 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that you killing emacs is a metaphor. I believe 
that you killing emacs that you terminated is a metaphor because you killed it is 
literally not possible. I draw inferences because I do not believe literally that you 
killed i t . 
Is tropetype: You killing emacs is a metaphor. You killing emacs that you 
terminated is a metaphor. I draw inferences because I do not believe literally that 
you killed i t . 
Literally not possible: You kilhng emacs is hterally not possible. You kilhng 
emacs that you terminated is literally not possible so I believe that you killed it is 
a metaphor. I draw inferences because I do not believe hterally that you killed it. 
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Input: Prices are soaring [Carbonell 1982 . 
Interpretation: Prices increase. Prices increase because I draw inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences by using a conceptual resolution because I 
do not believe literally that prices soar. I draw inferences by using a conceptual 
resolution. 
Not believe literally: I do not beHeve HteraHy that prices soar. I do not beHeve 
literally that prices soar because I beHeve that they soar is a metaphor. 
Believe is a tropetype: I beHeve that prices soaring is a metaphor. I beHeve 
that prices soaring is a metaphor because they soar is literally not possible. 
Is tropetype: Prices soaring is a metaphor. 
Literally not possible: Prices soaring is literally not possible. Prices soaring is 
literally not possible so I believe that they soar is a metaphor. 
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Input: Britain entered the EU [Wilks 1978, Martin 1990]. 
Interpretation: Britain joined the EU. Britain joined the EU because I draw 
inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. I draw inferences because I do not believe 
literally that Britain entered the EU. 
Not believe literally: I do not beHeve literally that Britain entered the EU. I do 
not believe literally that Britain entered the EU because I believe that it entered 
it is a metaphor. 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that Britain entering the EU is a metaphor. I 
believe that Britain entering the EU is a metaphor because it entered it is literally 
not possible. 
Is tropetype: Britain entering the EU is a metaphor. 
Literally not possible: Britain entering the EU is literally not possible. Britain 
entering the EU is literally not possible so I believe that it entered it is a metaphor. 
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Input: I entered LISP [Martin 1990 . 
Interpretation: You started LISP. You started LISP because I draw inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. I draw inferences because I do not believe 
literally that you entered LISP. 
Not believe literally: I do not beheve literally that you entered LISP. I do not 
believe hterally that you entered LISP because I beheve that you entered it is a 
metaphor. 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that you entering LISP is a metaphor. I believe 
that you entering LISP is a metaphor because you entered it is literally not possible. 
Is tropetype: You entering LISP is a metaphor. 
Literally not possible: You entering LISP is literally not possible. You entering 
LISP is literally not possible so I believe that you entered it is a metaphor. 
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A.5 Idioms 
Input: Jake is fighting the red tape in the university. 
Interpretation: Jake fights a bureaucracy. Jake fights the bureaucracy that the 
idiom that uses red tape may denote because I draw inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. I draw inferences because I do not beHeve 
literally that Jake fights the red tape that he fights. 
Not believe literally: I do not believe literally that Jake fights a red tape. I do 
not beHeve literally that Jake fights the red tape that he fights because I believe 
that he fights it is an idiom. 
Believe is a tropetype: I beHeve that Jake fighting a red tape is an idiom. I 
believe that Jake fighting the red tape that he fights is an idiom because he fights 
it is unlikely literally. 
Is tropetype: Jake fighting a red tape is an idiom. Jake fighting the red tape 
that he fights is an idiom. 
Literally not possible: Jake fighting a red tape is unlikely literaHy. Jake fighting 
the red tape that he fights is unHkely literaHy so I beHeve that he fights it is an 
idiom. 
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Input: Jake kicked the bucket. 
Interpretation: Jake died. Jake died because I draw inferences. 
Draw inferences: I draw inferences. I draw inferences because I do not believe 
literally that Jake kicked the bucket that he kicked. 
Not believe literally: I do not believe hterally that Jake kicked a bucket. I do 
not believe literally that Jake kicked the bucket that he kicked because I believe 
that he kicked it is an idiom. 
Believe is a tropetype: I beheve that Jake kicking a bucket is an idiom. I 
believe that Jake kicking the bucket that he kicked is an idiom because he kicked 
it is unlikely literally. 
Is tropetype: Jake kicking a bucket is an idiom. Jake kicking the bucket that he 
kicked is an idiom. 
Literally not possible: Jake kicking a bucket is unhkely literally. Jake kicking 
the bucket that he kicked is unhkely hterally so I believe that he kicked it is an 
idiom. 
Appendix A: Examples of figurative processing in L O L I T A 184 
A.6 Comparison statements 
Input: Goebbels is a rat [Cooper 1986 . 
Comment: This example shows how well the non-literal analysis is integrated into 
the rest of the system. Unlike with other architectures, there is no 'competition' 
between the literal and non-literal components. In this case, semantics correctly 
but unexpectedly chose the figurative reading of 'rat', i.e. 'informer' in the course 
of normal processing. Since the comparison statement mechanism operates inde-
pendently from the literal analysis, that is, it is not invoked on a failed literal 
interpretation, the input was checked again. It was found to be figurative and 
correct and therefore accepted. 
Interpretation: Goebbels is metaphorically an informer. 
Believe is a tropetype: I believe that Goebbels being a rat is a figurative com-
parison. 
Is tropetype: Goebbels being a rat is a figurative comparison. 
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Input : Goebbels is a rat [Cooper 1986 . 
C o m m e n t : In this case, the additional figurative word sense of 'rat ' that was 
correctly chosen by semantics in the example above had been deleted f rom the 
K N B to allow for testing of the bare comparison statement mechanism. Thus this 
example can be seen as producing the well-established figurative meaning of 'rat ' 
in the meaning of ' informer' , as was planned, on the fly. The brackets were added 
by hand to increase the readability. The text outside the brackets on its own 
constitutes the short N L G , the text outside and inside the brackets constitutes the 
long N L G . 
Interpretat ion: Goebbels is metaphorically poisonous (because I believe that 
Goebbels being a rat is a figurative comparison). Goebbels is metaphorically unsafe 
(because I believe that Goebbels being a rat is a figurative comparison). Goebbels 
is metaphorically vicious (because I believe that Goebbels being a rat is a figurative 
comparison). 
Bel ieve is a tropetype: I beheve that Goebbels being a rat is a figurative com-
parison. 
Is tropetype: Goebbels being a rat is a figurative comparison. 
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Input : John is a fox [Carbonell 1982 . 
C o m m e n t : In this example, the good integration and mutual support of the literal 
and non-literal analysis can be seen, too. Again, the figurative reading of a word, 
here ' fox ' was correctly chosen by the literal analysis. However, this interpretation 
had no 'side effects' in that i t elaborated on what characterises 'John'. The figu-
rative analysis component, however, transferred additional attributes of 'John' on 
the basis of this figurative comparison, namely being a 'trickster ', 'slyboots' and 
a 'dodger '. 
Interpretat ion: John is metaphorically a trickster. John is metaphorically a 
trickster because I believe that John being a fox is a figurative comparison. 
John is metaphorically a slyboots. John is metaphorically a slyboots because I 
believe that John being a fox is a figurative comparison. 
John is metaphorically a dodger. John is metaphorically a dodger because I believe 
that John being a fox is a figurative comparison. 
Bel ieve is a tropetype: I beheve that John being a fox is a figurative comparison. 
I believe that John being a fox is a figurative comparison so John is metaphorically 
a trickster. 
Is tropetype: John being a fox is a figurative comparison. 
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Input : Love is a journey [Lakoff 1993^. 
C o m m e n t : In this example the comparison statement algorithm was used to 
(meta-) interpret a conventional metaphor schema, namely L O N G - T E R M P U R P O S E -
F U L A C T I V I T Y IS A J O U R N E Y , sub-schema L O V E IS A J O U R N E Y . I t is important 
to note that the directionality is preserved. While a lover is metaphorically a trav-
eller, a traveller does not become metaphorically a lover. The interpretation shows 
which knowledge was available in both domains and could be mapped. I t includes 
the agent (lover, traveller), alteration (the system seems to interpret a relation-
ship as marking a state change, in parallel to the change of location occurring in 
the context of travel) and impediments (problems, obstacles/delays). This result 
points into the direction that a computational resolution of comparison statements 
on the basis of conventional figures might be a feasible undertaking (see also Sect. 
6.5). 
To avoid repetitious N L G listings, brackets have been added. The text in 
brackets together w i t h the text outside the brackets constitutes the long NLG, the 
text outside the brackets on its own constitutes the short N L G . 
Interpretat ion: ( I believe that love being a journey is a figurative comparison 
so) love is metaphorically a change. ( I believe that love being a journey is a 
figurative comparison so) a goal is metaphorically a destination. ( I beheve that 
love being a journey is a figurative comparison so) a problem is metaphorically 
an obstacle. ( I believe that love being a journey is a figurative comparison so) a 
problem is metaphorically a delay. ( I believe that love being a journey is a figurative 
comparison so) a lover is metaphorically a traveller. 
A lover is metaphorically a traveller (because I believe that love being a journey is 
a figurative comparison). A problem is metaphorically a delay (because I believe 
that love being a journey is a figurative comparison). A problem is metaphorically 
an obstacle (because I beheve that love being a journey is a figurative comparison). 
A goal is metaphorically a destination, (because I believe that love being a journey 
is a figurative comparison). Love is metaphorically a change (because I believe that 
love being a journey is a figurative comparison). 
Love is metaphorically a motion (because I believe that love being a journey is a 
figurative comparison). Love is metaphorically a travelling (because I believe that 
love being a journey is a figurative comparison). 
Bel ieve is a tropetype: I believe that love being a journey is a figurative com-
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parison. 
Is tropetype: Love being a journey is a figurative comparison. 
O t h e r events: The destination that a goal is metaphorically. The traveller that a 
lover is metaphorically. The delay that a problem is metaphorically. The obstacle 
that a problem is metaphorically. 
A p p e n d i x A : E x a m p l e s of figurative processing in L O L I T A 189 
Input : Butchers are surgeons [Veale 1995]. 
C o m m e n t : In this example of a comparison statement, a feature and an attribute 
transfer takes place (c.f. Fig. 5.7). On the basis of the results of triangulation, 
the features ' sk i l l ' and 'wealth' are transferred. Since triangulation supports the 
overall comparison, the metaphorical is-a relation between the input concepts is 
reinforced. The transfer of attributes, again on the basis of triangulation, allows 
cross-domain correspondences between tools used and acts performed by the input 
concepts. 
The text i n brackets, together w i th the text outside the brackets constitutes 
the long N L G , the text outside the brackets on its own constitutes the short NLG. 
Interpretat ion: Butchers are metaphorically skilled. Butchers are metaphorically 
rich. Butchers are metaphorically surgeons. 
A knife is metaphorically a scalpel (because I believe that butchers being surgeons 
is a figurative comparison.) Slaughter is metaphorically surgery (because I believe 
that butchers being surgeons is a figurative comparison.) 
Bel ieve is a tropetype: I beheve that butchers being surgeons is a figurative 
comparison. 
Is tropetype: Butchers being surgeons is a figurative comparison. 
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Input : Encyclopaedias are gold mines [Ortony 1979 . 
Interpretat ion: A n information is metaphorically gold. A n information is meta-
phorically gold because I beheve that encyclopaedias being gold mines is a figurative 
comparison. 
Encyclopaedias are metaphorically mines. Encyclopaedias are metaphorically mines 
because I beheve that encyclopaedias being gold mines is a figurative comparison. 
Encyclopaedias are metaphorically big. Encyclopaedias are metaphorically big be-
cause I believe that encyclopaedias being gold mines is a figurative comparison. 
Bel ieve is a tropetype: I believe that encyclopaedias being gold mines is a 
figurative comparison. I beheve that encyclopaedias being gold mines is a figurative 
comparison so encyclopaedias are metaphorically mines. 
Is tropetype: Encyclopaedias being gold mines is a figurative comparison. 
O t h e r events: The gold that an information is metaphorically. 
Appendix B 
Algorithmic and representational 
details 
This section describes algorithmic and representational details and considerations, 
in particular the representation of figurative knowledge in the form of natural 
language ( N L ) , the choice of using the SemNet as a common data structure and 
details of the algorithms for the resolution of individual types of figures as well as 
the important auxiliary methods used. 
B . l Natural language representation of figura-
tive knowledge 
The knowledge about the fo rm of figures and the way in which they combine 
concepts is stored in the SemNet in the fo rm of events (see also Sect. 2.2.1). The 
figurative knowledge and its organisation have to satisfy certain requirements. 
This knowledge should, quite obviously, enable the system to make use of i t 
while resolving input, that is, provide the necessary information for a non-literal 
analysis on the basis of the knowledge-based approach. Carbonell stated that 
metaphors use concepts so that "X is used to mean Y in context Z" [Carbonell 1982 . 
When applied to our question, figurative knowledge thus has to express the concepts 
X , Y and, where applicable, Z. Moreover, i t should represent the organisation of 
figures, since i t has been shown convincingly that a hierarchical organisation of 
figures not only has a cognitive aspect [Lakoff 1993, Lakoff et al. 1995], but also 
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helps the computational analysis of figurative input (c.f. the discussion of the 
M I D A S system in Sect. 3.2.5.1). Finally, the non-Hteral analysis can be more 
efficient, flexible and general i f the figurative knowledge also contains information 
on the type of figure. 
These requirements are all met by the current representation of figurative knowl-
edge. The actual representation consists of events of the generic form 'A figure of 
type V , namely figure U , makes use of concept X to express concept Y ' . This form, 
which is remarkably close to Carbonell's dictum is powerful enough to represent 
the figurative knowledge needed for handling all types of knowledge-based tropes. 
The part that expresses the type and 'name' of the figure is optional, but greatly 
helps post-processing analysis and serves as a basis for other tasks, such as stylistic 
analysis or empirical analysis of the frequency of figures. The fact that the special, 
figurative concept relation is only valid in a certain context is supphed by the figu-
rative resolution algorithm. Either the lack of a valid literal interpretation, but the 
existence of an acceptable figurative interpretation, or the analysis of the context 
(meaning the actual context of the utterance or the conceptual context of the input 
concepts) supply the information necessary to reliably apply the figurative schema 
under consideration to the input. The most important part of the figurative knowl-
edge is the ' X means Y (on the basis of figure U ) ' concept relation. I t is stored 
in the SemNet in exactly the same way other knowledge is stored, that means by 
representing the concepts involved as nodes of the SemNet and their relation as 
links between the nodes. 
This enables the knowledge engineer to input, check, modify and output figu-
rative knowledge using the existing N L interfaces. More importantly, the uniform 
means of representation and the sharing of information between the figurative and 
other types of knowledge already contained in the SemNet means that other parts 
of the system can access figurative knowledge, while the entire knowledge contained 
in the SemNet can be used by the figurative sub-system. Another extremely im-
portant factor that leads to the choice of the existing SemNet structure as the basis 
for the representation of figurative knowledge is that w i th a shared knowledge base 
( K N B ) , no discrepancies between types of knowledge can arise. This is a plausi-
ble risk because the processing of input extends the SemNet continually wi th new 
concepts and relations. 
Before the concluding remarks, some examples of figurative knowledge are pre-
sented. The examples are the input typed in a query session wi th the L O L I T A 
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system and which added figurative knowledge to the SemNet. 
An a r t i s t - f o r - a r t - f o r m metonymy uses an a r t i s t t o d e s c r i b e a r t . 
A p r o c e s s - a s - l i v i n g - t h i n g metaphor uses an animal to denote a process. 
A work-f or-author metonymy uses an author to d e s c r i b e a work. 
A c a p i t a l - f o r - g o v e r n m e n t metonymy uses a c a p i t a l to d e s c r i b e the 
government. 
A c o n t a i n e r - f o r - c o n t e n t metonymy uses a c o n t a i n e r to d e s c r i b e the 
content. 
The last piece of figurative knowledge was the input that enabled the non-literal 
analysis to resolve the 'Denise drank the bottle ' example f rom Appendix A.2. The 
generality and naturali ty of the figurative knowledge should be noted. What is 
expressed in this piece of knowledge is the simple linguistic fact that constitutes 
and describes a particular metonymy. The applicability and instantiation of the 
knowledge is performed by the non-literal analysis. 
I t is obvious that the figurative knowledge could be refined wi th respect to its 
hierarchical structure. For example, one might want to include 'a container-for-
content metonymy uses a bottle to describe the contents of the bottle ' in order to 
add to the knowledge about metonymies. While i t is possible to do so, i t is not 
necessary. Concept extension is capable of matching input like 'Denise drank the 
bot t le ' to the generic schema on the basis of the knowledge already contained within 
the SemNet. When considering the example 'Ted played Bach' that was resolved 
to the interpretation 'Ted played art ' w i th the help of the figurative knowledge 'an 
artist-for-art-form metonymy uses an artist to describe art. ' the case for includ-
ing more specific knowledge is strengthened. I t is true that figurative knowledge 
stating that 'an artist-for-art-form metonymy uses a composer to describe music' 
would refine the interpretation. But this refinement could be achieved by other 
means as well. I f there were knowledge in the SemNet that stated that 'composers 
produce music' , the method of masking (c.f. Sect. 5.2.4) could be used to derive 
a refinement of the interpretation. The huge amount of knowledge that is already 
present i n the SemNet and its structure play another important role for the figu-
rative knowledge. They give the figurative knowledge its hierarchical order, as can 
be seen in the example ' I read Shakespeare' f rom Appendix A.2. While the inter-
pretation ' I read a work by Shakespeare' is the most generic, the interpretations ' I 
read poetry' and ' I read a drama' are more specific, since the SemNet taxonomy 
states a sub-type relation between versifier and playwright on the one hand and 
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author on the other. In order to prepare the ground for stylistic and empirical 
analyses, the two events 'a metonymy uses a source to describe a target' and 'a 
metaphor uses a source to describe a target' are put into the SemNet. Once a 
metaphor or metonymy has been resolved, the actual concept f rom the input and 
the interpretation are marked as source and target, respectively, on the basis of 
their relation being a figurative one. 
A final point concludes the discussion of the representation of figurative knowl-
edge. I t would clearly be undesirable i f the non-literal analysis were to t ry and 
resolve the N L input of figurative knowledge. This is the case when, for example, 
existing figurative knowledge is refined. To avoid this happening, a function set 
early into the resolution algorithm for knowledge-based tropes checks whether the 
input is in fact meta-language, describing figurative knowledge, in which case no 
fur ther steps into the direction of non-literal analysis are taken. 
B.2 Algorithmic details 
This section presents details of the algorithm for the individual types of tropes. The 
steps taken during processing are discussed wi th reference to Fig. 2.2. The ini t ia l 
stage which is similar for all types, is the triggering of the non-Hteral analysis. Non-
li teral analysis of the input is performed either after an explicit request (because, 
for example, the l i teral analysis did not yield a satisfying result), after a constraint 
violation (this is optional and not the main modus operandi) or, as default, in the 
normal course of processing input. 
B.2.1 Simple tropes 
When input is analysed using the simple resolution method, i t is first checked 
against generic figurative knowledge. The function 'determine-trope' is called f rom 
wi th in the normal pragmatic analysis process and functions as an interface between 
the other parts of the system's analysis and the non-literal analysis. I f the input is 
found not to be a figure, the function returns the appropriate pragmatic analysis 
result. I f , however, the input is a figure, the pragmatic analysis result w i l l be of 
the type 'figure' and an attempt is made to interpret the input as a figure. 
To this end, the type-specific concept extension dehvers information that al-
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lows an examination of aspects of the input concepts, such as their place wi thin 
the ontology of the system's K N B . W i t h the extended input that constitutes the 
following step, the metaphoric knowledge consultation checks whether this input 
satisfies the fo rm of generic figures. I f the input is neither anomalous nor literal 
but figurative, that is i f the metaphoric knowledge consultation showed that i t is a 
simple figure, the function 'interpret_trope' is called. A t this stage, the figurative 
analysis could stop i f the task were to estabhsh that the input was anomalous or 
either l i teral or figurative. 
I f the input could not be classified as a simple trope, processing branches to the 
failure handUng for simple tropes. This consists, as mentioned above, in returning 
a pragmatic analysis indicating that the input is not acceptable as such. I f the 
l i teral analysis of the input is unsuccessful, too, the current default for handling 
this case comes into action. I t consists of at tr ibuting a low degree of belief to the 
input . Should the simple resolution method not be the only figurative resolution 
method in operation, the input is passed on to the next higher level of resolution 
instead of the failure handling. 
The funct ion 'interpret_trope' takes the extended input and the type of simple 
trope the input was found to constitute and returns the system's interpretation of 
the input i n the light of i t being figurative. For simple figures, the interpretation can 
be regarded as finding an abstraction f rom the actual input that yields a plausible 
relation between the input concepts. In the prototype, single interpretations are not 
re-evaluated individually. Instead, all possible interpretations are collected at once 
and the least generic is chosen as the result. Although a more refined interaction 
between modules might be desirable, this was found to be a fu l ly sufficient, fast 
and robust approach. 
W i t h i n the function 'interpret_trope', processing also branches into the figura-
tive reasoning for simple tropes. This means that on the basis of the triggering 
conditions (c.f. Fig. 5.12) of the input having a vahd figurative reading (it may or 
may not have a l i teral reading, too) and of being categorised as a certain type of fig-
ure, the information necessary for integrating the results of the figurative analysis 
into the SemNet structure is created (see also Appendix B.2.7). 
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B.2.2 Fixed metonymies 
Processing input using the fixed metonymy method is similar to the simple reso-
lut ion method. But since no constraint violation detection can guarantee discov-
ery of all metonymies and only of metonymies in the input, processing cannot be 
triggered by a constraint violation. Instead, input is passed to the function 'deter-
mine_fix_metonymy' f rom wi th in the normal pragmatic analysis whenever the fixed 
resolution is switched on. 
The type-specific concept extension is considerably more elaborate for fixed 
metonymies than i t is for simple tropes. The input concepts are extended to 
their ontological relations wi th the rest of the SemNet, e.g. along the sub- and 
super-type lines, as well as to similar and conceptually related concepts. The 
context sensitive and dynamic nature of the SemNet K N B ensures that relevant 
concepts are taken into consideration, even if they are related to the input solely 
via previously processed input. 
The extended input is then passed to the metaphoric knowledge consultation 
funct ion, which tries to match i t w i th stored figurative knowledge. A large portion 
of the applicable code is shared between the simple and the fixed resolution, since 
simple tropes are a sub-set of fixed metonymies. Thus, simple tropes can be re-
solved using the fixed method. I f input is passed on f rom the simple resolution to 
the fixed method, i t is, of course, not checked again wi th respect to simple tropes. 
I f the knowledge consultation shows that the input cannot be classified as a simple 
trope, but matches w i t h knowledge about fixed metonymies, the particular inter-
pretation funct ion for fixed metonymies, 'makeinterxomp', is called. I t takes the 
extended input and the metaphoric knowledge that matched i t and returns all valid 
interpretations of the input as a metonymy. 
The name 'makeinterxomp' stems f rom the early stages of development, when 
the simple tropes were contrasted wi th more 'complex' ones. A failed simple res-
olution w i l l temporarily label input that was not acceptable as 'complex trope'. 
Pragmatics then decides whether this input is rejected or passed on to a higher 
resolution level. I f i t is passed on to the fixed resolution, i t w i l l not be processed 
using the simple resolution, because i t is already marked as a (possibly) complex 
trope. I f the fixed metonymy handling does not find a figurative reading, i t is 
finally marked as not being acceptable as figurative input. Should i t also fai l the 
l i teral analysis, i t is handled using the default mechanism of being assigned a low 
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degree of belief. 
When a positive match w i t h figurative knowledge is found and the task finds 
the interpretation of figurative input, 'makeinterxomp' returns a list of at least 
one valid metonymical interpretations for the input. Otherwise, processing can 
stop because i t has been established that the input is acceptable and of the type 
' f ixed metonymy'. I f there is more than one interpretation, the most appropriate 
one is selected using the function 'pick_one'. This function is implemented only in 
a prototypical fashion and can select interpretations on the basis of simple contex-
tual information. Its default is to select the most specific interpretation available. 
The others are by no means discarded, selection should rather be seen as rank-
ing the interpretations in the order of their importance. Furthermore, the input 
concept and its metonymical interpretation are connected in the SemNet by the 
auxiliary funct ion 'relate.them'. I t is obvious that there is a relation between the 
two concepts on the basis of the metonymical utterance. The exact nature of this 
relation, however, cannot be named easily, as there is no possibility of storing i t 
alongside the figurative knowledge. Metonymical relations are too divergent, there-
fore the relation is a generic one and can only be examined by considering the type 
of metonymy at the same time. 
The generic figurative reasoning is triggered f rom wi th in the 'makeinterxomp' 
funct ion and explicates the coherence of the events constructed in the course of the 
fixed resolution (see also Appendix B.2.7). 
B.2.3 Contextual metonymies 
The algorithm for resolving contextual metonymies is, by and large, similar to the 
algori thm for fixed metonymies. The main difference is the context consultation 
which augments the concept extension performed for the fixed metonymies. 
Af te r the 'determinexontextual ' function is called f rom wi th in the normal prag-
matic analysis, concept extension similar to that used for fixed metonymies is 
performed. The extended input is then checked against contextual information 
that is compiled in situ by the figurative analysis. Thus no superfluous data are 
passed around and the contextual information is guaranteed to be the most recent. 
The context consultation checks the extended input against the context to find 
possible context referents for concepts (and their extensions) that appear in the 
input . There are generally a number of contextual references to the collection of 
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concepts which lie in the extension of the input. These are checked for possible 
metonymical concept relations wi th the relevant concepts f rom the input, whereby 
the metonymical relations are those defined by the fixed metonymies. I t should 
be noted that in the prototype, the metonymical relations which are checked are 
generic ones. Eventually, the contextual metonymy branch of the figurative analy-
sis should deal w i t h the context extension and matching, passing on its results to 
the fixed metonymy resolution. Thus, all the figurative knowledge available to the 
fixed method would become available to the contextual resolution, too. I t is obvi-
ous that such an approach is feasible. However, this project took a broad coverage 
and feasibility position, therefore such an integration issue took no priority over 
the implementation of the basic functionality. 
The funct ion 'makeinterxont ' which is similar to the function 'makeinterxomp' 
takes the context referent, the input concept and the metonymical relation in which 
the two stand and returns the interpretation of the contextual metonymy. From 
an overly simplistic point of view, this interpretation could be regarded as a sort 
of anaphora resolution. The point to note is that there is no simple replacement of 
a concept f r o m the input w i th another concept that either has already occurred in 
the text or bears some other relation to the input and is denoted by the relevant 
input concept. Instead, the possible anaphoric referents (which, incidentally need 
not appear in previous input but can be traced on the basis of concept extension) 
are taken f r o m a much wider field, namely, that of conceptually and metonymically 
related concepts of the input. 
I f one or more of these is found to stand in a plausible metonymical relation 
to one of the input concepts, i.e. i f the interpretation is performed as opposed to 
stating that the input is acceptable as a contextual metonymy and not anomalous, 
the generic chain of figurative reasoning is activated to integrate the information 
produced by the contextual resolution into the SemNet for future use (see also 
Appendix B.2.7). 
B.2.4 Conventional metaphors 
The conventional metaphor resolution allows i t to be determined whether input is 
of the type conventional metaphor (see Sect. 5.2.2) and to interpret i t accordingly. 
Addit ional ly, i t allows treatment of lower types of simple and fixed metonymies. 
The fact that, as Lakoff and Johnson observed, metaphor "is principally a way of 
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conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understand-
ing" , whereas metonymy "has primari ly a referential function, that is, i t allows us 
to use one entity to stand for another" [Lakoff and Johnson 1980] indicates that 
the algorithm for conventional figures has to differ notably f rom the algorithm for 
metonymies. Yet again i t has to offer a functionality that is comparable to the 
resolution algorithm for metonymies, in order to be able to resolve them as well. 
The most prominent differences to the other algorithms are the necessarily more 
complex concept extension, the type determination, and the 'preferred schema' 
constraint. 
Processing of input is started by activating the conventional resolution. I f i t is 
the only figurative analysis method selected, all input w i l l be analysed wi th respect 
to its being a conventional figure or metonymy. I f lower levels are activated and do 
not find a figurative interpretation for a portion of input, the input is passed up 
to the conventional method in the current configuration. The concept extension 
is not l imi ted to ontological and taxonomic relations. Concepts f rom the SemNet 
that stand in a relation to concepts f rom the input via, e.g., episodic knowledge 
or i n a contextual connection are collected as well as the usual similar, sub- and 
super-type concepts. 
The second stage of metaphoric knowledge consultation, however, does not 
simply check whether a concept f rom the extension matches metaphoric knowledge 
of the class 'conventional figure'. I f any concept f rom the input extension appears 
in figurative knowledge about any type of figure stored in the SemNet, the function 
w i l l record this appearance and pass the input on, so that a resolution according 
to the type of figure indicated can be performed. 
I f the input is found to be of a lower type of figure, the type is extracted f rom 
the SemNet and passed, together wi th the input, to the interpretation function 
'makeinterxonv' . I f the metaphoric knowledge match occurred wi th information 
on a conventional metaphor, the last outstanding feature of this resolution method 
is activated, namely, the 'preferred schema' check. Since metaphors involve two 
conceptual domains but the input does not necessarily contain apparent concepts 
f r o m the two domains, i t is necessary to establish whether the two domains are 
present indirectly. For example, i t would be absurd to classify input as an instance 
of the L O V E AS J O U R N E Y metaphor simply because i t contains a concept f rom 
the domain of relationships. Even i f a metaphorical reading were intended, the 
existence of one concept is not a sound basis for such a classification. Therefore, a 
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method similar to concept extension is used to establish whether or not a connection 
exists between the input and the second, obligatory domain. This is also necessary 
because a number of conventional metaphorical schemata share the same concepts. 
Thus the second domain is needed to establish the kind of figurative schema that is 
applicable to the input. For example, in the sentence ' I killed emacs', the 'k i l l ing ' 
domain is explicit ly present. In order to reliably classify the input as an instance of 
the M A C H I N E S A R E P E O P L E and C E S S A T I O N O F F U N C T I O N IS K I L L I N G metaphor 
Lakoff et al. 1995], the second domain has to be detected. To this end, the input 
concepts are extended and this extension checked for compatibility wi th the second 
domain. In the example, 'emacs', the name of a software, w i l l quickly result in a 
match w i t h the machines domain and thus the applicability of the M A C H I N E S A R E 
P E O P L E metaphor is guaranteed. 
B.2.5 Idioms 
The resolution of idioms cannot reliably and exclusively be triggered by an anomaly 
detection mechanism. A failed li teral interpretation, however, is at least an indi-
cation that something out of the ordinary is present in the input. Therefore, i t is 
possible to activate the resolution of idioms on a constraint violation. The default, 
however, is to pass all input through the 'determineJdiom' function, whose task i t 
is to establish whether the input contains a lexical or a compound idiom. Since the 
conceptually organised structure of the system's K N B does not easily lend itself 
to the listing of additional word senses for phrases (whereas lexemes can be given 
an extra, idiomatic word sense), the concept of compound idioms was introduced. 
They consist of more than one lexical i tem and are classified as compound idioms 
on the basis of the idiom resolution process. Thus, the algorithm for the detection 
and interpretation of idioms can be seen as effectively augmenting the SemNet wi th 
a structure for the registration of complex idiomatic expressions. 
The code for concept extension for idioms is comparable to the concept exten-
sion that takes place in the case of fixed metonymies. The largest portion of the 
code is shared. 
The metaphoric knowledge consultation dilfers f rom the analogous procedure for 
other types. As mentioned above, no syntactic structures above the level of lexemes 
can be recorded in the SemNet at the moment. Moreover, the reliable detection 
of idioms requires that the input conforms to a more or less fixed form; this is not 
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necessarily a fixed surface fo rm (see also the discussion of lexical f lexibil i ty and 
semantic product ivi ty in Sects. 5.2.2 and 5.3.6), but a fixed conceptual form. This 
fo rm , however, cannot be covered in one knowledge unit . For example, the phrase 
' to kick the bucket' cannot be listed in the SemNet as a concept, listing 'to die' as 
its meaning. To solve this problem, the extended concepts are matched individually 
against metaphoric knowledge, and only i f all the required items that make up an 
individual id iom appear in the input in the right relations w i l l i t be classified as 
an instance of an idiomatic expression. This means that, while a generic event like 
'somebody kicking the bucket' can be put into the SemNet and described as an 
id iom, every piece of input has to be analysed in sections to see i f i t conforms to 
the requirements of being classifiable as an idiom. This procedure has the added 
advantage of being efficient, since processing can be stopped i f the algorithm fails 
to find a required i tem in the input. In this case, the input is evidently not an 
id iom. 
I f the metaphoric knowledge consultation yields a positive result, i t wi l l also 
have established whether the input is a lexical or compound idiom. The degree of 
complexity of the interpretation depends on this criterion, since f rom a simplistic 
point of view, lexical idioms can be seen as substitutes for the concept or surface 
f o r m they denote, whereas the surface fo rm of the interpretation of compound 
idioms can differ significantly f rom the original input. Thus, more care has to be 
taken when building the interpretation event for a compound idiom. Fortunately, 
so far no problems have occurred because the interpretation is not buil t using 
surface level linguistic items but on a deep, conceptual level. The generator then 
takes care of the correct realisation of the deep structure in natural language. 
The chain of idiomatic figurative reasoning prompted by the interpretation func-
t ion 'makein ter id ' differs f r o m the generic figurative reasoning, too. Context plays 
an important role in the interpretation and detection of idioms, but in most cases, 
the input could, especially in the absence of contextual information indicating oth-
erwise, be taken literally. Therefore, i t is not possible to establish that the idea 
expressed in the input is ' l i terally impossible'. Since we do not rely on a literal 
analysis to take place before the figurative analysis, we classify possibly idiomatic 
input as being ' l i terally unlikely' . I t would help to establish a protocol whereby a 
failed l i teral analysis signals the subsequent figurative analysis that the likelihood 
of the input being either figurative or anomalous is very high. But since the design 
of this solution was led by the criteria of openness and flexibility, no such rigid 
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model of information exchange was chosen. 
B.2.6 Comparison statements 
Comparison statements require the most thorough treatment of all types of figures. 
Whi le the algorithm for the resolution of the other types is more or less analogous 
across the type boundaries, the algorithm for comparison statements is distinct 
f r o m the knowledge-based procedure used elsewhere. 
The in i t ia l stage consists in knowledge consultation, a form of concept extension. 
But i n addition to an extensive concept extension (parts of the code are shared wi th 
the concept extension for metonymies), episodic knowledge and other information 
related to the input concepts are gathered as well. This proves necessary because 
i t forms not only the basis for the interpretation but also for the recognition of 
comparison statements. 
Af te r the comprehensive knowledge consultation, in i t ia l checks are made to es-
tablish whether the input is a comparison statement. The ini t ia l checks consist 
of an analysis of the fo rm of the input (e.g. i t has to be a generic 'is-a' relation, 
which can take various surface forms), and of determining whether (sufScient) in-
format ion on both concepts is available in the SemNet (see also Fig. 5.11) and 
whether a relation between the input concepts has already been established be-
fore (e.g. i f a sub/super-type relation already exists). This preliminary analysis 
classifies the input as being either a li teral comparison or a figurative comparison, 
or fails to classify i t without further checks. This arrangement enables expen-
sive, thorough computation to be spared i f the concept relation can be established 
more easily. Should the in i t ia l checks fa i l to result in a classification, processing 
branches neither to the interpretation function for figurative comparisons, 'makein-
ter-figurative' , nor to the interpretation function for literal comparisons, namely, 
'makeinterJiteral ' , but to the function responsible for further elaboration on the 
input concept's relation, 'makeinter_unknown'. 
I n the latter funct ion, the conceptual proximity of the concepts (or salience 
imbalance) is computed. This measure helps to establish whether a comparison 
between the concepts can possibly be literal or not. A high conceptual proximity 
is taken to indicate a li teral comparison, a low conceptual proximity suggests a 
figurative comparison. In order to bolster the result of the conceptual proximity 
computation, the domains of the input concepts (in other words, concepts related 
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to the input concepts) are compared using the triangulation method. I f the results 
of the extended checks yield no result indicating the nature of the comparison, the 
criterion of robustness makes i t necessary to make both the figurative and literal 
interpretation. Since the figurative reasoning allows revision of steps taken by the 
figurative analysis, the incorrect analysis can be retracted i f additional information 
invalidating i t becomes available. 
I f the outcome of the analysis has allowed a positive classification of the input, 
the according interpretation function, 'makeinterJigurative' or 'makeinterJiteral', 
is called. The simpler case of a li teral interpretation treats the input as a class 
inclusion or expressing a sub/super-type relation. This is the only valid literal 
reading at that stage, because other types of comparison such as identity have 
been caught during the in i t ia l checks. I f attributes of the vehicle concept have 
been gathered during the knowledge consultation stage, they are transferred to 
the tenor concept by the 'transfer_attributes' function, which is called f rom wi th in 
'makeinterJiteral ' . 
When a figurative comparison is interpreted, the additional transfer of features 
f r o m the vehicle to the tenor takes place. In order to find the applicable features, 
the information collected during the knowledge consultation is again evaluated 
using the triangulation method. Features that pass the evaluation are transferred 
and at t r ibuted 'metaphorically' to the tenor concept. Subsequently, the transfer 
of attributes takes place. The availability of information clearly influences the 
performance and reliabili ty of the algorithm. I t should be noted that there are 
cases where a positive classification can be made without knowledge about the 
concept's features and attributes, i.e. where the knowledge consultation was not 
very productive but other criteria allowed a classification. In this case, there wi l l 
be, of course, no or very l i t t le feature and attribute transfer. 
Af te r the two branches of literal and figurative interpretation have joined at the 
shared code of the 'transferJeatures' function, the type-specific chain of comparison 
reasoning completes the processing of comparison statements. 
B.2.7 Figurative reasoning 
This section gives details on the 'reasoning' which is part of the resolution of 
figurative input and internally documents the decisions made by the system and 
the steps taken in the course of the resolution. For a graphic representation of the 
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reasoning, see Fig. 5.12. 
I t should be noted that in the long natural language generation (NLG) of the 
events pertaining to the resolution of figurative input, the viewpoint is temporally 
located beyond completion of the resolution. Therefore, the interpretation appears 
in ' intermediate' events, although, of course, i t is linked to those events in the 
SemNet at a latter stage. When using the long N L G as a debugging tool, the 
temporal succession of the building of events cannot be traced; here the short NLG 
gives a somewhat clearer picture. Nevertheless, long N L G is extremely helpful in 
showing how the events are connected and how the information in the SemNet 
came about. 
The chain of reasoning is only prototypical, especially wi th regard to the surface 
f o r m of its N L G . I t is somewhat similar for all types of tropes and should be refined, 
not only w i t h respect to the needs of the various types of figures and sub-cases, 
but also to include more detailed information on how, for example, the figurative 
analysis was activated. 
This refinement clearly was not a goal of this project. The chain of figurative 
reasoning itself is more of an auxiliary method and by-product of the main objec-
tive. The new approach of storing intermediate results in the SemNet, however, 
was something that was discovered as being very useful in the course of this project 
and a technical report on this subject is in preparation. 
Since knowledge does not exist in isolation in the system's K N B , i t is necessary 
to integrate the results and intermediate steps of the figurative analysis into the 
existing SemNet structure. This task is performed by the figurative reasoning. I t 
states the cause and effects of the figurative analysis and ties the interpretation to 
a source. I n doing so, individual steps or the whole analysis can be traced back 
and, i f necessary, be retracted. 
Figurative reasoning consists, in the case of a successful resolution, of the tr ig-
ger condition, the ' l i terally not possible' event, which can take various forms, the 
reinforcing condition of the algorithm establishing that the input is a figure of a 
certain type and the actual chain of reasoning, culminating in the interpretation. 
On the basis of the verification that the input is of a particular type of figure (the 'is 
tropetype' event), this information is tied into the SemNet by generating the 'be-
lieve is a tropetype' event. This is necessary for two reasons, firstly because there 
has to be a source for the knowledge that the input is a figure, secondly because 
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factual information cannot be represented in isolation in the L O L I T A K N B . From 
an overly simplistic point of view, all the information contained in the SemNet can 
be described as being the world seen through the eyes of L O L I T A , the agent using 
the available information. Thus, there is a need to attribute a degree of belief to 
all new pieces of knowledge. 
I n the wake of the 'believe is a tropetype' event, some other manifestations of 
the belief system w i t h respect to the resolution of the input have to be taken into 
account. Generally speaking, the system cannot believe the input literally i f i t 
assumes that i t is a figure. Of course the possible cases arising in this context have 
to be carefully examined. For example, i t is possible that input is plausible both 
l i teral ly and figuratively; instances of the text type 'humour' often are based on 
this ambivalence. Likewise, i t should be considered whether a literal analysis took 
place before the figurative one and whether the outcome was positive or not. But 
as mentioned before, this is by no means an essential elaboration of the figurative 
reasoning, merely a refinement based on the results of this project. 
The next event constructed in the chain of figurative reasoning is the 'draw 
inferences' event. Since the input is not believed literally, a different interpretation 
has to be made. This is meant by 'drawing inferences', a term that was chosen 
at the early stage of this project. These figurative inferences are drawn using a 
specific method, namely, the particular resolution algorithm at hand. This fact is 
expressed in the 'draw inferences' event by simply stating the name of the part of 
the figurative resolution module that led to the interpretation. The events described 
are not simply generated and put into the SemNet, they are connected in a fashion 
that lends itself to partial revision (i.e. the causal structure is represented properly) 
and conforms to the requirements of the SemNet. 
Simple figurative reasoning 
The simple reasoning is specific to the resolution algorithm for simple tropes. A l -
though most of the reasoning code is shared between the different methods, each 
method has particular characteristics. The starting point for the simple chain of 
reasoning is either the fact that the input is ' l i terally not possible', that is a failed 
l i teral interpretation occurred, or the fact that a figurative analysis yielded the 
result that the input has a valid figurative interpretation, that is the recognition 
stage was completed successfully. I t is expressed in the 'is tropetype' event, whose 
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source is the L O L I T A system itself. 
I f the algorithm proved the input to be a figure, the information about the res-
olution process is t ied in wi th the rest of the SemNet by the 'believe is a tropetype' 
event. I t links the algorithmic evidence wi th LOLITA's belief system. The befief 
that the input is a figure is supported by the trigger conditions (see above). In the 
N L G representation, this support is expressed via a very generic causal relation. 
Based on the fact that the input is a figure, the 'not believe li terally ' event is put 
into a causal relation to the 'believe is a tropetype' event. Since the objective of the 
figurative resolution is to find an interpretation for the input and not to establish 
whether or not L O L I T A believes the input, processing enters the interpretation 
stage. I n the chain of reasoning, this is expressed by a causal relation between the 
'not believe l i teral ly ' event and the 'draw inferences' event, which expresses that 
a resolution is taking place and, in the case of simple tropes, is performed using 
a simple resolution method. I f more than one resolution method is used, only the 
last one is recorded in the 'draw inferences' event. 
The 'draw inferences' event finally is linked to the result of the resolution. This 
can either be the interpretation, which again is joined to the rest of the reasoning 
by a generic causal relation or an event stating that the resolution failed. I f the 
recognition stage could not classify the input as a figure, the fa i l event is of course 
generated directly, since no further steps are taken. I t states the method used and 
the negative result. Depending on whether a literal analysis has already taken 
place, the system can then deal wi th the input accordingly. 
The 'is seen as' event is generated only in the course of a simple resolution. I t 
expresses the figurative relation between the tenor and the vehicle, a notion derived 
f r o m the interaction view on metaphor (c.L Sect. 3.2.4). Although i t is very generic 
and prototypical (e.g. 'inputs use human features in order to describe a motorbike' 
to denote that the 'motorbike' is described or seen as 'human' in some respect), 
i t is sufficient to convey the basic idea of expressing the domain interaction at a 
general level. 
Generic figurative reasoning 
The generic figurative reasoning follows the simple figurative reasoning wi th the 
exception that the domain interaction is not represented in the same way as wi th 
simple tropes. Although the fixed metonymy method can be used to resolve simple 
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tropes and the conventional method to resolve fixed metonymies, the relevant NLG 
capabilities have not been included in the generic reasoning because i t is used by 
three resolution methods. Instead, an event recording the relation between the 
input concept and the concept denoted by i t on the basis of the metonymy is con-
structed (see also Appendix B.2.2) in the case of the fixed metonymy resolution. 
Apart f r o m the SemNet representations of the trigger conditions, reinforcing con-
di t ion and the actual chain of reasoning, no other specific events are buil t , to allow 
the use of one type to cover various resolution methods. The type of figure used in 
the 'is tropetype', 'believe is a tropetype' and 'draw inferences' events is passed as a 
parameter to the relevant functions constructing these f rom the individual parts of 
the resolution algorithm. Thus, the fixed, conventional and contextual resolution 
all share the code for generation of these events. Using the conventional resolu-
t ion, the type of figure is determined in the wake of the knowledge consultation. 
Therefore i t is possible to get results where, for example, a metonymy is resolved 
using a conventional resolution. 
Idiomatic figurative reasoning 
The fact that context plays an important role in the interpretation of idiomatic 
expression and that a large number of idioms have a perfectly plausible literal 
reading when there is no context and l imited world knowledge available made i t 
necessary to modify the status of the trigger conditions for this type of reasoning. 
Due to the fact that i t is not always possible to access a sufficient amount of 
knowledge in order to establish a priori whether the input is an idiom or not, the 
default is to assume that i f i t has an idiomatic reading, i t is more likely to be an 
idiomatic expression than a li teral utterance. In our opinion, problems would arise 
f r o m this assumption i f and only i f there were no literal analysis, either before or 
after the figurative one. Since i t is not possible to analyse input only figuratively 
but not l i terally at the moment (and i t is unlikely that this mode of operation wi l l 
be implemented), the only weak point of this approach remaining is the ranking 
of interpretations. A small percentage of cases where there is a valid literal and 
idiomatic reading constitutes, for example, humorous utterances and puns. Wi th in 
the figurative resolution, the idiomatic reading w i l l correctly be recorded. The 
evaluation of the fact that there are two valid interpretations, however, does not 
lie w i th in the scope of the figurative sub-system. This is reflected in the triggering 
condition part of the reasoning for idioms, which is distinct f rom the comparable 
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events generated elsewhere. I t states that the input is ' l i terally unlikely' i f and 
because i t is an idiom. Thus, i t is possible to ascribe a literal reading to the input 
as well without arriving at conflicting epistemic information on i t . 
Comparison reasoning 
I n order to keep the code simple, the comparison reasoning re-uses a large portion 
of the generic reasoning code. The particular feature of the comparison statement 
algori thm is that the type of comparison is verified by the ini t ia l checks or the 
funct ion ' makeinter.unknown' (c.f. Appendix B.2.6). Subsequently, the function 
responsible for generating the chain of reasoning selects the type of comparison on 
the basis of the interpretation event buil t beforehand. Of course, the dimension 
of l i teral versus figurative does not feature in the same way as i t does in the case 
of metonymies, for example. Once i t has been established that the input is a 
comparison, i t remains to be seen whether i t is a figurative or literal comparison, 
but there is no competing, different interpretation. Thus, the trigger condition in 
the case of comparison reasoning is that the event has a valid interpretation as 
a comparison. The 'is tropetype' event is completed wi th the appropriate type 
recursively after i t has been established whether the input is a literal or figurative 
comparison (or indeed both readings are plausible on the basis of the contents of the 
SemNet). W i t h comparison statements, the fact that the input is a comparison is 
sufficient for a resolution to take place, since i t has to be estabhshed which features 
and attributes are ascribed to the tenor concept and in which mode, literally or 
metaphorically. Therefore, the 'believe is a tropetype' event brought about by the 
'is tropetype' event 'causes' the resolution or 'draw inferences' event, which in turn 
leads to the interpretation. 
Fail events 
The last type of information added to the SemNet in the course of the figurative 
analysis of input are the fa i l events. Although they do not belong to the chain of 
reasoning as such, they can be seen as the final step of i t , being equivalent to the 
interpretation event(s) bui l t . Whereas an interpretation or at least a classification 
indicates the successful resolution of input, fa i l events indicate that the figurative 
analysis did not succeed. 
I n order to maintain a high degree of openness and following the criterion of 
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integration, the non-literal analysis cannot decide on its own how a failed figurative 
analysis should be treated. There might have already been a literal analysis, i t 
might be st i l l to follow, there may be more figurative methods that are apphcable 
to the input , and all these different configurations have to be taken into account. 
Not only would i t be nearly impossible to describe all possible cases, but future 
extensions of either part of L O L I T A may render the measures obsolete. Therefore, 
the construction of fa i l events was deemed to be necessary. They state the situation 
of the non-literal analysis and on this basis, all other parts of the system and 
subsequent figurative modules can determine the course of action to be taken. 
As mentioned before, a t t r ibut ing a low degree of belief is LOLITA's default for 
handling input whose analysis is not compatible wi th the knowledge in the SemNet. 
Clearly, stating that what is expressed in the input cannot be believed is only a 
first step towards 'intelligent' results. The fa i l events of the non-literal analysis 
can be seen as an extension of the basic default mechanism. Although they are 
implemented only prototypically, they give a more elaborate picture of the system's 
internal processes, stating the reason for the rejection of the input and the methods 
of analysis used. Analogous to the figurative reasoning recording single steps of the 
system in processing input, the fa i l events are used to record intermediate results 
in a way that is suitable for further handling by the system itself. Instead of giving 
error messages, the system registers its own actions and can retrieve information 
on its own behaviour. Moreover, the information recorded can serve as basis for 
subsequent steps of processing. 
The actual fa i l events (see also Appendix A . l ) consist of information giving the 
analysis method used, that is, l i teral or figurative. I f a figurative method failed on 
the input , its type is given, as well, e.g. simple resolution or contextual resolution. 
B.3 Conceptual proximity 
This section presents details on the computation of conceptual proximity. Con-
ceptual proximity is used in the resolution of comparison statements, and can be 
regarded as an implementation of the salience imbalance principle proposed by 
Ortony [Ortony 1979 . 
This method looks for similarities in the two domains of the tenor and vehicle 
concept and is comparable to finding analogies between the two domains. Since i t 
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is a computationally expensive undertaking to compare many concepts, triangula-
t ion is not performed at random, but only on concepts f rom the two domains which 
are closely related to the input concepts and i t is only performed when absolutely 
necessary. This is the case, for example, when no previous method could establish 
whether a comparison is figurative or literal. The proximity measure is computed 
using the following algorithm: recursively collect all concepts standing in a 'uni-
versal' and 'generalisation' relation to the tenor and vehicle concepts, respectively, 
and add them to the input. Add the recursive collection of all concepts standing in 
the 'similar ' relation to the concepts f rom the set of concepts collected in the last 
step. To this list, add the recursive collection of all concepts standing in the 'gen-
eralisation' relation to the concepts f rom the result. The result is the basis for the 
final step, in which information that is conceptually related^ to the members of the 
list of concepts obtained by processing so far is added to the result. The collection 
of concepts obtained by this algorithm for both the tenor and the vehicle form the 
basis for the formulaproximit?/ = (100/concepts—not—shared)*concepts—shared. 
I t should be noted that there is, of course, a defence for the case where there 
are no non-shared concepts, since the input is ini t ia l ly included in the collection 
of concepts. But more importantly, concept relations where there might be a 
number of shared concepts but no non-shared concepts never reach the stage of 
processing conceptual proximity. Such cases (identity, weak identity and class 
inclusion) are caught at an earlier stage in the algorithm for comparison statements, 
prior to the computation of conceptual proximity (c.L Sect. 5.3.7 and Appendix 
B.2.6for details). This 'split functionali ty ' is permissible since the computation of 
conceptual proximity is by no means a general function, but only part of the whole 
algori thm for comparison statements. 
The following debugging output presents a few examples of comparison state-
ments, their conceptual proximity value, and the resultant classification wi th re-
spect to the status of the comparison. The first two examples were not passed to 
the conceptual proximity computation because the concept relation between tenor 
and vehicle could be established during the ' in i t ia l check' phase (c.f. Appendix 
B.2.6 and Fig. 5.11). In these examples, the first fine represents the status and 
classification, the second line the input, followed by the trace, beginning wi th the 
header indicating debugging output, namely, 'RE: ' and the name of the function 
^Conceptually related information in this case means, e.g., the inclusion of 'knife' in the sense 
of 'cutlery', i f the input was 'knife' in the meaning of 'weapon'. 
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producing the output, here, 'determinexomparison'. The last fine of each example 
is debugging output giving the tenor and vehicle concepts along the corresponding 
Noderefs (c.f. Sect. 2.2.1). 
(Weak) I d e n t i t y 
something i s something 
RE: determine_comparison 
T a u t o l o g y / I d e n t i t y / C l o s e r e l a t i o n 
T o p i c : something: 19714 V e h i c l e : something: 19714 
Tenor i s sub-type of v e h i c l e , l i t e r a l comparison 
g e r b i l s a r e gnawers 
RE: determine_comparison 
D i r e c t c l a s s i n c l u s i o n 
T o p i c : g e r b i l : 6431 V e h i c l e : gnawer: 44340 
k i l l e r s a r e murderers 
RE: determine_comparison 
I n d i r e c t c l a s s i n c l u s i o n 
T o p i c : k i l l e r : 48231 V e h i c l e : murderer: 23982 
The following are examples of debugging output f rom the function responsi-
ble for the computation of conceptual proximity. The first line of each example 
presents the input, followed by fancy traces, stating the system's classification of 
the comparison, the conceptual proximity value ('closeness') and the number of 
features available on each of the concepts in the SemNet^. 
Tenor i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o v e h i c l e , l i t e r a l comparison 
lamps a r e f u r n i s h i n g s 
Comparison; v e r y c l o s e , presumably c l a s s i n c l u s i o n ? 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 70.0000000 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 3 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 3 
Shakespeare i s an author 
Comparison; v e r y c l o s e , presumably c l a s s i n c l u s i o n ? 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
^It should be noted that identity counts as a feature, thus one feature is similar to having no 
information on the concept in question. 
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C l o s e n e s s : 63.4146347 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 3 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 12 
L o l i t a i s a g i r l 
Comparison; v e r y c l o s e , l i t e r a l . 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 51.6483536 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 5 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 43 
g u i t a r i s t s a r e m u s i c i a n s 
Comparison; v e r y c l o s e , l i t e r a l , 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 51.4285736 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 4 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 13 
g e r b i l s a r e mice 
Comparison; v e r y c l o s e . 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 40.0000000 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 6 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 6 
k i l l e r s a r e l i k e c r i m i n a l s 
Comparison; r e l a t e d concepts. 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 38.8888855 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 3 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 19 
murderers a r e c r i m i n a l s 
Comparison; weak r e l a t i o n . 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 17.3913040 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 14 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 24 
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l e c t u r e r s a r e academics 
Comparison; odd r e l a t i o n . Data m i s s i n g ? 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 4.16666651 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 20 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 26 
P o l i t i c i a n s a r e k i l l e r s 
Comparison; no r e l a t i o n , p r e d i c a t e i n t r o d u c t i o n 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 0.00000000 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 27 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 28 
P o l i t i c i a n s a r e g l y n s k i s ^ 
No i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e v e h i c l e a v a i l a b l e ; 
no r e l a t i o n 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 0.00000000 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 27 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 1 
G l y n s k i s a r e computers^ 
Comparison; no r e l a t i o n , p r e d i c a t e i n t r o d u c t i o n 
C o n c e p t u a l measures 
C l o s e n e s s : 0.00000000 
T o p i c f e a t u r e s : 1 
V e h i c l e f e a t u r e s : 16 
B.4 Invariance hierarchy 
In this section, details on a modified invariance hierarchy are given. Invariance 
hierarchies are used to rank and evaluate the cross-domain relations which occur in 
^Since there is no information on the vehicle, no comparison is possible and therefore the 
relation between tenor and vehicle is labelled as 'no relation' (see also Fig. 5.11). 
^In this case, there is no information on the tenor. Therefore both a literal and figurative 
interpretation is sought. In both cases, information from the vehicle domain is transferred into 
the tenor domain. This is reflected in the label 'predicate introduction' comparison. 
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comparison statements (see also Sect. 3.2.3.2). Our invariance hierarchy is based 
loosely on the invariance hierarchy put forward by Carbonell [Carbonell 1982 . 
Whi le his model uses invariance hierarchies to find 'relevant matches' between the 
two domains of the tenor and vehicle, this solution uses the preliminary invariance 
hierarchy as an additional filter after the cross-domain correspondences have been 
found. This task is important when the most salient interpretation of a comparison 
is needed, for example, in the dialogue application of the L O L I T A system. Since the 
prototypical implementation of the figurative analysis has not yet been polished, 
there is no practical use of the invariance hierarchy as such. The basic functionality 
is t ry ing to find all plausible interpretations, the ranking and further processing is 
the responsibility of customised interfaces to the figurative analysis or the individual 
applications. 
Nevertheless, a casual analysis of examples has proven that the filtering of 
interpretations according to the concept relation they express can act as a further 
refinement of the resolution process. Carbonell's invariance hierarchy consists of the 
concept relations goals, planning strategies, causal structures, functional attributes, 
temporal orderings, natural tendencies, social roles, structural relations, descriptive 
properties and object identity. 
Whi le Carbonell suggests that a high concept relation, for example, causal 
structures, effectively blocks a lower cross-domain correspondence, for example, the 
correspondence of descriptive properties between the tenor and vehicle, we suggest 
that a higher relation takes priori ty and is preferred over a lower correspondence, 
but does not halt the process of evaluating all correspondences. This approach is 
feasible, because in our model the invariance hierarchy filtering takes place after a 
number of cross-domain correspondences have been established, as opposed to Car-
bonell's theoretical model, where the invariance hierarchy consultation forms part 
of the domain comparison stage. Moreover, we do not use all of Carbonell's rela-
tions. Since the relations are not explicitly present in the SemNet, for example, as 
labelled arcs between concepts, the only way of inspecting the SemNet for possibly 
matching concept relations lies in the application of the masking method (c.f. Sect. 
5.2.4). The cost-benefit ratio for the additional processing is, judged by the meagre 
results of achieving a non-essential means of ranking interpretations, not accept-
able. Therefore a modified and simplified invariance hierarchy is used. I t prefers 
causal relations over functional relations, which in turn are preferred over natural 
attributes and tendencies. By means of concept extension, or simple abstraction 
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f r o m the actual input, relations like 'use' and 'make' can be matched wi th func-
tional and causal relations, respectively. Natural attributes and tendencies, such 
as size, colour or skill are found on the assumption that they are represented in 
definitional knowledge in the SemNet. Thus the processing cost for the appHcation 
of the invariance hierarchy is kept as low as possible, while the benefit of being 
able to rank interpretations is maximised. Again, i t is important to note that the 
sole basis for this is the information available in the SemNet. Therefore neither 
external knowledge sources nor inconsistencies can lead to unexpected results. 
Work remains to be done wi th respect to the invariance hierarchy mechanism. 
A thorough corpus analysis of comparison statements must yield empirical data on 
which a final invariance hierarchy can be based. Moreover, the mechanism has to 
be implemented properly as part of a customised figurative resolution interface, e.g. 
for the dialogue application of L O L I T A . This application obviously would benefit 
f r o m the (contextually) most appropriate interpretation of a comparison statement 
to enable i t to conduct a natural, interactive dialogue. As i t stands now, the in-
terpretations which are kept in a data structure of the type list are compared one 
by one to the entries of the invariance hierarchy, starting wi th the topmost, e.g. 
causal relations. I f a relation matches, i t is copied into the result list and removed 
f r o m the input list. Af te r the list of interpretations has been processed, the same 
procedure starts over again i f there are lower entries in the invariance hierarchy. 
Otherwise, the resultant list is the ranking of the interpretations according to the 
invariance hierarchy. This very basic implementation was used during the experi-
mental stage of the design of the solution and proved the feasibility and usefulness. 
However, i t must be refined when used wi th in a final application interface. 
B.5 Abstract data type metaphor 
As mentioned before, the interfacing of the non-literal analysis to the rest of the 
complex L O L I T A system has been implemented in a basic way, sufficient to show 
the capabilities and to allow the parent system to make f u l l use of the figurative 
resolution's results. The N L E criteria such as integration, flexibility and usability 
required the solution to take interfacing needs into account f rom the very early 
design stage on. Thus i t was ensured that an open, flexible and powerful interface 
that delivered all the necessary information avoided any kind of bottleneck between 
the components of the system. 
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I n our opinion, the information that is derived f rom the analysis of figurative 
input and required by other parts of the system consist of an indication that fig-
urative input was detected, the steps that were taken during the analysis and the 
results of the analysis. 
In order to enable a clear interface to be bui l t , this information has to be 
bundled into an abstract data type that hides away details f rom the rest of the 
system. Interfacing is then only possible via pre-defined functions that access this 
data type and its building blocks in a uniform fashion. Thus any changes in the 
actual implementation have no negative effect on the interfaces and on other parts 
of the system's code. The abstract data type proposed for the general use by other 
parts of the L O L I T A system is the data type 'metaphor'. 
metaphor = (base [[cta:;,m,z]„,.. .[cia;,m,i]J) 
Where a 'metaphor', in the sense of an entity to be represented in the L O L I T A 
system's inter-module information exchange, consists of 
• a base, that is the input of the figurative resolution algorithm. This is an ut-
terance which has been pre-processed by the system. Pre-processing includes 
syntactic, semantic, and optionally also partial pragmatic analysis. Only in-
put above the complexity level of lexemes w i l l be processed ful ly , since 'words' 
cannot be used metaphorically as such. The next part of the abstract data 
type is 
• a list of triples [ctx,m,i], where 
- ctx denotes the context of the utterance or concept. For the time being, 
zero contexts and contexts of the type conforming to the established 
abstract data type 'context' wi th in the L O L I T A system are permissible. 
The second entry in the triplet represents 
- m , the method applied to base in ctx by the non-literal analysis, which 
yields 
- z, the interpretation of base in ctx according to m . This can be the 
actual interpretation, or, in the case of an unsuccessful resolution, the 
appropriate fa i l event (see Appendix B.2.7). 
The reason for having ordered triples is that the same base can result in differ-
ent interpretations, depending on the context, when the same method is applied to 
A p p e n d i x B : Algor i thmic and representational details 217 
i t . Likewise, one base can yield different interpretations in the same context when 
different methods, a conventional resolution and comparison resolution, for exam-
ple, are applied to i t . Also, the same context, method and base can yield distinct 
interpretations, varying in the degree of generality. I t should be noted that, due 
to the well-defined structure of the figurative reasoning (c.f. Appendix B.2.7) all 
pieces of information created during the non-Hteral analysis are accessible through 
the interpretation part of the data type. 
Since the implementation of interfaces based on the abstract data type presented 
was not one of the objectives of this undertaking, no such interface exists. An 
implementation would have meant that a considerable amount of work in various 
parts of the system's code would have had to take place, improving other parts 
w i t h no immediate benefit to the figurative sub-system apart f rom the further 
proof of its feasibility and functionality. A l l the information that wi l l be bundled 
into the abstract data type 'metaphor' already exists and can be accessed by other 
means (see also Sect. 6.3), yet the design of the abstract data type 'metaphor' 
anticipated the requirements of poHshed and refined appHcations wi th respect to 
the information handled by the non-literal analysis. 
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